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Abstract
This thesis seeks to describe aspects of Edmund Burke's political ideas, and to 
show that these ideas were presented as an alternative to the political ideas of 
John Locke. The dissertation is composed of two parts: the first outlines the 
historical context in which Burke's political ideas were set; the second studies 
Burke's own political concepts in opposition to those of Locke.
The first part of the dissertation is a detailed review and study of a large 
number of political writings from Burke's time, particularly (but not solely) 
from the decade after the outbreak of the revolution in France. This study 
presents the intellectual context of Burke's ideas, and shows these to have 
been widely perceived by contemporaries (both those opposing and 
supporting his views) as set against John Locke's political ideas.
The second part of the dissertation looks at Burke's own work. It charts all of 
Burke's known references to Locke or his works, and shows that all of those 
which relate to the latter's political ideas, were critical. It demonstrates that on 
top of various scattered cases, at least twice, in an important draft composed 
in 1782 and in a weighty memorandum of 1793, Burke decidedly and 
comprehensively challenged Locke's fundamental political principles, and 
pronounced them to be deficient and dangerous. It points out that Burke 
identified the source for the danger posed to political systems by Lockean 
ideas in their introduction of narrow judicial reasoning into political 
considerations. It proceeds to present the central themes of Burke's political 
theory, showing these to contrast (sometimes explicitly so) with Lockean 
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On annotations, quotes and short titles
The m ethod for annotations and quotes:
For modem texts, the full details are provided in the footnotes at the time of 
first appearance; subsequently, a shortened version appears, consisting of the 
surname of the author and one or more words from the title.
For pre-20* century texts, the same principles apply, with the following 
exceptions: in cases of famous works or of very long titles, only the first 
sentence appears; when the author's name did not appear on the original 
work or is only presumed, it is put within square brackets; if the author is 
unknown he is termed Anonymous within square brackets.
The edition of all texts is the first, unless otherwise stated.
The place of publication for all texts is London, unless otherwise stated.
In quotes all italic or bold lettering, all punctuation, spelling and capitals, are 
as in the original. Additions are explicitly noted by the use of square brackets. 
Quotes and references to Locke's Two treatises are by section (appearing as 
sec.) instead of page. The m odem  edition used for this text is the one edited 
by P. Laslett, for the "Cambridge texts in the history of political thought" 
series (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988).
The short titles for frequently mentioned works:
COR -  T.W. Copeland (general editor), The correspondence of Edmund Burke 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967-1978), 10 volumes.
CST -  W. Cobbett and T.J. Howell (editors), Complete collection of state trials 
and proceedings for high treason and other crimes and misdemeanors from the earliest 
period to the present time (1809-1828), 33 volumes.
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OED -  J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner (eds.), The Oxford English dictionary - 
second edition (Oxford, Clarendon, 1998), 20 volumes.
PH -  W. Cobbett and J. Wright (eds.), The parliamentary history of England, from 
the earliest period to the year 1803. From which last-mentioned epoch it is continued 
downwards in the work entitled, "The parliamentary debates" (1806-1820), 36 
volumes.
PW -  G. Claeys (ed.), Political writings of the 1790s (William Pickering, 1995), 8 
volumes.
ST -  John Locke, "The second treatise of government, an essay concerning the 
true original, extent, and end of civil government" in Two treatises of 
government (1690).
WS -  P. Langford (general editor) The writings and speeches of Edmund Burke 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1981-), 10 volumes (vols. IV and X yet to appear).
The short titles for texts by Edmund Burke:
Abridgment -  "An essay towards an abridgment of the English history" (c. 
1757) WS vol. I pp. 332-552.
Address -  "Address to the King" (1777) WS vol. HI pp. 258-276.
Appeal -  "An appeal from the new to the old Whigs" (1791) in William King 
and French Laurence (eds.), The works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke 
(1792-1827) vol. VI pp. 73-267.
Assembly -  "Letter to a member of the National Assembly" (1791) WS vol.
Vin pp. 294-335.
Conciliation -  "Speech on conciliation with America" (1775) WS vol. Ill pp. 
102-169.
Discontents -  "Thoughts on the cause of the present discontents" (1770) WS 
vol. II pp. 241-323.
Duration -  "Speech on a bill for shortening the duration of parliaments"
(1780) WS vol. m  pp. 588-602.
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Education -  "On education" (c. 1776) WS vol. Ill pp. 242-246.
Elliot -  "Letter to William Elliot" (1795) WS vol. IX pp. 29-45.
Eitzwilliam  -  "Letter to the Earl Fitzwilliam" (1795) [a.k.a. "Fourth letter on a 
regicide peace"] WS vol. IX pp. 44-119.
Impeachment -  "Speech on opening of impeachment" [of Warren Hastings] 
(section of 16 February 1788) WS vol. VI pp. 313-373.
Langrishe -  "Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe" (1792) WS vol. IX pp. 594-639. 
Noble -  "Letter to a noble Lord" (1796) WS vol. IX pp. 145-186.
Observations -  "Observations on the conduct of the minority" (1793) WS vol. 
VIII pp. 402-452.
Popery -  "Tracts relating to the Popery laws" (1765) WS vol. IX pp. 434-481. 
Quebec -  "Speeches on the Quebec government bill" (1791) in The speeches of 
the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (1816) Vol. IV pp. 1-38.
Reflections -  "Reflections on the revolution in France" (1790) in C.C. O'Brien 
(ed.), Edmund Burke, Reflections on the revolution in France (Penguin, 1986). 
Regicide I -  "First letter on a regicide peace" (1796) WS vol. IX pp. 187-264. 
Regicide II -  "Second letter on a regicide peace" (1796) WS vol. IX, pp. 264- 
296.
Regicide III -  "Third letter on a regicide peace" (1797) WS vol. IX pp. 296-386. 
Religious -  "Speech on a motion for leave to bring in a bill to repeal and alter 
certain acts respecting religious opinions" (1792) in William King and French 
Laurence (eds.), The works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (1792-1827) 
vol. X pp. 41-62
Remarks -  "Remarks on the policy of the allies" (1793) WS vol. VCH pp. 492- 
496.
Representation -  "Speech on a motion made in the House of Commons, the 
7th of May 1782 for a committee to inquire into the state of the representation 
of the commons in parliament" (1782), in William King and French Laurence
6
(eds.), The works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (1792-1827) vol. X pp. 
92-108.
Sheriffs -  "Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol" (1777) WS vol. El pp. 288-330. 
Sublime -  "A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime 
and beautiful" (1757) WS vol. I pp. 185-320.
Vindication -  "A vindication of natural society" (1756) WS vol. I pp. 129-184.
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Introduction
This study will examine the relationship between the political ideas of 
Edmund Burke and those of John Locke. More specifically, it will attempt to 
verify the proposition that Burke's political ideas can be understood as a 
deliberate attempt on his part to offer an alternative to Locke's political ideas. 
I will carry out this examination in two stages. The first stage will look into 
the perception of Locke's and Burke's political ideas in the historical context 
of Burke's time. The second stage will consist in a close reading of Burke's 
writings, in order to find out his attitude to Locke's ideas, and how he placed 
his own in relation to them.
In order to examine the historical context of Burke's political ideas and 
particularly their relation to the way Locke's ideas were discussed, I have 
chosen to focus the first part of this research on the 1790s controversy in 
Britain, concerning the revolution in France. This choice has three main 
reasons. The first is that since a complete review of the historical context of 
political ideas during the whole of Burke's public career (spanning more than 
40 years) would be outside the scope of this dissertation, a shorter period and 
a more constrained field of ideas have to be selected. As a specific segment of 
public discourse on political principles, the revolution controversy is 
particularly valuable, having evinced the most significant -  in terms of both 
volume and content -  public output of publications on political ideas in 18th 
century Britain. Furthermore, in relation to at least two of the principal issues 
with which the revolution controversy was preoccupied -  the meaning of the 
constitutional precedent set in 1688 and the relation of British liberty to the
8
French principles -  Locke's ideas were regarded by many participants as 
crucial.1
The second reason is that Burke's interventions very much shaped the 
themes and emphases of the debate. No other writer against the French 
revolution evinced so many responses (both negative and positive), so that 
many of the writings that this debate stimulated, directly or indirectly 
touched on Burke's ideas. The extent of this impact was reflected in the 
observations of many of Burke's opponents, such as Thomas Christie, who in
1791 expressed dismay at seeing a man of Burke's talents and experience, "a 
politician and a philosopher", a "master in Israel", mistaking so much the ideas 
of the French revolution; and Francis Plowden, who wrote in 1794 that 
posterity will scarcely believe how "at the close of the 18th century, the 
condemnation of Burke and of his book upon the Revolution of France, and of 
its principles, became in the eyes of the British Nation the test of turbulence, 
faction and sedition".2
The third reason is that the nature of the revolutionary debate, and Burke's 
place in it, occasioned his greatest output in terms of both quantity and 
quality. His works from this time present Burke's ideas at their most mature, 
and many of them treated at length issues pertaining to the principles of 
political society, (including the inheritance of Locke's and Lockean political 
ideas).
My study of Locke's and Burke's ideas and of their historical context, has 
profited from developments in scholarship of recent years. Research on the 
literature of the revolution controversy is still far from complete, but it has
1 The principal issues of the controversy are discussed in G. Claeys' "Introduction" PW vol. I 
pp. xxiv-xxv.
2 Thomas Christie, Letters on the revolution of France (1791) PW vol. I p. 179 - quoting John, 3:10; 
Francis Plowden, A short history of the British empire during the last twenty months viz. from May
1792 to the close of the year 1793 (1794) pp. 45-46. Burke's role in the controversy is discussed in 
J.C.D. Clark (ed.), Edmund Burke, Reflections on the revolution in France -  a critical edition 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2001) p. 97.
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witnessed significant progress in the last two decades. Deserving special note 
is the growing scholarly attention to the loyalist publications of the revolution 
debate, which had been relatively neglected in the past, and the recent studies 
of the periodical and fictional output of the period, which have considerably 
widened the previously known scope of means and places in which the 
debate of the 1790s was carried out.3
In the last decades a great change has also occurred in the way scholarship 
views the ideas of John Locke and of Edmund Burke. A reappraisal of Locke's 
ideas and of the way he was regarded in his own days and throughout the 
18th century has occurred. His political thought is now known to have been 
reputed in his own days, as quite radical in content and import; his moderate 
image having been built after his death, mainly around the eminence of his 
An essay concerning humane understanding (1690). In Burke's case, the 
conventional view which regarded him as a conscious follower of Locke has 
been undermined for some time -  although claims to an affinity between 
some of Burke's and Locke's ideas persist, far more modest in scope and 
clearly in the minority. In the case of both Locke and Burke, it appears that 
scholarship has traveled to a great degree full circle, coming close to the way 
they were regarded in their own time.
However, I will argue that the separate developments in scholarship have not 
yet been integrated into an adequate picture of the relations between the 
political ideas of these two thinkers. Such an integration will be attempted by 
looking at the way Burke's contemporaries viewed the relations between the
3 For example J.J. Sack, From Jacobite to conservative (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1993); J. Dinwiddy "Interpretations of anti-jacobinism" in M. Philp (ed.), The French revolution 
and British popular politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. 38-49; D. 
Eastwood, "Patriotism and the English state in the 1790s" in Philp French pp. 146-168; T.P. 
Schofield, "Conservative political thought in Britain in response to the French revolution" in 
The Historical Journal 29 (1986) pp. 601-622; J. Mori "Languages of loyalism: patriotism, 
nationhood and the state in the 1790s" in English Historical Review 118 (2003) pp. 33-58; E.L. de 
Montluzin, The anti-Jacobins 1798-1800 (Macmillan, 1988); M.O. Grenby, The anti-Jacobin novel 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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ideas of the two, at Burke's treatment of Locke's ideas, and at Burke's own 
political thought -  with a special emphasis on the issue of sovereignty.
The original contributions to knowledge in this research concern the political 
ideas of Burke, and their relationship to the ideas and the intellectual legacy 
of Locke. In particular I propose that Burke's ideas were viewed by his 
contemporaries to be evidently anti-Lockean in import, and that my detailed 
study of his political thought shows this view to be a correct assessment of his 
position. This proposition goes against those views in scholarship which 
downplay the importance of Locke and his ideas in the political discourse of 
late 18th century Britain, and which assign to anti-Lockeanism a peripheral 
place in Burke's thought, if at all.
In the first part of this dissertation, treating the historical context by way of a 
close examination of the pamphlet literature of the 1790s, I propose a re­
assessment of the meaning and import of the political ideas it treated in a 
number of areas. Though my study confirms the preponderance of those 
identifying themselves with the Anglican Church among writers of loyalist 
views, I challenge the too close identification of those views with the High 
Tory outlook, as presented in scholarship, especially by J.A.W. Gunn. Instead, 
I propose that there was a wide variety of Anglican political attitudes 
represented in the pamphlet literature with an important part of it explicitly 
identifying itself with Burke and his ideas.4 However, the most significant 
contribution to scholarship in this part of my study concerns the importance 
assigned to Locke's ideas in the pamphlet literature of the 1790s. I challenge 
the position that minimizes the importance of Locke's ideas in the debate, 
advocated prominently by G. Claeys, whose eight-volume Political writings of 
the 1790s, is the main scholarly collection and introduction to the subject. I 
contest both Claeys' explicit claim to this effect, and its implicit expression in
4 J.A.W. Gunn, Beyond liberty and property (Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983) 
pp. 174-179.
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the under-representation of material treating Locke and his ideas in the 
selection. I also point to methodological problems in Claeys7 selection and 
interpretation, in the choice of texts and in his introduction's unsatisfactory 
treatment of the impression created by this choice.5 My research shows that 
far from Locke and his ideas being of secondary importance in the political 
debate of the 1790s, much of it -  particularly so among more prominent and 
influential writers -  was couched in Lockean issues and terms, with many 
explicit references to Locke and his works. Moreover, I show that all 
important radical pamphlets, and many of the more significant loyalist ones, 
presented Burke's ideas as fundamentally antagonistic to Lockean political 
concepts, often explicitly mentioning Locke. This last conclusion refutes the 
claim by scholars like E.L. de Montluzin that most 1790s conservative writers 
agreed with many of John Locke's ideas, and presents support to the view 
that most conservative writers were adverse to Locke's ideas -  a view that I. 
Kramnick has articulated, but to which he has offered only the weakest 
factual proofs.6
In the second part of the dissertation, dealing directly with Burke's political 
ideas, my main contribution to scholarship is the conclusion that the anti- 
Lockean import contemporaries pointed to was a central and conscious 
component of his thought. I dispute both the views of scholars like A.
Cobban, B.T. Wilkins and F.A. Dreyer, who describe Burke as some kind of 
Lockean, and of those like F. O'Gorman, J. Conniff and J.C.D. Clark, who 
propose a more moderate view of Burke's debt to Locke, claiming Burke 
adopted some aspects of Locke's theory which he developed in synthesis with
5 G. Claeys (ed.), Political writings of the 1790s (William Pickering, 1995), 8 volumes. See 
especially "Introduction" in vol.I pp. xvii-lx. See also G. Claeys, "The French revolution 
debate and British political thought" in History of Political Thought 11 (1990) pp. 59-80.
6 Montluzin Anti-Jacobins pp. 44-46 and notes; I. Kramnick, "Republican revisionism  
revisited" in The American Historical Review 87 (1982) pp. .650-652.
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other ideas.71 also disagree with the position of scholars like F. Canavan, J.L. 
Pappin III and J.G.A. Pocock, who, while accepting a conflict between Burke's 
and Lockean (usually they treat a wider radical political discourse and not 
specifically John Locke's) political ideas, downplay its significance to Burke's 
thought, and (except for Pocock) regard it mainly as a side effect of his debt to 
the medieval natural law tradition.8 My contribution in this respect is also 
methodological, since none of the above scholars attempted a substantial and 
detailed treatment of the relations between the political ideas of Burke and 
those of Locke, which is exactly what my research sets out to do. I make a 
complete and detailed review of all recorded cases in which Burke explicitly 
treated Locke. In addition, I present many cases from Burke's writings where 
he treated ideas that are obviously Lockean. Moreover, I propose that a 
number of Burke's more important works, particularly the Reflections and the 
Appeal were to a great measure attacks on the most fundamental assumptions 
of Lockean political theory. I show the Appeal as a sustained and 
comprehensive refutation of the ideas of British proponents of "natural 
rights" political ideas, which was not only anti-Lockean but also attacked 
problematic aspects of John Locke's political theory. In addition, I concentrate 
on two cases where I argue that Burke was clearly and comprehensively 
censuring political ideas that were explicitly attributed to Locke. These are the 
Representation (1782) and the Observations (1793). Both texts addressed
7 A. Cobban, Edmund Burke and the revolt against the eighteenth century (George Allen & Unwin, 
1929 -  reprint by AMS, 1978) p. 55; B.T. Wilkins, The problem of Burke's political philosophy 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1967) pp. 19, 23; F.A. Dreyer, Burke's politics, a study in Whig orthodoxy 
(Waterloo, Ontario, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979) pp. 5, 68-69, 81-84; F. O'Gorman, 
Edmund Burke, his political philosophy (George Allen & Unwin, 1973) pp. 15-17, 63; J. Conniff, 
The useful cobbler: Edmund Burke and the politics of progress (New-York, State University of New  
York Press, 1994), pp.10-11,50-51; Clark Reflections pp. 37-38, 86-87;
8 F.P. Canavan, The political reason of Edmund Burke (Durham N. C., Duke University Press, 
1960) pp. 205, 88-89; J.L. Pappin III, "Edmund Burke's philosophy of rights" in I. Crowe (ed.), 
The enduring Edmund Burke (Wilmington, Delaware, Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1997) pp. 
115-127; J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, commerce and history (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1985) pp. 65,167-169.
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parliamentary debates in which the Lockean principles to which Burke was 
objecting had been raised by some participants explicitly in Locke's name, 
and thus could not have been understood by contemporaries but as direct 
challenges and denials of the principles of the one in whose name they were 
being invoked. Both of these texts have already been treated by scholarship 
(particularly so the Representation, by Pocock), but not for their significant 
implications for Burke's anti-Lockeanism, to which I draw attention.91 give 
further support to my position by exploring four central themes of Burke's 
political thought. Proceeding from them to describe his view of the 
components and function of political society, I show these to consist in a 
refutation of Locke's basic political premises. Particular attention is given to 
Burke's treatment of property in his political thought, showing that far from 
accepting Locke's view of it as the reason for the existence of government, as 
claimed by scholars like Canavan, F.P. Lock and J.R. Dinwiddy, he held an 
opposite position. He regarded property as a tool for the preservation of 
government to whose existence it is subordinate.10 Finally I proceed to 
examine Burke's idea of political sovereignty, a subject which has been 
unsatisfactorily treated in recent scholarship. I disagree with the work of 
O'Gorman, Conniff, Dreyer, Pocock, H.T. Dickinson, L. Strauss and P. Stanlis, 
which labels Burke's ideas on the subject as conventional or undecided. Even 
in cases when scholars point to these ideas as having greater merit, they 
nevertheless refrain from giving them sufficient treatment and explication.111
9 See J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, language and time (Methuen, 1972) pp. 227-229.
10 F.P. Lock, Burke's Reflections on the revolution in France, (George Allen & Unwin, 1985) pp. 80- 
81; J.R. Dinwiddy, "James Mill on Burke's doctrine of prescription" in J.R. Dinwiddy, 
Radicalism and reform in Britain (Hambledon, 1992) p. 263; and F. Canavan, The political 
economy of Edmund Burke (New-York, Fordham University Press, 1995) pp. 70-71.
11 O'Gorman Burke p. 17; Dickinson Liberty p. 215; Conniff Useful pp. 272-273; Dreyer Burke's 
pp. 51-53; L. Strauss, Natural right and history (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953) pp. 
299-300; P. Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the natural law (Ann Arbor, Mich., University of 
Michigan Press, 1965) pp. 214,245; Pocock Virtue p. 94; J.G.A. Pocock, The ancient constitution 
and the feudal law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987 reissue) pp. 170-175.
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show that Burke did have a clear and unusual idea of political sovereignty, 
which held an important place within his political thought. My consideration 
of this subject includes a treatment of Burke's understanding and use of the 
term contract (or compact), showing it to have been coherent and anti- 
Lockean, contrary to claims by scholars like Dreyer, Dickinson and Clark, that 
he either used the term like Locke or was inconsistent in its use.12
12 Dreyer Burke's pp. 68-70; Dickinson Liberty p. 291; Clark Reflections pp. 86-87.
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Part I -  Burke and the Lockean inheritance in historical context
1. Overview -  the writers and their writings
In the decade following the 1789 outbreak of revolution in France, England 
saw a flood of publications dealing with the implications of French events on 
British political institutions and ideas. Immediately following its publication 
in November 1790, Burke's Reflections on the revolution in France became the 
most significant text of the developing debate, and a large part of publications 
subsequently devoted to the subject addressed, to one degree or another, his 
political ideas. By the spring of 1791, about fifty replies to the Reflections had 
been published, but pamphlets favorable to Burke and his ideas had also 
started to appear, eventually outnumbering the negative ones. The number of 
tracts treating the revolution and its repercussions soon numbered in the 
hundreds, many of them addressing issues that were not directly connected to 
the controversy around Burke's ideas. The general trend of opinions 
expressed in publications concerned with the revolution mirrored that 
surrounding the Reflections. The publications favorable to the revolution were 
at first in the clear majority, but were gradually overtaken by those opposing 
it, with the latter texts eventually outnumbering the favorable ones by about 3 
to 1, and the total number of publications reaching into the thousands. Even 
more impressive was the extent of distribution and readership. Although the 
number of editions did not necessarily reflect real circulation or success, 
nevertheless some of the more popular pamphlets indisputably achieved 
circulations unheard of in England up to that time. Burke's Reflections 
eventually sold about 50,000 copies; Thomas Paine's Rights of man, published 
in two parts in 1791 and 1792, reached several hundred thousand copies; John 
Gifford's Address to members of loyal associations (1792), apparently sold some
16
100,000 copies; and Hannah More's Cheap repository tracts (1795-1797) a series 
of low-priced loyalist political dialogues directed at popular audiences, sold 
more than two million copies.13
Throughout the 1790s, but particularly in the tense years 1791-1793, the 
pamphlet war reflected the uncertainty about the future shape of the state, in 
a great debate about political principles. Radicals repeatedly attempted to 
disclaim the accusation against them that, because of their support of the 
French revolution, they entertained notions of overthrowing the British 
government by similarly violent means. Mirroring the intensity of the debate 
were the explicitly millennial tones of many texts. These were to be found 
among radicals like Catherine Macaulay, who in her anonymously published 
Observations on the Reflections of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke (1790) asserted 
that the French revolution was in fact the new "millennium", which some 
passages in the New Testament Revelations presaged; and among loyalists like 
William Sewell who in his anonymously published A  rejoinder to Mr. Paine's
13 As to pamphlets which directly concerned themselves with Burke's attacks on the French 
revolution, S. Andrews identifies 65 such texts in the 1790s, but P.J. Stanlis puts the minimum 
at 90, and is in my estimate closer to the mark. See S. Andrews Periodical p. 27, and P. J.
Stanlis, "Review of The language of politics in the age of Wilkes and Burke by James T. 
Boulton" in The Burke Newsletter 5 (combined issue Spring-Summer 1964) p. 343.
For the numbers of publications which took part in the wider revolutionary debate, see the 
discussion by Claeys PW vol. I pp. xxviii-xxxi; M. Butler (ed.) Burke; Paine, Godwin and the 
revolution controversy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 179-180. Sir Leslie 
Stephen, The dictionary of national biography (1885-1903) vol. XXI p. 1184.
It appears that the publication of novels partly or wholly devoted to treating revolutionary 
ideas and images followed a pattern similar to that of the pamphlets, with radical-leaning 
novels at first the majority, but being eventually greatly outnumbered by loyalist output. See 
Grenby Anti-Jacobin pp. 2-3.
As to problematic aspects of the number of editions see for example the postscript to John 
Gifford's A letter to the Hon. Thomas Erskine (1797), where revealed his work was styled 
"Eleventh" (actually being only the second) edition, as an ironic comment on the vast 
numbers of editions that "democratic" publications were claiming -  such as Thomas 
Erskine's view of the causes and consequences of the present war with France (1797) which  
purported to be the 9th edition (and eventually claimed to have reached 48 editions) -  a 
number apparently achieved by minuscule numbers of copies in each print. See in Gifford 
Erskine note on p. 2, and postscript pp. 173,179-180. But S. Andrews' The British periodical press . 
and the French revolution, 1789-99 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave, 2000) p.
215, seems to accept the number of editions as evidence of Erskine's pamphlet's success.
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pamphlet, entitled, Rights of man (1791), expressed his hope that the visible 
"infernal Purposes of the Powers of Darkness" will be defeated, and thus a 
contribution will be made to accelerate the coming of the epoch "when the 
Shechinah shall descend to tabernacle with men".14
The year 1792 marked the high tide of radical publications, after which the 
increasingly bloody turn of the French revolution, a growing anti­
revolutionary reaction in Britain (actively supported by the government), and 
the outbreak of war with France in February 1793, caused many supporters of 
the revolution to fall silent, while the publication and distribution of radical 
texts became gradually harder. Renewed energy was temporarily infused into 
the radical camp in 1794 by the failure of the prosecution for treason of a 
number of prominent radicals, and the unpopularity of the war with France. 
By 1795 continuing public hostility combined with government provisions 
which greatly widened the scope of what might be legally construed as 
seditious activity, brought radical activities into terminal decline, with 
publications virtually stopping and the radical societies gradually petering 
out. In the following years some supporters of revolution ceased to be 
politically active (among them Thomas Hardy, James Parkinson, and -  for 
many years -  John Thelwall), others recanted of their views (among them 
James Mackintosh, Daniel Stuart, Henry Redhead Yorke and David Williams), 
while tens of thousands eventually emigrated to America (including such 
prominent figures as Joseph Priestley and Thomas Cooper). As a result, the 
radical argument in British politics was decisively diminished for more than 
two decades.15
14 Claeys "Introduction" PW vol. I pp. xviii, xlii. [Catherine Macaulay], Observations on the 
Reflections of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, on the revolution in France, in a letter to the Right Hon. 
Earl of Stanhope (1790) PW vol. I p. 127. [William Sewell], A rejoinder to Mr. Paine's pamphlet, 
entitled, Rights of man; or an answer to Mr. Burke's attack on the French revolution (1791) p. 135.
15 M. Philp, "The fragmented ideology of reform" in Philp French pp. 61-64; Butler Burke pp. 9- 
11; PW vol. I pp. xliv-xlvii, li. The pamphlet debate about the revolution actually began with 
Richard Price's A discourse on the love of our country (1789), which had provoked 21 responses
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As befits a body of literature that is by nature controversialist, there is ample 
evidence of writers being acquainted with other texts, their arguments and 
authors. Often tracts were intentionally devised, in both structure and 
reasoning, to address other published texts; many were explicitly titled as a 
response or as a support, to some particular other pamphlet. Burke and Paine 
are examples of this approach, with the latter's two-part Rights of man, an 
admitted reaction to the writings of the first -  the early part to the Reflections, 
the later part to the Appeal from the new to the old Whigs (itself bearing Burke's 
1791 retort to a number of Paine's arguments in the first part of Rights of man). 
Indeed, in some cases, texts by writers such as William Paley, Hannah More 
and Thomas Green, directly attested in their pamphlets that the public 
commotion caused by other tracts (chiefly Paine's and Burke's), had been a 
major reason for their authors' composing them, and engaging in the debate.16 
This pattern was certainly not confined to some texts only, but was a trait 
prominent in writings of this period. Among writers on the radical side,
James Mackintosh's Vindiciae Gallicae, for instance, while explicitly directed 
against Burke, also referred scathingly to the works of Samuel Cooper and
by the time the Reflections appeared. But Burke's pamphlet undoubtedly raised the intensity 
of the debate and shaped its terms. See also "Introduction" in Clark Reflections p. 63.
16 See for example pp. 158-159 of Thomas Paine, Rights of man, (1791-1792, published in two 
parts) in B. Kuklick (ed.) Thomas Paine, political writings (Cambridge, 1989) pp. 57-263. For the 
public perception of the controversy see in dialogues anonymously published and intended 
for popular readership, such as William Paley7s Equality, as consistent with the British 
constitution, in a dialogue between a master-manufacturer and one of his workmen (1792) PW vol.
VII p. 227, where the character of the master-manufacturer (whose views are vindicated in the 
dialogue), claims "I own, Mr. Paine's book made so much noise, that, from curiosity, I have 
read it, and I find nothing in it to make me alter my conduct"; and More's Village politics. 
Addressed to all the mechanics, journeymen, and day labourers in Great Britain (1794, 4th edition)
PW vol. VIII p. 4, where a bricklayer is described as claiming to have read Paine's Rights of 
man. Another example is Thomas Green's anonymously published Slight observations upon 
Paine's pamphlet, principally respecting his comparison of the French and English constitutions; with 
other incidental remarks, in three letters from a gentleman in London to a friend in the country (1791) 
PW vol. V p. 214, which describes how Burke's book and Paine's response were the talk of his 
coffee house.
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Edward Tatham -  two of Burke's most intellectually substantial defenders.17 
Daniel Stuart too, in his Peace and reform, while explicitly singling out for 
censure Arthur Young's The example of France, a warning to Britain, as 
representative of a tide of extreme Tory opinion sweeping British public 
discourse, also attacked the ideas of among others Burke, John Reeves and 
Judge William Henry Ashhurst. George Rous added to later editions of his 
Thoughts on government a postscript attempting to refute the claims raised 
against him in Thomas Gould's anonymously published Vindication of the Rt 
Hon Edmund Burke's Reflections.18 On the loyalist side of the debate too an 
awareness of the wider dispute was displayed. Some texts were devoted to 
defending other loyalist pamphlets -  primarily those of Burke, Tatham and 
Ashhurst -  from attacks by radical writings. A typical example was the 
anonymous Three warnings to John Bull before he dies (possibly attributable to 
Hester Thrale Piozzi), which commended a number of loyalist tracts, 
including Richard Watson's An address to the people of Great Britain, Ashhurst's 
Charge, and Young's Example -  regretting the fact that 2500 copies of the latter
17 James Mackintosh, Vindiciae Gallicae. Defence of the French revolution and its English admirers, 
against the accusations of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke; including some strictures on the late 
production ofMons. de Calonne (1791,3rd edition) PW vol. I p. 385 describes the two as the only 
kind of "literary advocates of the most miserable description", that are currently left to 
defend what he calls "Priestcraft and Toryism". Tatham the target for many others, including 
the anonymous author (apparently a dissenter, using terms such as "priest-craft" and "true 
church") which in The political crisis: or, a dissertation on the rights of man (1791) PW vol. Ill pp. 
111-112 put Tatham on a par with Burke, describing them as the two greatest "gladiators" of 
the age. For the reactions in the periodicals to the pamphlets by Samuel Cooper and Tatham, 
see Andrews British pp. 28-30.
18 Daniel Stuart's Peace and reform against war and corruption in answer to a pamphlet written by 
Arthur Young, esq. entitled 'The example of France, a warning to Britain' (1794) PW vol. IV pp. 285- 
289. Other attacks on Ashhurst's famous Charge include William Hughes' Justice to a judge. An 
answer to the judge's appeal to justice, in proof of the blessings enjoyed by British subjects (1793, 2nd 
edition) PW vol. IV pp. 1-11; the anonymous More reasons for a reform in parliament (1793) PW 
vol. IV pp. 49-56; and Jeremy Bentham's Truth versus Ashhurst (written in 1792 but published 
only decades later). See also the postscript to George Rous' Thoughts on government: occasioned 
by Mr. Burke's Reflections (1791,4th edition) PW vol. II pp. 2-29.
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remained unsold, while Paine's tract was widely disseminated.19 Many other 
loyalist texts were aimed mainly at attacking radical pamphlets and their 
authors. Richard Price's and Joseph Priestley's texts, stand out after Paine's as 
the radical tracts most attacked; but the list includes many other writers, 
among them Rous, Capel Lofft, Thomas Christie and Benjamin Bousfield.20 
But the two most outstanding examples of loyalist attempts at a wide-ranging 
attack against radical tracts are certainly Young's Example and Gould's 
Vindication. Young attacked, among others, the ideas of Paine, Christie, 
Priestley, Mackintosh, Yorke and William Godwin, and in later editions 
devoted special attention to rejecting the criticism raised against his pamphlet 
in Stuart's Peace. Gould's text was a direct attempt to rebut all main objections 
to the Reflections, and it supplied a detailed (if somewhat pedantic) criticism of 
what were regarded by him as the ten most prominent among the radical
19 Among the many defenses of Burke are Samuel Cooper's The first principles of civil and 
ecclesiastical government, delineated (in two parts) in letters to Dr. Priestley, occasioned by his to Mr. 
Burke (1791); Edward Tatham's Letters to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke on politics (1791); 
and [Frederick William Hervey], A new friend on an old subject (1791) PW vol. V pp. 66-78. 
Tatham was defended by [William Atkinson? -  attribution uncertain], A concise sketch of the 
intended revolution in England; with a few hints on the obvious methods to avert it (1794) PW vol. 
Vm p. 191. Ashhurst was defended by Thomas Lionel Freeman's An address to the disaffected 
subjects of George the third, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, & c. King, Defender of the faith, &c. 
&c. (1793) PW vol. VII pp. 363; and by the anonymously authored A bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush, or a dialogue between John Frankly and George Careful, both members of the same 
club (1792) PW vol. VB pp. 289. See also [Hester Thrale Piozzi? - attribution uncertain], Three 
warnings to John Bull before he dies. By an old acquaintance of the public (1798) PW vol. VIII pp. 
273-274.
20 Against Price see [Atkinson?] Concise pp. 188-189, and Charles Hawtrey, Various opinions of 
the philosophical reformers considered; particularly Pain's [sic] Rights of man (1792) PW vol. VI p. 
66, where he claimed that Price's opinions about the rights acquired by the English in 1688 
were the opposite of Paine's about past people or parliaments not being able to bind the 
present. Against Priestley see Arthur Young, The example of France a warning to Britain (1794, 
4th edition) PW vol. VIII p. 69; Tatham Letters p. 10, and [Atkinson?] Concise p. 191 who 
criticized Priestley's attacks on Burke, while upholding Tatham's defense of him. Against 
Lofft, see Tatham Letters pp. 93-94. Against Christie, see Young Example pp. 62-63. Against 
Rous see [Anonymous], Cursory remarks on Dr. Priestley's letters to Mr. Burke, and strictures on 
Mr. Paine's Rights of man (1791) PW vol. V pp. 118-119. Against Bousfield see [Anonymous], A 
brief reply to the observations of Ben. Bousfield, esq., on Mr. Burke's pamphlet respecting the 
revolution in France (1791) PW vol. VII pp. 43-60.
21
pamphlets directed against Burke's text.21 Illustration of the intensity with 
which arguments were approached within the debate is offered by the many 
examples of very specific side controversies carried on -  often vehemently -  
between pamphlets, over various minor matters of fact or opinion that had 
been stated in some text.22
The vast extent of the literary output (much of it inconsequential) of the 
debate engendered in Britain by the French revolution, and even of only that 
part which can be said to be specifically relevant to the context of Burke's 
writings and ideas of those years makes it necessary to determine what is to
21 Young Example pp. 63, 68-69, 81,152,157-159. For the ten radical pamphlets treated by 
Gould see [Thomas Gould], A vindication of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke's Reflections on 
the revolution in France, in answer to all his opponents (1791) PW vol. VII pp. 61-64 
(Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the rights of men), 64-65 (Williams' Lessons), 65-70 (Scott's 
Letter), 70-71 (Anonymous' Short observations), 71-82 (the "Preface" and "Appendix" added to 
Price's Love of our country after the Reflections published), 82-91 (Towers' "Appendix" added 
to his Thoughts), 91 (Lofft7s Remarks), 91-96 (Rous' Thoughts) 91-101 (Macaulay's Observations) 
101-118 (Priestley's Letters). An added significance to Gould's text is that after its publication 
and because of it, the author -  who at the time of writing did not know Burke and was about 
to return to Ireland (see Gould Vindication pp. 119-120) -  was invited to Beaconsfield. This 
proves that Burke was surely aware of at least the main arguments against him in the 10 
tracts treated by Gould, and that he was pleased with the rebuttals by the latter, to the degree 
that he invited the unknown young Irishman to his house. From Burke's correspondence we 
know he was aware at least since January 1791 of the main arguments in pamphlets by 
Wollstonecraft, Rous, Lofft and Macaulay. See COR vol. VI p. 214 n. 1.
22 An instructive example of this occurrence is offered by Paine's assertion in Rights about the 
degeneracy of the Jews -  as indicative of the eugenic perils in the intermarriage practices rife 
among aristocracies. Soon, Paine's claim about the Jews is found reiterated by another radical 
writer, Thomas Cooper, in his A reply to Mr. Burke's invective; while loyalist texts moved to 
disprove it, with the anonymous Rod in the brine, expressing doubts as to if the Jews' "families 
are more degenerate, than those of other men", and the anonymous Considerations, proposing 
that not merely that Paine's claim was false, but that the truth was exactly opposite to it - 
notwithstanding the many moral and political disadvantages they were subjected to in 
Europe, the Jews seemed to have kept moral qualities of their ancestors, and the success of 
the boxing champion Mendoza showed the same to be true about the physical ones. Thus, in 
this minor controversy at least, the picture commonly drawn as to the attitudes of radicals 
and loyalists towards the Jews is reversed. See Paine Rights p. 100; Thomas Cooper, A reply to 
Mr. Burke's invective against Mr. Cooper and Mr. Watt in the House of Commons, on the 30th of 
April, 1792 (1792, 2nd edition) p. 71; [Anonymous], A rod in the brine, or a tickler for Tom Paine, in 
answer to his first pamphlet, entitled the rights of man. By an Oxford graduate (1792) PW vol. VI p. 
15; [Anonymous], Considerations on Mr. Paine's pamphlet on the Rights of man (Edinburgh, 1791) 
PW vol. V p. 91. For a derogatory attitude towards the Jews among loyalists - thought not in 
relation to Paine's claim - see [William Jones], One penny-worth of truth from Thomas Bull, to his 
brother John (London, 1792) PW vol. VII pp. 285. See also, discussion in Sack Jacobite pp. 40-41.
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be excluded from the material to be studied, rather than what to include in it. 
The exact number of the publications connected to the revolution controversy 
will probably never be known, but it has been estimated at about four 
thousand, comprising pamphlets, books, sermons and broadsheets; of which 
about one quarter were directly related to texts by the two most significant 
participants in this controversy -  Burke and Paine. I have therefore attempted 
to select the more significant and representative ones from among the many 
thousands, eventually examining about 270 texts -  to which I added some 30 
significant texts that preceded the revolution, reviewing in total about 300 
texts.23
The authorship of the texts reviewed here is known in most of the cases, but 
not all. About 100 out of the some 300 tracts inspected were published 
anonymously, for reasons as varied as fear of prosecution for libel or concern 
that a writer's identity might bear on the dismissal of ideas treated (as indeed 
sometimes happened, for instance when the author was identified as a 
woman). In some cases the identity of the author was rapidly recognized (as 
with Burke's Appeal). At other times writers authors publicly acknowledged 
their authorship of texts originally published anonymously (as with Mary 
Wollstonecraft's Rights of men). However, in about a quarter of the texts 
reviewed here, the authorship remains unknown to this day.24
231 have reviewed all of the 127 texts included in the main scholarly collection, Claeys' eight- 
volume Political writings of the 1790s, and about 170 additional texts not in the collection, but 
deemed of importance by contemporaries, by current research or by my estimate. On the 
numbers and nature of the texts, see Claeys' "Introduction" PW vol. I pp. lix-lx, and also 
Claeys "French" pp. 59-80.
24 In a letter to his friend John Douglas, Bishop of Salisbury, Burke described the Appeal as "a 
publication without the Name of the authourjsic], though he makes no secret of his writing". 
See COR vol. VI p. 309. Burke's view of the women authors who held revolutionary views 
was displayed in a letter he wrote to his acquaintance Mrs. Crewe, to whom he expressed the 
hope that "Wives and Mothers of families" such as her, will employ their influence to save 
themselves and their family from the destruction wrought by "...the Mrs Helena Maria 
Williams, and the Mrs Woolstencrofts [sic] &c &c &c &c &c and all that Clan of desperate, 
Wicked, and mischieviously ingenious Women, who have brought, or are likely to bring Ruin 
and shame upon all those that listen to them". See COR vol. VIII p. 304.
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Before turning to the analysis of the said texts, two methodological points 
should be made. Firstly, in order to describe the two contending groupings of 
writers and opinions, those favoring the revolution in France and major 
alterations to the constitutional arrangements in Great Britain, and those 
opposing revolution and constitutional alterations, the terms "radicals" and 
"loyalists" will be employed respectively. This classification corresponds to 
the perception both contemporary and scholarly, that the writings indeed 
reflect two actually contending ideological camps; however these labels 
should not lead to over-simplification of the wide variations in contents and 
style inside of either grouping, or to conceal the fact that some texts really 
cannot be assigned to either camp. Secondly, I have studied a similar number 
of texts from each of the two camps, although, as mentioned above, the actual 
ratio of publications is estimated as leaning preponderantly to the loyalist 
side (by some 3 to 1). The principal reason for this choice is that most of the 
more sophisticated and consequential arguments on both sides were aired 
during the first stages of the debate, when the numbers of publications were 
less unevenly distributed between sides (in fact with radical texts initially 
predominant).25
Almost all of the leading writers supportive of the French revolution and its 
principles during the 1790s can be identified as connected to some degree to 
one of three main groupings that were active in the spread of radical ideas 
associated with the revolution. These groups were differentiated to a great
25 The use of the term "radical" to denote those advocating extreme changes in the political 
system is dated to the late 18th and early 19th century. See OED vol. XIII pp. 91-92; see also 
Clark Reflections p. 375 n. 639. The terms "loyalty" and "loyalist" were widely employed in 
England since the 17th century, to describe adherents of the established political system, with 
a particular attachment to the monarchy. See OED vol. IX pp. 74-75. See also the title of 
[Anonymous], Loyalty necessary to self-preservation; or, an antidote against the baneful influence of 
republican doctrines (1798) PW vol. VHI p. 275. About texts occupying the middle ground 
between loyalist and radical (Claeys terms the latter 'reformer') views, see Claeys' 
"Introduction" PW vol. I p. lix.
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extent, by separate social, organizational, and political characteristics -  
although there existed a measure of overlap between them.26 
The first was a group of politicians who, led by Charles James Fox, coalesced 
during the 1790s around their support for revolution in France and 
parliamentary reform in Britain, into the party that would come to 
monopolize the Whig appellation in the 19th century. In April 1792 many 
among them (but not Fox) formed the radical "Society of Friends of the 
People", accelerating internal divisions that drove the old, "Rockingham", 
Whig party, to split into Foxite and Burkite wings by the end of 1793. With so 
many of them coming from establishment and aristocratic backgrounds, like 
Charles (later Earl) Grey, Thomas Erskine (son of the Earl of Buchan) and Fox 
himself (son of Baron Holland), the Foxites might be termed as establishment 
radicals. Espousing a radical language of natural rights, they professed a 
steadfast loyalty to the British constitution, and put forward political reforms 
that were relatively modest in their scope. Their role in the pamphlet war of 
the 1790s was marginal, as they were active mainly in parliament, authoring 
only a small number of pamphlets, such as A  letter from Earl Stanhope, to the 
Right Honourable Edmund Burke (1790), Erskine's View of 1797, and some 
speeches that were distributed in pamphlet form. By the second half of the 
1790s, the political importance of the Foxites was very much diminished, 
following the final split of the Whigs -  with the majority of their MP's joining 
the Burkeite followers of the Duke of Portland -  no prospect of achieving 
reform or power, and the "Friends" disbanding by late 1793.27 
The second group consisted of a relatively close-knit net of reformers, many 
of them familiar with each other. Members of this group, which might be
26 For a different classification of radical authors see J.T. Boulton, The language of-politics 
(Routledge, 1963) pp. 83-96.
27 Charles Stanhope [Earl Stanhope], A letter from Earl Stanhope, to the Right Honourable Edmund 
Burke: containing a short answer to his late speech on the French revolution (Dublin, 1790, 3rd 
Edition) PW vol. I pp. 1-10; Thomas Erskine, View of the causes and consequences of the present 
war with France (1797, 35th edition).
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termed as moderate radicals, were mostly from a middle-class, professional 
social background, frequently of literary occupation, usually from London, 
often with connections to dissenter churches, and in many cases to the 
"Foxite" Whigs. Several individuals in this group had been at some time 
involved with the activities of the "Society for Constitutional Information" 
(SCI). Set up in 1780 with the aim of producing and distributing written 
material supportive of political reform, the SCI was moribund by the second 
half of the 1780s, but the outbreak of revolution in France (and Burke's attack 
on it in the Reflections) infused it with renewed activity.28 
Straining to be seen as eschewing extremism, the members of this group 
distanced themselves from more controversial figures, like Thomas Paine, 
demanded relatively moderate reforms -  mostly in parliamentary 
representation, and in the church establishment -  and shrank from advocating 
a complete overhaul of the British constitution, by such measures as the 
immediate extension of universal political rights, or the immediate 
disestablishment of the Anglican Church (though many of them supported 
such measures in principle).
A defining characteristic of this group was its connection with the circles of 
protestant dissenters from the established church, and especially with those 
espousing the ideas known as "rational dissent". Although the complete 
identification -  often made by their adversaries -  of those supporting radical 
causes with the dissenters, is not warranted by the facts, the dissenter 
presence among reformers was considerable. The dissenters had had a 
leading organizational and an intellectual role in various public struggles of 
the 1770s and 1780s, like the American conflict and the campaigns for political 
reform - such as the calls for termination of disabilities based on religious 
opinions (the Test Acts) or for the modification of parliamentary
28 About the SCI, the "Friends" and the relationship between the two, see P.A. Brown, The 
French revolution in English history (Frank Cass, 1965 reissue) pp. 53-55.
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representation. Thus, by the outbreak of public debate about the revolution in 
France, a central place was already occupied within the radical outpouring of 
opinions on events by leading dissenters like Joseph Priestley, Joseph Towers, 
David Williams, Capel Lofft, Thomas Cooper and of course Richard Price, 
whose November 1789 speech "On the love of our country", was one of the 
catalysts for Burke's Reflections. Moreover, these prominent dissenters 
performed a decisive role in the social and personal interaction that made 
many of the leading London radicals, into an actual group, and not just a list 
of unconnected writers. A central avenue of dissenter influence and 
acquaintance in radical circles was their prominence in London's publishing 
industry. Most important were Ralph Griffiths owner-editor of the most 
successful periodical of the period, the Monthly Review (appeared 1749-1844), 
and Joseph Johnson, owner-editor of the Analytical Review, (appeared 1788- 
1799, co-edited by Thomas Christie) and publisher of many tracts, among 
them those of Priestley, Wollstonecraft, Christie, Paine, Godwin and Barlow. 
Around Johnson's dinner table, many of these and other radicals met and 
formed the close personal and intellectual acquaintances described. In 
Sheffield Joseph Gales, a Unitarian publisher was at the center of radical 
opinion, with his weekly Sheffield Register and by-weekly Patriot.29 
Testifying to the relatively close-knit character of the moderate radical group 
are the numerous recorded cases of mutual acquaintance. For instance, among 
those personally acquainted with Price, in addition to his closest dissenter 
associates such as Priestley and Towers, there can be found such radical
29 Another example is the New Annual Register, (appeared 1781-1824) was edited by the 
leading dissenter Andrew Kippis, and Godwin for many years wrote the Registers' historical 
section. For discussions by loyalist writers of the influence of dissenter-owned magazines on 
the spread of radical ideas see Tatham Letters p. 96, and [Atkinson?] Concise pp. 188-189. For a 
more general identification of radicalism with the dissenters see Burke's view in COR vol. VI 
pp. 15,125-126, and [Anonymous], An address to the inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland; in 
reply to the principles of the author of the Rights of man (1793) PW vol. VI p. 379. See also Butler 
Burke pp. 6,11.
27
writers as Thomas Christie, Christopher Wyvil, Mary Wollstonecraft and 
Samuel Parr. Often, such intellectual and personal connections were 
evidenced in the texts. Many radical pamphlets were intended (and 
sometimes titled) as a vindication of some other tract, and their texts 
frequently attest to familiarity with persons or writings. One prominent 
example is Sir James Mackintosh, who in his Vindiciae -  regarded by 
contemporaries as the most comprehensive and persuasive moderate attempt 
to rebut Burke's Reflections -  defended Price's words, called George Rous' 
Thoughts excellent, commended the treatment of the new French constitution 
in Christie's Letters, and praised Catherine Macauley's Letter. Additionally 
connected with Mackintosh were writers like his brother-in-law Daniel Stuart, 
Parr who in his Sequel testified to their acquaintance, and most probably 
Christie - since it is evident from the context of Mackintosh's treatment of the 
latter's work, that he had seen it in manuscript, before it was published.30 
Another example of the mutual contacts and connections in this group is 
Christie himself, who in his Letters quoted approvingly from Wollstonecraft's 
Vindication and from Brooke Boothby's Letter, and who expressed his 
expectation for the upcoming publication of the commentary on the judicial 
part of the new French constitution by "the ingenious pen of Mr. Bentham".31 
Another apparent acquaintance of Christie was John Scott, who in his 1791 
Letter reported a conversation he had with a man who had resided in France -  
most probably Christie -  alleging Burke's ignorance of what was actually 
happening in that country.32
30 Mackintosh Vindiciae pp. 293, 332, 339, 341, 369. In a footnote relating to the reorganization 
of the French judicial system, he commended Bentham's Draugth[sic] of a new plan for the 
organisation of the judicial establishment in France (1790), and described it as "profound and 
ingenious, though perhaps occasionally paradoxical" (p. 352). See also Samuel Parr, A Sequel 
to the printed paper lately circulated in Warwickshire by the rev. Chas. Curtis (1792) p. 54.
31 Christie Letters pp. 159,165, 266.
32 [John Scott], A letter to the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, in reply to his 'Reflections on the revolution 
in France &c.' by a member of the revolution society (1791, 3r^  edition) PW vol. II pp. 159.
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The third group of radical writers was markedly more popular in the social 
background of its members, and in the style and intent of their publications. It 
consisted of people from the professional middle class, artisan and sometimes 
even from working class background, usually holding views that were 
markedly more far-reaching, in both political and economic implications, than 
those of the former groups, and thus might be termed extremist radicals. 
Several were members of the controversial London Corresponding Society 
(LCS), created in January 1792, with additional contacts and connections to 
provincial radical groups out of London.33
Particularly worth noting as by far the most active radical center outside 
London was Sheffield, combining a history of public unrest with a large 
radical organization having a strong artisan component, the Sheffield Society 
for Constitutional Information (SSCI), the talents of an active radical 
publisher, Joseph Gales, and an articulate and ambitious leader, Henry 
Redhead Yorke. By 1794 Yorke was addressing both popular mass meetings, 
and selected parties holding readings of commentaries on Locke and 
pamphlets of his own composition. This activity culminated in an open air 
mass meeting of April 1794, which passed a resolution to abandon the 
reformist policy of petitioning parliament, in favor of more direct action. At 
this point the authorities arrested several prominent Sheffield radicals, (Gales 
succeeded in escaping to America), and it turned out that some had turned to 
more drastic avenues of action, arming themselves for future conflict. Yorke 
was apparently not involved in the arms plot, but he handled his own defense
33 H.T. Dickinson, The politics of the people in eighteenth-century Britain (Macmillan, 1994), pp. 
226,237-238. The adoption of the French revolutionary appellation "citizens" on the titles of 
several of the pamphlets and broadsheets published by the LCS, such as Citizens; we are eager 
to address you on the extraordinary occurrences that have recently agitated the nation (1796) and the 
broadsheet Citizens! The critical moment is arrived (1794) cannot have failed to indicate to 
loyalist and radicals alike, what were the aspirations of such a group. There also are 
indications of attempts within the LCS to procure arms in preparation for an insurrection, in 
1794. See J. Mori, Britain in the age of the French revolution, 1785-1820 (Longman, 2000) p. 38.
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at his 1795 trial for conspiracy so disastrously that he was imprisoned in 
Dorchester for close to four years. He eventually married the jail governor's 
daughter, and left the prison an enemy to the revolution (but still a 
Lockean).34
Most writers in this group, while actively identifying with extreme popular 
politics, were of middle class background. However, they were outsiders to 
the mainstream of the capital's Whig circles, for social, economical, 
geographical or ideological reasons -  some were immigrants, others from the 
lower reaches of the middle class, artisans or from the working class, others 
yet were active outside of London, and all were proposing immediate and far- 
reaching political changes in the British constitution. They included Joseph 
Gerrald, Maurice Margarot, John Baxter, Thomas Hardy, Henry Redhead 
Yorke, Benjamin Damm, John Oswald, Thomas Cooper and James Parkinson. 
But probably the most important and prominent among them all was John
34 Brown French pp. 146-147. For Burke's impressions of unrest in Sheffield both before and 
after 1789 see COR vol. VI pp. 312-314 and in the notes. The main facts known about the arms 
plot are that a printer named Richard Davison, employed at the Sheffield Register, had begun 
to prepare arms (he had about 100 pike heads made), with the involvement of two members 
of the SSCI, named Widdison and Moody. Davison also offered to procure weapons for 
radicals in Norfolk and in London (he contacted Hardy) but these approaches did not bear 
fruit. Gales, publisher of the Sheffield Register, seems to have known of Davison's actions, but 
the exact extent of his involvement in his employee's activities has never been discovered. 
Other important English radical centers were Manchester -  whose local Corresponding 
Society sent in 1792 the prominent radical Thomas Cooper (together with James Watt) to meet 
French revolutionaries, an action fiercely attacked (among others by Burke), and eventually 
resulting in Cooper's emigration to America in 1793 -  and Norwich, in which radical groups 
like the "Norwich revolution society", and the "United society, for the purpose of 
parliamentary reform" were active until cowed into inaction by the May 1794 arrest for high 
treason of Isaac Saint, publican of the "Pelican" tavern. Summoned to London for 
interrogation, Saint admitted there to being the secretary of the "United society", and was 
detained for at least two months. What happened to him afterwards is not known. See 
[Anonymous], No Jacobins, no levellers, no pretended friends to peace, no secret lovers of France, no 
wolves is sheep's cloathing [sic], Windham and the constitution forever (1794). In Scotland too there 
was considerable radical activity, up to November 1793 when a "British convention" 
assembled in Edinburgh (with some delegates from England), using French forms (such as 
addressing each other as "citizen") and purporting to prepare for power. On 6 December the 
"convention" was dispersed by the authorities and its leaders arrested. For the provincial 
radical activities see Brown French pp. 55-68,104-106. See also M. Philp, "Introduction" in 
Philp French pp. 5-7 and Andrews British pp. 49-51.
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Thelwall, who for a short time in the mid-1790s combined a powerful intellect 
and the support of some Whig reformers, with a spectacular success in 
reaching mass popular audiences (accordingly, he was member of both the 
Whig Friends Of The People, and the popular LCS).35 
These writers, associating mainly in the LCS, and in similar provincial 
organizations, explicitly praised Paine's ideas and their political 
consequences, and displayed an inflammatory style, wedded to far-reaching, 
sometimes extravagant proposals -  like calls for limitations on individual 
property and for a world-state. By the mid-1790s they had all been driven to 
silence, by trials for sedition (although not in all cases actually imprisoned), 
and the growingly hostile public reaction to their activity. Even Thelwall, who 
in the heyday of his popularity had had many supporters among the more 
radical of Whig politicians, was eventually abandoned by them - when they 
saw fit to distance themselves from his, now less respectable, ideas and 
politics.36
Naturally, there were some writers not easily subsumed in either of the above 
groups, the most important of which was Thomas Paine. Connected by his 
political background from the time of the American conflict to the Whig and
35 Gerrald grew-up in the West-Indies and Pennsylvania before coming to London, Margarot 
was the son of a French importer of wines, Baxter was a silversmith, Hardy was a shoemaker, 
Yorke and Damm were active in Sheffield, Oswald lived in Paris and joined the French 
revolutionary army. Relatively un-typical were Cooper a member of the Manchester 
Constitutional Society, who was a lawyer acquainted with Priestley; and Parkinson, a London 
medical Doctor and son of a Doctor. Thelwall was the son of a silk merchant, but he 
supported himself by writing and later by teaching locution. See Brown French pp. 72-73.
36 Benjamin Damm, An address to the public on true representation and the unity of man [Sheffield, 
1791] pp. 4-5, described Paine as "that universal philantropist" and as "Unanswerable 
P o litic ia n Henry Yorke Thoughts on civil government addressed to the disfranchised citizens of 
Sheffield (1794) PW vol. IV pp. 230 and 241, proposed universal education (including for 
women) and universal suffrage, and called his readers "COMRADES"; the title of John 
Oswald's The government of the people; or, a sketch of a constitution for the universal common-wealth 
(1793) PW vol. IV pp. 95-103, speaks for itself; John Thelwall's Rights of nature against the 
usurpations of establishments, a series of letters to the people, in reply to the false principles of Burke 
(1796) in G. Claeys, The politics of English Jacobinism (Pennsylvania State University Campus, 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) p. 400 attacked the accumulation of capital into the 
hands of a few, which he called "a disease".
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dissenter circles of the first group, and by his social background (he originally 
trained as a staymaker) and writing style to the popular radicalism to the 
second group, he straddled both and belonged to neither. Paine's trajectory in 
the 1790s brought him from being numbered among respected Whig 
reformers (even corresponding with Burke), to being regarded in England as 
epitome of wildest extremism and atheism, with even such an inveterate 
supporter of radical causes as Thomas Erskine eventually joining in the 
prosecution against Paine's Age of reason.
In addition, there were some writers who occupied an intermediate position 
between radicals and loyalists, both in their opinion and in their reputation 
among other writers. One such case was William Paley, who's work won 
praise from both sides of the divide -  from Priestley, Parr and Yorke on the 
radical side (though, it seems, they were all praising Paley's Principles of moral 
and political philosophy (1785) and not his writings after the French revolution) 
and from Tatham and others on the loyalist side.37
Another case was Francis Plowden, whose Jura Anglorum and A  short history of 
the British Empire during the last twenty months, purported to defend the British 
constitution from the two-pronged attack of Paine and Burke. Plowden's 
outlook should have positioned him in the radical camp, for he proclaimed 
the British constitution to be founded on a democratic basis. He expressed 
support for political reform and at least one loyalist pamphleteer thought his 
views required rebuttal. However, Plowden's able wording, his shirking of 
more contentious matters (such as the meaning of the revolution in France or
37 Joseph Priestley, Letters to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, occasioned by his Reflections on 
the revolution in France, & c. (1792, 3rd edition) PW vol. II p. 338; Parr Sequel p. 70; Yorke 
Thoughts p. 263; Tatham Letters p. 48; and [Anonymous], A friendly address to the reformers of 
England (1794) PW vol. VIII pp. 179-180,182. Another loyalist writer castigated Paley, for 
being one of those who had fallen into the snare of Locke's sense-based philosophy. See 
Thomas Green, An examination of the leading principles of the new system of morals, as that 
principle is stated and applied in Mr. Godwin's Enquiry concerning political justice, in a letter to a 
friend (1799, 2nd edition) PW vol. VIII p. 351.
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the extent of reform), his extensive quotes from authorities like Montesquieu 
and Blackstone, and his negative comments on Priestley's religious views, 
made him appear to many as a defense of the established political order.38 
A third example was Sir Brooke Boothby, whose quibbling and pompous 
texts declared their support for the loyalist side of the debate, while drawing a 
tortuous line of reasoning in an attempt to reject both Burke and Paine, while 
at the same time defending Rousseau (Boothby's acquaintance) from 
accusations of being a revolutionary. Thus Boothby's purportedly loyalist 
texts, were denounced by the loyalist writer Charles Hawtrey, and 
commended by the radical Thomas Christie.39 
Research about the loyalist side of the revolution debate, although 
significantly expanded in the last decade, has to date been far less 
comprehensive than that about the radical side. In general, three (sometimes 
overlapping) categories of loyalist writers are mentioned and studied: those 
linked to government sponsorship, those connected with loyalist associations, 
and those associated with the so-called "High Tory" circle. It will emerge, 
however, that such a portrayal is significantly deficient, as a sufficient 
description of the dominant ideas and attitudes on the loyalist side in the 
revolution debate.40
38 Francis Plowden, Jura Anglorum. The rights of Englishmen (1792), and A short history of the 
British empire during the last twenty months viz. From May 1792 to the close of the year 1793 (1794). 
An attack on Plowden's views was [Anonymous], The malecontent. A letter from an associator to 
Francis Plowden esq. (1794). The Jura brought Plowden a honorary DCL from Oxford, an 
uncommon honor for a Catholic - especially one that had trained at St. Omer to become a 
Jesuit. Plowden's distance from the mainstream of the loyalist camp was evidenced by his 
vitriolic denigration of Burke and his ideas. See Plowden Short pp. 45-46.
39 Hawtrey Various opinions p. 89; Christie Letters p. 165.
40 The leading periodicals of the loyalist camp were: the Gentleman's Magazine, a long- 
established mainstay of mainstream public opinion which, accordingly, at first commended 
the fall of the Bastille, but adopted increasingly anti-revolutionary views as the 1790s 
progressed; The British Critic, founded in 1793 by the High Tory "Society for the Reformation 
of Principles by Appropriate Literature"; the short-lived but influential Anti-Jacobin or Weekly 
Examiner, published during 1797-1798 by a group of ambitious young supporters of the 
government, headed by George Canning, and followed by its indirect successor the Anti- 
Jacobin Review, or Monthly Magazine edited  by John Gifford, appearing from July 1798. See
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A prominent characteristic of many loyalist writers was indeed their 
connection to government. Often they were minor officials, such as 
magistrates, members of governmental boards or even pro-govemment MP's. 
At other times government connection was only pecuniary -  the writer was 
paid for his services. Altogether, it has been estimated that more than half of 
loyalist publications were composed by writers directly employed, patronized 
or pensioned by the government.41
However, these writers cannot be described as a group, in terms of 
organization or ideas. There was no mutual connection or coordinated action 
between them, and there is no evidence for the government making any 
concerted effort to direct the kind of opinions or proposals such writers put 
forward. While some writers clearly shared a certain propensity for legalistic 
and instrumental arguments, tending to base the case against revolutionary 
notions on moderation and convenience, others presented far more principled 
and ideological stances (with wide variations among those too). Probably the 
most famous and important examples of the former kind are Judge Ashhurst, 
and Arthur Young (who later headed the board of Agriculture), while figures 
such as John Reeves (formerly a colonial magistrate, and later appointed the 
King's printer) and John Bowles (paid by government for his numerous
Montluzin Anti-Jacobins pp. 21-22. Another dimension of the ideological debate were novels 
partly or wholly devoted to treating revolutionary ideas and images. One example of overlap 
between categories is Edward Sayer, the loyalist author who published anonymously both 
the pamphlet Observations on Doctor Price's revolution sermon (1790), and the novel Lindor and 
Adelaide (1791). See Grenby Anti-Jacobin pp. 31-33.
41 See Dinwiddy "Interpretations" pp. 46-47. There seem to have also been significant covert 
activity to influence opinions by secret service financial subsides, with sums of up to 5,000 
pounds every year. See PW vol. I p. xxxvii. But this did not stop, for example, John Gifford, a 
writer and editor subsidized by government funds, from handling another writer closely 
associated with the government quite harshly, when he described Arthur Young's anti­
revolutionary Example as an amend and recantation for Young's former political errors about 
France. See John Gifford, A letter to the Earl of Lauderdale containing strictures on his Lordship's 
letters to the peers of Scotland (1800, new edition) p. 34.
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loyalist pamphlets), are examples of the latter kind of writers connected to the 
government.42
The second category of loyalist writers, were those connected to loyalist 
associations. These associations, accused by radicals of being merely tools of 
the government, were in fact nothing of the sort. They were for the most part 
spontaneous organizations, headed by middle class property owners and by 
religiously motivated individuals, wishing to halt and reverse the apparent 
spread of revolutionary and atheist ideas and actions among British popular 
classes. This they effected by printing and distributing material, both original 
and not -  the latter often as a shortened and popularized version of a more 
serious work. The most famous and important of these organizations was 
"The Association for the Protection of Liberty and Property against 
Republicans and Levellers", founded by the ubiquitous Reeves in November 
1792, and soon germinating related or similar organizations around the 
country. By February 1793 there were already over 1,000 such associations all 
over Britain, and they eventually numbered more than 2,000. There is ample 
evidence that Pitt's government was uneasy both with the popular focus and 
with some of the ideas divulged by these associations. Reeves later testified 
that the government presented his association with only guarded support. In 
1795, his pamphlet Thoughts on the English government was alleged to be 
absolutist in leaning. When prosecuted for it, Reeves found out that Pitt and 
his parliamentary supporters, far from defending him, joined in the 
denunciation. Hannah More too, was criticized in some loyalist circles for 
politicizing the masses through her popular writings. However that may be, 
the loyalist associations certainly had an important role in stemming and then
42 Others writers in this group were John St. John and George Dallas. On writers connected to 
the government see also Sack Jacobite pp. 23-24, 86-87, 93; Mori "languages" pp. 33-59.
35
reversing the tide of opinion concerning revolutionary ideas, during the 
1790s.43
The third category to which loyalist writers are assigned, and probably the 
most coherent one, is the group of writers identified as "High Tory". The 
term, already employed by contemporaries and adopted by modem 
scholarship, wishes to convey the principles of a group which in their support 
for the role of the monarchy and of the established church, propounded new 
versions of older ideas which had been formulated by High Church and Tory 
thinkers of the early 18th century (such as the patriarchal origin of government 
or the view of the clergy as an estate of parliament).44
43 John Reeves, Thoughts on the English government. Addressed to the quiet good sense of the people 
of England (1795) -  three additional parts were added in 1799-1800. About the associations see 
Butler Burke pp. 8,179; Sack Jacobite pp. 100,104-105; Andrews British p. 210. An excellent 
primary review of their ideas and activities is provided by the Association papers -  a collection 
of proceeding and publications by Reeves' association, published in 1793. The collection is 
prefaced by the "Considerations and Resolutions" of the association's first meeting, leading 
to its institution as a permanent society. The meeting is described as considering the main 
claim of the radicals as being the "Principle of Equality", and their wish, to achieve "ideas of 
perfection" never known in the world. The meeting holds that inequality is inevitable, and 
that the political system in the "happy Country" that is England, "is more the result of every 
man's own exertions, than of any countrouling institution of the state", and that by this 
inequality and mutual dependence, the extraordinary prosperity of England was created and 
continues to prosper. Furthermore it is claimed that the example of France, shows that such 
notions would bring, under the "arbitrary disposal of self opiniated Philosophers, and a wild  
and needy mob", only destruction and murder, while the people who "have only changed 
their masters, groan under new tyrannies of which they have never heard or dreamed". Such 
are "the new lights and the false philosophy" of England's "pretended Reformers" (Association 
papers pp. 1-3). The collected 50 tracts printed and distributed by the society, are of varied 
nature. Some are reprints of contemporary documents like Lord Loughborough's Speech on 
the alien bill and The speech by M. Pethion, Mayor of Paris upon the accusation of M. Robspierre; 
others are extracts from works by thinkers like Paley and Bolingbroke; other yet are short 
simple texts, intentionally written to impress upon popular audiences the evils and dangers 
of French revolutionary ideas, such as More's Village politics and a number of pamphlets from 
the "Bull Family" series, anonymously authored by William Jones of Nayland; and there even 
are a number of anti-revolutionary songs, either new, such as The happy man, or setting new  
words to extant traditional tunes, such as Song to the tune O the golden days of good queen Bess. 
About the accusations against More see Grenby Anti-Jacobin p. 15. About the role of 
religiously motivated loyalists see Grenby Anti-Jacobin pp. 155-156.
44 The term merges two related but distinct appellations of the early 18th century -  that of the 
"High Church" Anglicans stressing the sacred nature of Episcopacy and of hierarchy; and the 
"Tory" adherents of the divine nature of kingship. The term was already employed in the
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Only some of the many writers connected with this group took a direct part in 
the revolution controversy, among those the most prominent were Bowles, 
Reeves, Jonathan Boucher, William Jones, Robert Nares and George Home. 
The names of Bowles and Reeves illustrate the partial overlap between the 
three categories discussed, with Bowles' connection to government, and 
Reeves actually linked to all three groups -  government, loyalist associations 
and High Tories.45
The more significant insight into the nature of loyalist authorship is however 
offered by the fact that all of the other four named above were Anglican 
clergymen. It appears that the role of the Anglican clergy among loyalist 
participants of the revolution debate, has not yet been sufficiently studied, nor 
its import adequately considered. Even in the brief survey offered by this 
essay the preponderant role of Anglican clergymen is immediately manifest. 
Among writers of loyalist tracts whose authorship has been satisfactorily 
established (since often published anonymously), Anglican clergymen 
number about half.46 The proportion becomes even larger, if to those who
1790s, such as in [Belsham] Historic p. 74. For the appellation being adopted by modem  
scholarship, and for their ideas see Gunn Beyond pp. 164-165,174-179,185.
45 On the loyalist side -  like the radical one -  patterns of acquaintance were important in 
establishing argumentation and assisting publication. This was especially evident in the High 
Tory circle, where for example the American exile Boucher's acquaintance with Stevens aided 
his induction into English loyalist publications, and eventually (through Jones of Nayland's 
assistance) his being awarded a living. John Gifford and John Bowles, professional writers, 
mutual friends and supporters, stood at a center of a net of acquaintances and correspondents 
covering most of the prominent loyalist authors, including Reeves, Brand and Cobbet. 
Naturally there was a degree of social overlap between groups.
46 Of some 150 loyalist tracts reviewed here, the authors of about 45 remain unknown. The 
remaining 105 texts were authored by 60 odd writers (since some writers produced more than 
one tract), among them roughly half can be identified as Anglican clergymen. This 
preponderance is in keeping with the findings of E.L. de Montluzin's research into the 
identity of those who contributed articles to the two leading loyalist reviews of the time.
Of the seventy writers she identified from Gifford's Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine, 
clergymen are by far the largest single group: over half were, had been or were to be clerics -  
with a handful from various denominations (including some dissenters and a catholic), but 
the great majority Anglican; she has noted a similar prevalence of Anglican clergymen among 
writers in Nares' British Critic. See Montluzin Anti-Jacobins pp. 30-41 and E.L. de Montluzin, 
"Attributions of authorship in the British Critic during the editorial regime of Robert Nares,
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were actually serving clergymen, are added authors otherwise linked to the 
established church - such as holders of academic positions subjected to direct 
(such as teaching divinity), or partial (such as teaching Hebrew and Syriac) 
church influence, or laymen active in various devotional and lay-church 
circles and organizations.47
The Anglican voice clearly emerges as the principal one, within the loyalist 
camp -  with such authors consisting of a proportion as large, if not larger, 
than that of dissenter clergymen among radical writers. As a consequence of 
this preponderance, the degree to which the Anglican voice is identified with 
the High Tory circle and its ideas becomes essential for a correct 
interpretation of loyalist opinion.
A major problem with identifying the weight of this circle within loyalist 
opinion is that in the 1790s the label of High Tories was applied rather 
indiscriminately and usually as a term of disparagement. The tendency is 
evident even in an intelligent writer as Mackintosh, who disparaged Samuel 
Cooper and Edward Tatham, as the only kind of "literary advocates of the
1793-1813" in Studies in Bibliography 51 (1998) pp. 241-259. See also R. Hole, "English sermons 
and tracts as media of debate on the French revolution, 1789-1799" in M. Philp, The French 
revolution and British popular politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. 18-37.
47 In Oxford and Cambridge, degrees and fellowships could only be conferred on those who 
subscribed to the 39 articles of the Anglican Church (in Ireland's Trinity College of Dublin, 
fellows were required to take Anglican holy orders and remain celibate; in Presbyterian 
Scotland's universities the situation was different). Examples of cleric academics are, Edward 
Tatham, Doctor of divinity and Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford; George Home, fellow of 
Magdalen College, Oxford, Vice-Chancellor of the University, and eventually Bishop of 
Norwich, who published in pamphlet form the anti-revolutionary A charge to the clergy of the 
diocese of Norwich, (1792); James Hurdis, fellow of Magdalen and Oxford Professor of Poetry 
published in pamphlet form Equality: a sermon (1794); Richard Hey, a fellow of Magdalen 
College, Cambridge, who authored a pamphlet named Happiness and rights (1792); William 
Atkinson, fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge and the reputed author of A concise sketch of the 
intended revolution in England; with a few hints on the obvious methods to avert it (1794). Burke 
described Oxford in a letter as "one great seminary of the Church of England". See COR vol. 
VII p. 571.
Stevens and others of the High Tory group are examples of laymen active in church 
organizations, and so is the anonymous author of An answer to Dr. Priestley's letters to the Rt. 
Hon. Edmund Burke in a letter to the author by a layman of the established church (1791), who 
described himself as a "lay-divine".
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most miserable description", left to defend "Priestcraft and Toryism" -  the 
commonly-used terms of scorn towards High Tory ideas. In fact Cooper and 
Tatham were outstanding examples of clergymen who attempted to offer 
loyalist political views which would not be based on the traditional High 
Tory terminology and arguments. Even Burke, himself, certainly no High 
Tory, was sometimes labeled so by adversaries.48 
Furthermore, the identification of the High Tories of the 1790s is also 
problematic in current scholarship too. Gunn, for example, describes the High 
Tory circle as centering around William Stevens, a writer, editor and lay 
church activist, and including among others: George Home, Bishop of 
Norwich (and Stevens' cousin); William Jones "of Nayland", prominent 
loyalist author (whose writings Stevens edited); Robert Nares, loyalist writer 
and -  with his friend William Beloe -  editor for many years of The British 
Critic; Jonathan Boucher, John Gifford (formerly John Richards Green), John 
Reeves and John Bowles.49 However I believe that detailed scrutiny of the 
names of these supposed High Tories will show considerable differences of 
opinions, primarily between what could be described as Church and Tory 
tendencies. Those of the first tendency were concerned primarily with 
theological and church matters, and in politics stressed primarily the sacred 
nature of monarchy and the duty to obey it. They included writers like 
Stevens, Home, Jones of Nayland, and Nares (though the tatter's 
latitudinarian views did not satisfy the grouping around the Nayland 
vicarage and its offspring the so called "Hackney Phalanx", and eventually 
led to his dismissal in 1813 from editorship of the British Critic) -  all 
clergymen or lay church activists. The second tendency, stressing the practical
48 Mackintosh Vindiciae p. 385; [Belsham] Historic p. 74.
49 Gunn Beyond pp. 175-177. Gunn's description should be approached with caution. It 
contains inaccuracies (such as Robert Nares' first name being given as John, and John 
Richards Green's first name being given as James), but far more important, it creates an 
erroneous impression of ideological homogeneity which some of the individuals included -  
such as Gifford and Bowles -  certainly defied.
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side of government and its genesis in power, included writers like Reeves, 
Gifford and Bowles who appear to be a group socially and ideologically 
distinct from the High Tories. Socially, these writers had close contacts with 
the High Tory circles, but they were at least as close to Burkean ones; 
intellectually, they could be found embracing terms and attitudes from the 
High Church and Tory tradition as often as professing devotion to Burke' 
ideas. Unlike the High Tories they had close contacts with government, 
especially with its ideologically Burkean wing of former Whigs like George 
Canning and William Windham. Reeves' ambiguous relation with Pitt's 
government has already been described, but when prosecuted he was 
publicly supported by Windham and Burke, and eventually was appointed as 
the King's printer. Gifford's and Bowles' relations with the ministry were 
more straightforward -  both wrote pamphlets for the treasury, edited 
government-backed publications, and in time were awarded profitable posts 
as commissioners. But they too always maintained an independent and 
ideological position in their relation to government. Gifford, who in 1798 
launched his monthly Anti-Jacobin, as a continuation of sorts to the similarly 
named weekly, previously published by Canning and his associates, made 
prominent his allegiance to Burke's ideas. He explicitly praised the Reflections 
in his writings, printed a letter from Burke to him as the preface to the 1800 
edition of his Letter to the Earl of Lauderdale, and dedicated to Burke a book he 
edited (and perhaps wrote). Bowles, from 1793 editor of the pro-govemment 
newspaper The Sun, not only actively corresponded with Burke, but was 
linked to the political set closest to Burke, comprising William Windham, 
French Lawrence and Walker King.50
50 Montluzin Anti-Jacobins pp. 32-33,110-111,158-159; Sack Jacobite pp. 86-88, 93,104,198; 
Gifford Erskine pp. 1-2, 77-80; John Gifford, A second letter to the Hon. Thomas Erskine (1797) pp. 
4, 34, 60; Gifford's Lauderdale edition of 1800 noted in the title the addition of "a preface, and an 
original letter from the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, to the author, explaining the much-perverted 
expression of'The swinish multitude"’. Bowles Retrospect pp. 300-302; Andrews British p. 148;
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In fact, even if one or two more names are added to their number, the authors 
that can be clearly identified with High Tory ideas or circles are only a 
handful among the score and a half of writers who have identifiable 
connections with the established church. In some cases, when texts have very 
little theoretical content, it is impossible to assign to them a clear ideological 
relation, but where a theoretical framework is discernible, the great majority 
of Anglican writers do not subscribe to High Tory ideas, like the patriarchal 
origin of government, or principled non-resistance. In fact, these writers 
display a wide range of political ideas, on which their opposition to 
radicalism is based. These ideas include: an appeal to revive Aristotleanism; 
versions of Hobbes' principles; the "ancient constitution" tradition; and a 
defense of the existing order on largely practical considerations. To these 
might be added the "quasi-contract" notion of Josiah Tucker, which exerted a 
visible influence on the debate - notwithstanding the Dean's silence at this 
time (although he died in 1799, he was already 78 years old when the 
Reflections was published).51
COR vol. IX pp. 224-227. For Reeves' ideas about the degree of political danger from 
Catholics or dissenters, being in the Burkean tradition, see Sack Jacobite pp. 202,227. For 
Gifford's and Bowles' distance from High Tories see Mori "Languages" pp. 33-58. Gunn 
himself notes that Bowles was, in idiom at least and probably not only, more Burkean than 
High Tory. See Gunn Beyond p. 176. Montluzin (on p. 33) lists Gifford, Bowles and Fitzjohn 
Brand among loyalist writers who had no significant dealings with Burke, except for sending 
for his perusal copies of their work and receiving "corteous but perfunctory letters of thanks 
in reply". But in Bowles' and Gifford's cases at least, the evidence above points to a more 
significant relationship.
51 Examples of clergymen supporting other political viewpoints are: Tatham, who turned to 
Aristotle for ideas of civil government, see Tatham Letters pp. 16-17; Samuel Cooper, who 
sounds Hobbesian when he stresses the need of absolute uncontrollable sovereignty in every 
state, see Cooper First p. 127; Charles Hawtrey, who supported a version of the ancient 
constitution argumentation, see Hawtrey Various pp. 72,129; William Paley who in his 
anonymously published Reasons for contentment, addressed to the labouring part of the British 
public (1792) PW vol. VII pp. 219-226, defended the existing political order on the basis of a 
pessimistic evaluation of the practical succor that most men could expect in this world. 
Although Dean Josiah Tucker did not take part in the debate, the lasting presence of the ideas 
famously presented in his A treatise concerning civil government (1781), was shown by the need 
displayed by writers like Boucher, Young and even Rous, to address them explicitly - see 
Jonathan Boucher, "On Civil Liberty, passive obedience and non resistance" in his collection
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This variegated ideological field suggests a number of considerations. First, 
the extent of variety in terms approaches and ideas was far greater in the 
loyalist than in the radical camp. It appears that, far from there being one 
dominant theoretical response to the challenges of revolutionary radicalism, 
the wide variety reflected a sense of inadequacy in High Tory or pragmatic 
responses, and a search for new ones. Second, it obviously means that the 
Anglican output cannot be simply reduced to the High Tory creed. These 
conclusions point to the need for a more detailed study of the Anglican 
output in order to determine if there can be ascertained within it one (or 
more) distinctive approach to the revolutionary challenge, and the relations of 
such approach (or approaches) to Burke's ideas. Although this avenue of 
study cannot be pursued fully here, it is possible to establish that while a 
number of Anglican writers openly adopted Burke and his ideas, others -  
especially among clergymen connected to the High Tory circle -  were 
markedly less enthusiastic towards them.
of essays A view of the causes and consequences of the American revolt (1797) p. 531; Young 
Example p. 170; George Rous, A letter to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, in reply to his 
Appeal from the new to the old Whigs (1791) pp. 62-64.
2. Debating Locke - the perception of Locke's ideas in  the 1790s
Many tracts of the revolution debate from both radical and loyalist authors 
were aimed at particular, sometimes personal, targets. Some had nothing in 
them but transitory and inconsequential material. But from those pamphlets 
displaying even a limited theoretical orientation, one underlying theme 
emerging above all others was the attempt to interpret the Whig tradition and 
its defining moment, the 1688 revolution. Since at this time Whiggism had 
become synonymous with the mainstream and legitimate English political 
tradition, even those -  like Thomas Paine -  who claimed to reject it outright, 
were compelled to address it.52
The fundamental argument -  as defined among others by Burke -  was about 
the correct interpretation of the Whig political tradition and the events of 
1688: Were these to be seen as expressions of a revolutionary creed that had to 
compromise in the circumstances, or of an essentially anti-revolutionary 
outlook which had achieved and perpetuated its purpose? To a great extent, 
the core of this dispute concerned the status assigned to John Locke's political 
ideas -  since their acceptance as the theoretical underpinnings of the Whig 
political order would tilt the debate about its nature very much in favor of 
one side. Indeed, an important characteristic common to many of the most 
important tracts -  radical as well as loyalist -  was the centrality assigned to 
the Lockean framework as the foundation of radical political ideas. It is to the 
examination of the substance and meaning of this common claim that the 
discussion must now turn.
52 [Anonymous], A brief reply to the observations of Ben. Bousfield, esq., on Mr. Burke's pamphlet 
respecting the revolution in France (1791) PW vol. VII p. 47, described the two accepted 
definitions of what is a Whig: the first is a person bound to oppose "every arbitrary stretch of 
power" and to keep the several branches of the constitution separate and independent of each 
other. The second is the more general appellation of the supporters of the House of Hanover. 
Since the second applied to all subjects who had not proved themselves otherwise, it is by the 
first definition that real or fictitious Whigs were to be judged".
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Although the debate over Locke's ideas and intentions continues today, the 
mainstream of current research can be fairly represented by the position of 
scholars such as H.T. Dickinson, R. Ashcraft and J. Dunn. Their scholarship 
has established that the vast majority of those, either Whigs or Tories, who in 
1689-1690 debated the meaning of the revolution, subscribed to a moderate 
and pragmatic reading of events as a defense of the established order, 
combining (sometimes confusedly) ideas of contract, possession, abdication 
and conquest. John Locke's Two treatises of government (1690), which 
repudiated these very doctrines, was part of a small (but not unimportant) 
minority of those described in scholarship as "radical Whig writers" that 
contemporaries clearly perceived as expressing an extremist political 
perspective. Furthermore, although radical Whigs of the late 17th century had 
propagated notions of the liberty of the subject, only Locke developed a 
political theory, apparently coherent, and with a considerable revolutionary 
potential. Unlike other radical Whigs, Locke did not stop at locating 
sovereignty in the combined legislature of King, Lords and Commons. 
Instead, he granted authority to the legislature only as long as it did not abuse 
the trust placed in it by the people, with which sovereignty ultimately lay, 
and which could reclaim that authority if it deemed its natural rights 
threatened. Thus Locke effectively asserted a right of resistance or, in other 
words, revolution. In addition, Locke's granting of this right of resistance to 
all men (not only the propertied) implicitly assumed that the natural equality 
of men was the basis for all true discussion of political representation. These 
political views of Locke's, although he did not fully articulate their radical 
import, were understood and certainly regarded as too radical to be endorsed 
by the majority of the Whig party. Locke's Two treatises attracted only limited 
attention at the time of their publication, and few of his contemporaries 
directly quoted Locke's views, whether approvingly or less so. But it would 
be wrong to suggest that Locke did not exert some political influence. By
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1690, three editions of the Two treatises had appeared, and the contract theory 
was certainly debated in the late 17th and early 18th century. Furthermore, 
Locke's ideas did not completely disappear from circulation. Aided by the 
indirect agency of popularizations such as the highly influential pamphlets, 
Political aphorisms (1690), and its later re-publication in altered forms, first as 
Vox populi, vox Dei (1709) and then as The judgement of whole kingdoms and 
nations (1710). Under its different guises and names, this was one of the best­
selling pamphlets of the 18th century, with subsequent editions appearing also 
in 1747 and 1771. Thus, whereas Locke was once viewed as " the philosopher 
of the Whig party", scholarship has established that in his lifetime he was 
actually among its radical fringes, and that for a long time afterwards, his 
political ideas informed and influenced principally the radical circles of 
Hanoverian England.53
However, by the middle of the 18th century, Locke had become widely 
accepted as a bearer of mainstream Whig principles. Ironically, this 
transformation of Locke's reputation owed a great deal to a long eclipse of his 
political ideas. As the Whig political order increasingly became the 
establishment -  particularly so after the 1714 accession of the House of 
Hanover to the British crown, and the subsequent cessation of the great Tory- 
Whig political debates of the early 18th century -  the disputation about the 
meaning of 1688 lost its relevance. Hence, as the never especially widespread 
interest in Locke's Two treatises lessened, his reputation came to rest more and 
more on his epistemological Essay. The result was that progressively through 
the 18th century, the status of the Two treatises was supported more by the 
esteem towards the Essay than by the actual reading and treating of the
53 Dickinson Politics pp. 195-196; R. Ashcraft, "Locke, revolution principles, and the formation 
of Whig ideology" in The Historical Journal 26 (1983) pp. 774-775; R. Ashcraft, Revolutionary 
politics and Locke's Two treatises of government (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986) pp. 
572-573, 585,589. It is important to note that Political aphorisms was not merely influenced by 
the Two treatises, but rather to a great extent was a plagiarization of it, taking long, 
unacknowledged, verbatim passages from the latter.
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political ideas in the Two treatises -  what J. Dunn describes as a "slackly 
ideological reading" of the book.54
By the second half of the mid-IB* century, the name of John Locke had 
become an accepted source of intellectual authority underpinning the long 
Whig political ascendancy, while at the same time informing the opinions of 
those groups of radicals who were opposed to this very settlement. This latent 
contradiction emerged when, during the 1760s and 1770s, Locke's ideas 
started to be publicly employed as authority for new and radical political 
demands. This is evidenced from the first pamphlet calling for parliamentary 
reform in 1766, the anonymous Reflexions on representation in parliament, 
through James Burgh's 1774 Political disquisitions, one of the most influential 
radical tracts of the time, and up to John Wilkes, the most popular 
campaigner for political reform of his age, who in a famous speech of 1776 
quoted two whole paragraphs from Locke. Furthermore, by the 1770s the 
employment of Locke in demands for political reform in England became 
increasingly intertwined with the issues raised by the American conflict, such 
as illustrated by the most widely read radical pamphlet of the period, Richard 
Price's tract Observations on the nature of civil liberty (1776).55
54 John Dunn, "The Politics of Locke in England and America in the eighteenth century" in 
J.W. Yolton (ed.), John Locke: problems and perspectives (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1969) pp. 57-59.
In a letter of September 1791 to Henry Dundas, Burke gave his own view of the history of the 
radical fringes of the Whig party. Describing "the Republicans" of England as having been, 
for the first time since the civil war, "embodied under the French standard" by the revolution, 
to create a party, he remarked that "[u]ntil then they were individuals who hung upon the 
whigg [sic] party, and by that party were lookd [sic] upon as absurd and visionary men of no 
sort of consequence". It is interesting to consider what place should be assigned to Locke and 
his ideas within such a description. See COR vol. VI p. 420.
55 Kramnick "Republican" pp. 637-640, 649; H.V.S. Ogden, "The state of nature and the 
decline of Lockian political thought in England, 1760-1800" in The American Historical Review 
46 (1940) pp. 32-32. Another example of the appeal to Locke is Matthew Robinson-Morris, 
Lord Rokeby's anonymously published pamphlet, Considerations on the measures carrying on 
with respect to the British colonies in America (1774). The text, dealing with the legitimacy of 
taxing the Americans, is very Lockean in argumentation and language, describing British 
MP's as "our trustees and guardians", claiming current problems caused by the English 
"having taxed those colonies without their consent" and describing such principles as "the
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It appears that the great political convulsion caused by the rebellion of the 
American colonies was for many in England the trigger for a re-evaluation of 
accepted political tenets, including Locke's authoritative status. Indeed, 
Jonathan Boucher, a loyalist pamphleteer on both sides of the Atlantic and an 
acute observer of the revolutionary debates, asserted in 1797 that the 
unraveling of Locke's long-lasting prestige as England's unassailable great 
political thinker was a result of the re-examination of political ideas 
occasioned by the American conflict. Boucher asserted th a t" [t]ill the 
American war, he [Locke] was looked up to as an oracle: and the whole nation 
implicitly pinned their faith, in politics, on his dogmas". But as that war 
caused men to examine things for themselves, the "infallibility" ascribed to 
Locke was considerably lessened. Then, Boucher continued, in 1781 Josiah 
Tucker's A  treatise concerning civil government so successfully savaged Locke's 
ideas that since then "writers in general venture to read Mr. Locke, as they do 
other authors, without being overawed...". Whatever the truth in Boucher's 
analysis of causation for the more general unraveling of Locke's prestige, 
Tucker's Treatise certainly brought about a great number of publications 
arguing for and against Locke's political principles, and by the late 1780s it 
was clear they were being challenged as the accepted interpretation of the 
English constitution.56
principles of Whigs" -  stressing that "I mean of Whigs before the Revolution and at the time 
of it; I mean the principles which such men as Mr. Locke, Lord Molesworth and Mr. 
Trenchard maintained with their pens, Mr. Hampden and Lord John Russell with their blood 
and Mr. Algernon Sidney with both". See pp. 3-4, 9-10,138-139.
56 See Boucher "Civil" p. 531, in footnote. For the assaults on the consensus about the nature 
of British government, around 1776, see Gunn Beyond pp. 172-173.1. Kramnick proposes that 
Locke's themes were politically revived in the later half of the 18th century by English 
reformers. See Kramnick "Republican" p. 655. Dickinson remarks that radicals of the later 
eighteenth century, like James Burgh, Richard Price, Joseph Priestley and Thomas Paine, 
adopted Locke's theoretical concepts as the foundations for the political reforms they were 
advocating. See Dickinson Politics p. 196. For the controversy initiated by Josiah Tucker, 
around Locke's political ideas, see below note 160.
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Essentially, as long as the Whig political settlement remained unchallenged, 
Locke's authority was widely accepted without his views on the origins of 
government being subjected to much scrutiny or discussion. This attitude is 
evidenced by mainstream figures like the elder William Pitt, who in the 1750s 
recommended the Two treatises to his nephew Thomas, then at university; and 
like William Blackstone, who in his Commentaries, published in 1765, endorsed 
some of Locke's central political tenets (though with significant reservations, 
and caveats).57
It is a measure of the status Locke had attained, as well as of the complacency
of the political establishment, that this unquestioned acceptance persisted for
some time even after the 1770s had made the practical political implications of
his ideas quite clear. For a long time yet, there could be found not a few
instances of those displaying a seeming incapability of grasping the obvious
divergence between Locke's ideas on the origin of government and their
implications for the legitimacy of the 1688 Whig settlement, even when those
very ideas were being explicitly stated. A good example of this inability, was
offered as late as the eve of the French revolution (during the regency debates
of 1788), in a tract that criticized the policies of Charles James Fox as
undermining the Whigs'
first principles, such as are to be found of our Constitution as 
mentioned by Mr. Locke, and as established at the Revolution. In 
the first place, That all power is derived from the people; and the 
power itself being always in them, they may make or alter any 
form of government. That there is no natural right in one man to 
govern another but that is by institution, force, or consent.58
57 Dunn "Politics" pp. 57-59. See also Dickinson Liberty pp. 132-133, and Sack Jacobite p. 10.
58 [Anonymous], Fox against Fox !!! Or the political blossoms of the Right Hon. Charles James Fox 
(1788) pp. vii-ix. About the widespread acceptance of Locke's ideas as representing the Whig 
principles, see for instance Gibbon's remark "Locke's treatise of Government instructed me in 
the knowledge of Whig principles, which are rather founded in reason than experience" in 
Edward Gibbon Memoirs of my life (Thomas Nelson and Sons publishers, 1966) p. 78. See also 
Gunn Beyond p.173, and R.W. Harris, Political ideas 1760-1792 (Gollancz, 1963) pp. 15-16. Even 
during the 1790s, Fox and Erskine could be found attempting -  albeit with diminishing 
success -  to evoke Locke's name as standing for both the Whig mainstream and the principles
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And so, the text was attempting to defend the constitutional setting of its time 
as based on the actualization of Locke's principles in 1688, oblivious to the 
possibility that someone might demand the same actualization again. 
Nevertheless, as Locke's ideas became more relevant, they were increasingly 
challenged. This process greatly intensified when the debate on the revolution 
in France brought forward a far more significant challenge to the acceptance 
of Locke's ideas, since their possible identification with revolutionary 
principles implied that they might be seen not merely as an incorrect 
interpretation of the British constitution, but as a mortal threat to it.
When coming to discuss the place of Locke's ideas within the writings of the 
1790s, there is of course the question of which texts among those who do not 
treat him or his ideas explicitly should be viewed as "Lockean". An eminent 
example is Thomas Cooper's Propositions respecting the foundation of civil 
government, a text obviously Lockean in many of its ideas and terms, with a 
tide evidently referring to the Second treatise's sub-title, which nevertheless 
does not mention Locke or his works. Among loyalists too abound cases of 
attacks on obviously Lockean terms and ideas without Locke being 
mentioned. Such is the anonymous Remarks on Mr. Paine's pamphlet, warning 
from the various absurdities and multiplied confusions resulting from the 
doctrine of man "possessing his natural rights in a state of society, and being 
judge in his own case as to their exercise". Since an adequate treatment of 
such indirectly "Lockean" material falls outside the scope of this inquiry, and 
since I hope to prove satisfactorily the centrality of Locke's ideas within the 
debate about the revolution by employing texts which address them
of the French revolution. See for example PH vol. XXX p. 922, and CST vol. XXIX p. 925 and 
vol. XXV pp. 676-679.
explicitly, the following discussion will employ indirect Lockean texts such as 
Cooper's, only as adjunctive support.59
It is to be regretted that the main scholarly collection of sources for this 
period, G. Claeys' eight-volume Political writings of the 1790s, covering 127 
texts, presents an effective obstacle to a thorough consideration of the 
Lockean aspect of the revolution controversy. Claeys under-represents this 
aspect of the debate in both the choice of texts included and the interpretation 
of it that he offers in the introductory essay. Thus, while texts by important 
radicals as Mackintosh, Christie, Priestley, Price and others appear in the 
collection, the fact that they all treat Locke in their works is neither stressed 
nor even discussed by Claeys. Indeed the under-representation becomes 
qualitatively misleading in the case of the loyalist side of the debate, where 
some of the most important texts extensively addressing Locke's ideas are 
missing from the collection -  among these Samuel Cooper's and Edward 
Tatham's works, deemed by contemporary opponents such as Mackintosh as 
central to the loyalist argumentation. Indeed Claeys himself describes 
Tatham's Letters as an especially notable loyalist work of the period, but does 
not reproduce it in the collection. Moreover, in the introduction Claeys offers 
no hint to indicate that the absence of a discussion of the Lockean aspect, or 
the exclusion of many important tracts treating Locke, was determined by 
editorial or other practical considerations. This minimization of the Lockean 
aspect of the revolution debate may be due to Claeys' belief, expressed in a 
previous work on the debate, that the discussion of Lockean contract theory, 
though extant in the political writings of the 1790s, was of secondary
59 Thomas Cooper's Reply pp. 93-100 reprinted as an appendix to this 1792 pamphlet, the text 
of Propositions respecting the foundation of civil government originally published in 1790; 
[Anonymous], Remarks on Mr. Paine's pamphlet, called the Rights of man. In a letter to a friend 
(1791) PW vol. V p. 33. Another case was Gerrald, who claimed for British rights the "two­
fold sanction of reason and antiquity", mixing Sidney and Locke. See [Joseph Gerrald ? -  
attribution uncertain], The address of the British convention, assembled at Edinburgh, November 19, 
1793, to the people of Great Britain (1793) PW vol. IV pp. 86-92.
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importance next to "the relationship between economic inequality and social 
progress" defined in terms of the Scottish discourse of commerce and 
manners. However, such a view should first explain the fact that so many of 
the most significant tracts of the period, seem to assign such importance to the 
Lockean aspect of the debate. Unfortunately, since Claeys does not address 
the issue in his discussion of the collection, the question remains unresolved.60 
Among the 270-odd texts addressing the revolutionary controversy, which I 
have reviewed for the purposes of this dissertation, about 60 mentioned 
Locke explicitly. Only some of those 60 texts treated Locke's ideas 
substantially, but many that did were among the most significant texts of the 
debate -  including tracts by Price, Priestley, Mackintosh, Christie, Rous, 
Thelwall Thomas Erskine and Towers on the radical side, and Tatham,
Samuel Cooper, Barwis, Bowles, Gifford and Cusack Smith on the loyalist 
side. Indeed, on the radical side the dozen or so authors whose texts were 
most often referred to by other radicals and attacked by loyalists writers turn 
out to have nearly all referred explicitly to Locke and his ideas in their works, 
often patently embracing them. In addition, many of the publications by the 
two most active radical societies, the SCI and the LCS, mentioned Locke as a 
source of authority, and often used verbatim phrases by him. On the loyalist 
side too, among the most important tracts, the treatment of Locke's ideas, if 
less universal, was still prominent.61
60 PW vol. I pp. xxviii-xix; Claeys "French" pp. 60-61. A different view of Locke's role in the 
debate is Dickinson's, who claims that the 1790s radicals still appealed to Locke, but the most 
influential among them developed two newer claims, the first stressing not historical but 
natural and inalienable rights of all men, the second demanding reform on utilitarian criteria. 
It appears to me that the first development was not new at all but a full acceptance of Locke's 
claim of juridical natural rights instead of the claim for historical rights by such as Sidney -  to 
which Locke had never subscribed. See H.T. Dickinson, Liberty and property (Methuen, 1977) 
p. 240.
61 The most important radical texts of the 1790s appear to be those by Paine, Priestley, Price, 
Rous, Christie, Mackintosh, Parr, Godwin, Lofft, Towers, Stuart, Yorke and Thelwall. On 
Paine's Lockeanism see below. Even Godwin, the only one among the above to reject some of 
Locke's main ideas -  but accepting others -  debated with them while addressing Locke
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Before proceeding to the detailed discussion of these texts and their meaning, 
the two conspicuous exceptions to the explicit treatment of Locke, should be 
addressed - Burke and Paine. Burke's treatment of Locke in virtually all he 
ever wrote deserves a separate discussion, and will be treated later in detail. 
Here it suffices to point out that Burke's total silence on Locke in his writings 
of the revolution debate, even in the Appeal (a text explicitly directed at 
interpreting the meaning of 1688 and enumerating a long list of many half­
forgotten names, as those of the true bearers of old Whiggism), and even 
when repeatedly attacked as anti-Lockean, speaks quite loudly about how 
unlikely is it that such an attitude was merely incidental.62 
In Paine's case, his obvious debt to Locke's contract theory as the basis for 
concepts and even nomenclature of the political doctrine he propounded in 
the Rights of man (although, unlike Locke, Paine spelled out fully the theory's 
radical political implications), was wedded to a furious denial of influence on 
his ideas by other writers. I suspect that the motive for this adamant and 
curious denial -  for which his opponents derided him -  might be that, 
acknowledging any determining influences on him by past writers could be 
construed as the one thing Paine most violently denounced in his political 
writings, some kind of authority of the past over the present.63
favorably. See for example his objection to Locke's notion of tacit consent, in Political justice 
(1793), book IE chapter 2, "On the social contract". For his agreement with some of Locke's 
ideas, see book I chapter 2, "History of political society". The above list of radical authors is of 
course open to challenge on some of the latter names, however, even if one or two authors are 
exchanged, the general trend remains the same. Moreover, the new names would probably be 
those of other Lockeans, like Wollstonecraft, Williams or Bousfield. About the publications of 
the SCI and the LCS see Kramnick "Republican" pp. 649-650.
62 Burke's treatment of Locke is discussed extensively in the next chapter.
63 PW vol. I pp. xxxi-xxxii. For Paine's plain Lockean concepts see especially Rights pp. 85-90. 
For derision of Paine's claim not to have been influenced by other thinkers [Anonymous], A 
fourth letter to Thomas Paine in answer to the second part of the rights of man: by the author of Letters 
to Thomas Paine, in answer to his late publication on the rights of man: shewing his errors on that 
subject, and proving the fallacy of his principles as applied to the government of this country (1792) 
PW vol. VI p. 305 where he was sardonically termed "a philosopher by instinct". See also 
[David Rivers], Cursory remarks on Paine's Rights of man (1792) PW vol. VI p. 130; and 
[Anonymous], A defence of the constitution of England against the libels that have been lately
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There were numerous instances in which Locke appeared in radical tracts 
only as a name among other noted thinkers, such as when William Belsham, 
rejecting Burke's reproach to the French revolutionists for "calling in the aid 
of philosophy" when framing their new government, rhetorically asked 
"were not LOCKE, HUME, MONTESQUIEU, and FRANKLIN, 
philosophers?", or when Mackintosh rhapsodized about "the Lockes, the 
Rousseaus, the Turgots, the Franklins, the immortal band of preceptors and 
benefactors of mankind".64
At other times Locke's name seems to have been invoked with other names, 
in order for it to imply something about them. In some instances Locke is 
paired with one or both of the politically far more controversial figures of 
James Harrington and Algernon Sidney -  both avowed republicans, and 
associated with the commonwealth regime -  in what appear as attempts to 
legitimize the latter two by association with the former. Such is the case when 
Parr asserted -  against Burke's wariness of theoretical speculation in politics -  
that political theory could be of general use, when conducted by "men of 
ability and virtue, by a Locke, a Sidney, and even a Harrington"; or when 
Joseph Towers extolled "the Lockes and the Sydneys" who had contributed to 
diffuse the spirit of freedom. In other cases Locke's name was paired with the 
name of Lord John Somers, one of the political leaders of the 1688 Whigs.
Thus Priestley claimed that in the 1688 revolution, "Lord Somers, Bishop 
Hoadley, Mr. Locke, and many others, have laid it down as a maxim, that all 
power in any state is derived from the people, and that the great object of all 
government, is the public good"; or when Christie contended that Burke's
published on it; particularly in Paine's pamphlet on the Rights of man (Dublin, 1791, reprint) PW 
vol. V p. 8. For Paine's political theory in the Rights of man being essentially that of John 
Locke, see Ogden "State" p. 39. For Paine adopting Locke's notions of natural rights, contract 
and popular sovereignty, while augmenting their radical aspects -  such as arguing that 
consent should be active and not merely passive -  see Dickinson Liberty pp. 243-244.
64 [Belsham] Historic pp. 95-96; Mackintosh Vindiciae p. 371.
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alleged affinity to Lord Somers' Whiggism was only apparent, and that 
Burke's sentiments were actually those of the Tory party of 1688.65 
Such pairings of Locke's name with Somers drew their significance from 
Burke's depiction of himself, in the Reflections and even more in the Appeal, as 
the political heir of the 1688 Whigs, among whom he awarded Somers a 
prominent position. Obviously, connecting Somers' views to Locke's would 
have both secured the association of the latter with the mainstream "Old 
Whig" leadership of 1688, while decisively refuting Burke's own 
interpretation of the events and his claim of political descent. Somers' alleged 
authorship of the Lockean The judgment of whole kingdoms and nations (1710) 
was the principal source for the view that he subscribed to Locke's political 
theory. This attribution, which scholarship has since convincingly refuted, 
seems to have been held as dubious even in the 1790s. However, Priestley, 
Christie and other radical writers appear to have held Somers' possible 
authorship as expedient, so that by quotes from the text showing it supported 
such notions as "natural rights of men" and government as "trust", they 
could identify 1688 and Somers with Locke, while positioning Burke in 
opposition to them.66
65 Parr Sequel p. 96; Towers, Thoughts on the commencement of a new parliament. With an appendix, 
containing remarks on the letter of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, on the revolution in France 
(Dublin, 1791, reprint) PW vol. I pp. 71-120; Priestley Letters p. 330. Christie Letters p. 165 
(renders name as "Sommers"). Bishop Headley's (mentioned by Priestley with Locke and 
Somers) case was altogether different from Somers' - after having delivered a famously 
Lockean sermon, published in 1705 as The measures of submission to the civil magistrate 
considered, Hoadley had been acknowledged as a Lockean, and Burke never claimed him as 
an ideological predecessor. See Ashcraft "Locke" p. 786.
66 Priestley Letters p. 335; Christie Letters pp. 165-166; Thelwall Rights pp. 447-448 ff. It is hard 
to see how Burke could have maintained his views on Somers, unless he held the said 
attribution of authorship to be spurious. But some scholars still adhere to this attribution. 
J.C.D. Clark for one, in a note to his edition of the Reflections claims that Somers' ideas were 
"far more extreme" than Burke appreciated. Clark brings as proof for this claim two texts 
"generally ascribed to Somers": A brief history of the succession to the crown of England (1688/9), 
which noting the many instances of parliament in regulating and changing the succession to 
the crown concludes that parliament had an unquestionable right to limit, restrain or qualify 
the succession; and the Judgement, which holds a position close to kingship being elective. 
Clark's conclusion is that Burke's attitude to Somers may have owed more to the tatter's
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In other cases yet, Locke's name was mentioned in conjunction w ith that of 
his most famous ideological opponent, Sir Robert Filmer, with the apparent 
intent being to imply an affinity with Filmer's absolutist views, in those 
opposed to Locke's heirs. Such is the case when Belsham ends one of his 
pamphlets adopting towards Burke "the words of Mr. Locke, in speaking of 
Sir Robert Filmer". In a manner suiting his outspoken views and style, we can 
find Thelwall condensing, within a few passages, all of the aforesaid uses for 
Locke's name: accusing Burke of holding aristocratic views, and therefore 
entailing that "what have been called the principles of that [1688] Revolution, 
it seems they are mere trash! Visions and afterthoughts of Lock [sic] and his 
disciples !"; adding (somewhat inconsistently with the accusation of 
supporting aristocracy) against Burke a charge of similarity with Filmer's 
support of despotism; and finishing off with praise of the fact that "the 
reformers and the innovators of the [1688] age, with Somers, Locke and 
Sidney at their head, appealed to the code of Nature for more genuine 
principles; and the clouds of sophistry were scattered by the rays of truth".67 
However, in addition to the general and mainly rhetorical uses of Locke's 
name exampled above, there can also be found among the radical texts many 
instances in which his name and ideas are employed in serious attempts to 
present a theoretical framework for the political opinions presented.
reputation rather than an actual perusal of his writings. See Clark Reflections p. 168 n. 83. 
However, Burke's attitude seems quite plausible, as it was based on the perusal of the views 
Somers publicly owned to, instead of on two anonymously published texts' of uncertain 
attribution. Furthermore, even if Burke allowed Somers' authorship of the Brief history this 
would not have presented a significant problem, as the idea of regulating the succession to 
the throne (for example by restricting it to Protestants only) was something Burke did not 
deny, and in fact explicitly defended. It is only the hardly attributable Judgement that was 
really inconsistent with Burke's principles. For a discussion of the Judgement and of the 
unlikely authorship of Somers, see Ashcraft "Locke" pp. 773-775, 792-793, and 800 (where 
Daniel Defoe is tentatively suggested as the likely author).
67 Parr Sequel p. 96; Priestley Letters p. 330; [Belsham] Historic pp. 95-96; Thelwall Rights pp. 
445, 447-448. For more examples of such employment of Locke's name, see Mackintosh, 
Vindiciae pp. 364-365, and William Belsham, Examination of an Appeal from the new to the old 
Whigs (1792) p. 94.
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Among the most overtly Lockean texts, was James Parkinson's anonymously 
authored 1793 pamphlet The village association, a text ridiculing loyalist claims 
and extolling revolutionary ideas, written in sardonic mock-popular style, 
evidently directed at the educated public. Nearing its end, the tract changes 
tone, and an earnest voice is introduced as a monologue by a character (the 
"curate") which, attempting to show that revolutionary ideas are not at all 
new, but in fact enjoy a distinguished pedigree, declares: "Do not, my friends, 
imagine this to be a new fangled doctrine: peruse the writings of the immortal 
LOCKE who wrote in support of that constitution, which we all so much 
admire, and there you will find the same principle, though perhaps exprest 
[sic] in more forcible and energetic language". And then, as proof for this 
claim, produces four extensive and verbatim quotes from sections 224, 226, 
228, 240 of Locke's Second treatise -  or as it was usually referred to at this time 
the "discourse on civil government".68
Another example of such a direct and extensive use of Locke's name and 
ideas as support for a serious claim is provided by the anonymously authored 
The political crisis: or, a dissertation on the rights of man (1791), which, in its 
attempt to give an account of the character and development of human 
society drew directly from the writings of Locke (and to a lesser extent Paine 
and Priestley). For a number of pages, passages from Locke's Second treatise 
are brought as proof that: the first step towards creating society was the 
voluntary compact between man and wife (sec. 105); at the founding of 
society, mainly in order to protect life and property, natural rights were 
"exchanged" but not reduced (sec. 131); these rights deposited in society are
68 [James Parkinson], The village association of the politics ofEdley. Containing the soldier's tale; the 
headborough's mistake; the sailor's tale; the curate's quotations; and old Hubert's advice (1793) PW 
vol. IV p. 46. For an additional use of quotes from ST (sections 224,225), as justification for 
resistance and revolution, and for the claim that "WHAT HAS BEEN CONSTITUTIONALLY 
DONE AT ONE PERIOD, MAY BE DONE AGAIN", see pp. 83-84 of Henry Yorke's Reason 
urged against precedent, in a letter to the people of Derby (1793) PW vol. IV pp. 67-84. For the ST 
being referred to as "Discourse on civil government" see CST vol. XXV pp. 676-679.
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termed political and include the right of every man to judge in his own cause, 
the right to make treaties and so on, and man can delegate only his own 
power (sec. 135); society can never lose "the native and original right it has to 
preserve itself", and if government derogates from its ends it is dissolved and 
the obligation of the subject to authority ceases (sec. 149); and religion too is a 
natural right (sec. 123).69
Deserving of a significant place within the range of radical publications, and 
their appeals to Locke, are the pamphlets which during the 1790s reported the 
trials of radical writers and activists, such as Thomas Paine, John Muir, 
Thomas Hardy, Henry Redhead Yorke and others, on charges ranging from 
sedition through conspiracy to high treason. These pamphlets offered an 
exceptional opportunity of putting to paper the extreme radical popular 
views, for which authors were being tried (and often convicted) -  while the 
pamphlets' purporting (not always accurately) to be reports of official legal 
proceedings, shielded them from prosecution. An added benefit for radicals 
was that the arguments for the legitimacy of their views and of their being 
expressed, was many times coming from the mouth of such a respectable and 
mainstream figure as the counsel for the defense, Thomas Erskine.70 
In these trials, and in the pamphlets reporting them, John Locke and his ideas 
were repeatedly and prominently appealed to. Both Erskine, as counsel for 
the defense in most trials, and those defendants (like Yorke and Muir) who 
undertook their own defense, frequently employed as a central argument the 
claim that they were being charged for merely reiterating the principles of 
"the immortal Mr. Locke". Often, these appeals to Locke were not limited 
only to general statements about the British constitution, but attempted to 
make particular political claims. Such was the case when Erskine claimed,
69 [Anonymous] The political crisis pp. 116-119.
70 Pamphlets were published reporting the trials of Paine, Muir, Hardy and Yorke. Thomas 
Erskine (1750-1823) was a prominent lawyer and Foxite MP, who Burke described in a letter 
of 1792 as "outrageously French". See COR vol. VII p. 315.
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during Thomas Hardy's trial, that the right to equal representation "stands 
upon the authority of Mr. Locke"; or when during Yorke's trial, the latter, 
defending himself, attempted to prove the constitutional probity of his claim 
that "consent" was the basis of government, by quoting directly from sections 
138 and 140 of Locke's Second treatise.71
Closely related to such attempts at legitimizing demand for radical political 
changes in England by associating them with Locke, were the more ambitious 
claims endeavoring to show that even the French revolution was predicated 
on English and indeed on Locke's political principles. Such was the case with 
Joseph Towers' anonymous Dialogue, where the M ordaunt character inquired 
as to why the "French principles", gave so much alarm to those who opposed 
them, since these principles, that "[a]ll men are bom, and remain, free and 
equal in rights", that the end of all social distinction is the preservation of the 
natural rights of man, and that the principle of sovereignty resides essentially 
in the nation, "appear manifestly to have had their origin in England", and 
are in fact those of Sidney and Locke. William Fox's The interest of Great Britain 
(1793) went even further, asserting that the principles of the revolution in 
France, according to which men are all "free, equal, and independent", did not 
originate from the French declaration of the rights of man, but rather "from 
the celebrated Mr. Locke's Treatise on Government, written avowedly for the 
purpose of defending the English revolution; and for writing which, he was 
rewarded with a thousand a year, from the British government". The same 
claim was reiterated by Erskine who in his speech at Hardy's trial (later 
published as a pamphlet), asserted that the radicals' demands for rights were
71 CST vol. XXIV p. 925, vol. XXV pp.669, 676-679,1099-1100. Additional examples are 
Erskine's extensive use of quotes from ST sec. 192, 221, 222,223,224 and 225 during John 
Home Tooke's trial; and Thomas Muir's long quote from ST sec. 222, in his own defense. See 
GST vol. XXV pp.676-679, vol. XXIII p. 192.
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drawn "from the revered work of Mr. Locke, and not from the revolution in 
France".72
Treatment of all cases and aspects to be found in the 1790s texts, which 
touched on Locke's ideas in a substantial fashion cannot be undertaken here, 
but it is possible to identify a number of core political concepts, repeatedly 
addressed and justified by references to Locke. The most salient among these 
were: (i) social contract (or compact); (ii) government as trust from the people; 
(iii) consent as the source of political authority; and (iv) natural rights.73
(i) Contract - to illustrate the complexity surrounding the use of the term 
contract, (appearing also as compact) within the revolution debate, it is 
sufficient to note that far from being a merely Lockean idiom, the term could 
carry among its many different implications the biblical covenant, the 
Hobbesian compact, the 1688 political settlement (in which the term "original 
contract" was employed by the resolution of the Commons, although not part
72 [Towers] Dialogue pp. 7-10; William Fox, The interest of Great Britain, respecting the French war 
(1793, 3rd edition) pp. 8-10. CST vol. XXTV pp. 923-924, vol. XXV p. 679. Towers7 claim was 
adopted by the reviewer of his pamphlet in the Analytical Review, who asked if it is w ise to 
carry on a war against the "French principles" when it means attempting to "eradicate the 
principles of Sidney and Locke?". See Andrews British p. 160. For another claim that the 
French revolution was the expression of British political principles (although Locke is not 
mentioned), see Belsham Examination p. 40.
73 These themes were identified as central to the Lockean view, and connected directly to
Locke7s writings, as early as 1690 when the influential and popular pamphlet Political
aphorisms, after assaulting the doctrine of passive obedience, put forward its own principles
as - the right of the people to resist the King7s violation of the original contract, power 
reverting to the people when the trust of government is dissolved, consent of individuals as 
the foundation of all government, and the equality of individuals in the state of nature. As 
noted above, the text was to a great extent a plagiarization of Locke7 s Second treatise, bringing 
long (unacknowledged), verbatim passages from it, and R. Ashcraft calls it "an essentially 
Lockean defense of revolution principles". Under different names and versions the text was 
one of the best selling pamphlets of the 18th century with subsequent editions appearing as
late as 1747 and 1771. See Ashcraft, "Locke..." pp. 773-774. Radicals of the late eighteenth 
century, like James Burgh, Richard Price, Joseph Priestley and Thomas Paine, adopted 
Locke7 s theoretical concepts as the ideological foundations for the political reforms they were 
advocating. According to Dickinson, these radicals "believed they were merely reiterating 
Locke7s views when they claimed that the doctrine of natural rights, the contract theory and 
the concept of popular sovereignty (which were all to be found in Locke7s writings) were the 
ideological foundations of a democratic system of government...77. See Dickinson Politics p. 
196.
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of the final declaration of parliament) or Rousseau's Contrat social. In addition, 
the term could be employed alternatively to describe the relations between all 
individuals in society (what might be termed the social contract proper), or 
the relations between the people and their rulers (what might best be termed 
as the political contract), or a combination of the two. Often, writers made it 
impossible to discern which of these (or which combination), was meant. 
Consequently, there is many times a real difficulty in determining what those 
employing the term meant to convey, even at the most literal level. Indeed as 
will emerge later, many authors devoted some passages in their works to 
what they saw as inexact renderings of the term by others. In order to clarify 
matters, it is best to keep in mind that the whole discussion of contract 
revolves around the problem of obligation -  who are obliged to whom, and in 
what consists their obligations. Locke tended to term society or "community" 
(relations between all individuals) as a contractual relation, while attempting 
to cast political relations as a trust (which is not a contract, and obliges only 
the trustees). Burke on his part stressed that both social and political relations 
were one contractual obligation (of what kind shall be later discussed), the 
"engagement and pact of society, which generally goes by the name of the 
constitution".74
Thus the main theme discernible among those radical writers who discussed 
the term contract was an effort to prove the dissolvability of the political 
contract -  mainly by associating it with terms such as "trust" or "consent", 
which implied a conditional in the agreement (the first a conditional in the 
collective, the people; the second possibly, though not necessarily, implying a 
conditional in the individuals) -  against a perceived challenge from those 
who viewed the contract as establishing an irrevocable obligation. Some
74 P. Laslett (ed.) John Locke, Two treatises of government (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1988) pp. 113-116. See also ST sec. 149,221, 240; Reflections pp. 104-106.
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radical writers, prominent among who were Priestley and Paine, put in 
explicit terms what Locke had mainly implied. They united the claim that the 
concept of contract was being misunderstood, with their attempt to prove the 
dissolvability of government. They did this by describing what they held as a 
widespread confusion between what were two distinct elements of the social 
contract, in effect two contracts: a "civil" contract between all individuals 
establishing society, and a "political" contract between the society and its 
rulers. This made it possible for them to maintain that while the governmental 
contract was dissolvable, this did not have to result in total anarchy and 
destruction of society, since society remained standing, irrespective of 
government. The potential, one might say invitation, for revolution with such 
theory was unavoidable. Priestley did not shirk from explicitly pointing this 
out -  asserting that the people have a capability of resuming for themselves 
the political power that the contract had vested in the King, since they may 
"surely recall a trust that has been abused". Hence, if the King breaks the 
"compact" between himself and the people, his rank and privileges are 
"forfeited".75
Other radicals went in the same direction without being so explicit. Belsham 
accused Burke of misusing the ambiguity of words by his associating to the 
term contract ideas suitable to a bargain and sale of cattle, which, once 
concluded "must be adhered to however eventually disadvantageous to 
either of the contracting parties". Instead, Belsham opined, the Whigs of 1688 
used the term contract to express "the redprocality [sic] of obligations which 
must subsist under every legitimate form of Government, between the 
governors and the governed". Rous too censured Burke, for his apparent 
support for "a sort of irrevocable compact", a view, the former implied, 
suspiciously close to that of those contending for supreme divine right of
75 Joseph Priestley, An essay on the first principles of government and on the nature of political civil 
and religious liberty (1771, 2nd edition) p. 9; Priestley Letters p. 334; Paine Rights pp. 165-166.
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kings. Similarly, Charles Pigott, connected contract to the notion of trust, 
albeit without using the latter term, in order to explain that whenever the 
laws become men's "scourge and misery, the obligation ceases; - the compact 
is dissolved", the principle of non-resistance is "exploded", and "the people 
reverting to their original inalienable rights" are bound to resist oppression, 
and "resume the reins of power". And Thomas Cooper -  writing in 
recognizably Lockean idiom without explicitly mentioning Locke -  went even 
further, making the test for dissolving the contract not the people's interests 
but only their will, claiming that unless the "compact" is the expression of the 
consent of the people, it is tyranny and hence illegitimate.76
(ii) Trust -  as already observed in the discussion of contract, radicals raised 
the notion of government as a trust for the people, wishing to prove the 
constitutional setting of the state could be voided by certain actions of those 
in government. The concept of trust means that really there is no political 
contract at all. It makes government merely an agency of the people. Most 
radical writers did not put matters so bluntly, choosing instead merely to 
describe it as a strong condition of the political agreement in the people, with 
the test for its maintenance or its invalidation in the safeguarding of the 
people's interests. Since such a trust stands or falls on who shall be the judge 
of the people's interests, radicals also attempted to aver a connection between 
the concept of trust and that of consent. Richard Price asserted that men with 
power hate "the doctrine, that it is a TRUST derived from the people, and not 
a right vested in themselves". Other texts went farther. The anonymous
76 Belsham Examination p. 96; Rous Thoughts p. 12; Charles Pigott, Strictures upon the new 
political tenets of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, illustrated by analogy between his different sentiments 
on the American and French revolutions (1791) PW vol. II p. 144; Thomas Cooper Reply pp. 93-98. 
See also in Mackintosh Vindiciae p. 334; Christopher Wyvil, A defence of Dr. Price and the 
reformers of England (1792) PW vol. HI p. 258. To Wyvil's pamphlet were also appendixed four 
petitions to parliament requesting parliamentary reforms, with one petition (from Cambridge 
in 1783) very Lockean in content and style - mentioning natural rights, consent of the people 
and the state being a contract.
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author of The confederacy of kings against the freedom of the world approved of the 
actions of the French National Assembly, as being correct "according to the 
principles of Mr. LOCKE and some of the first political writers", who asserted 
that if any branch of a government violates the "trust" from the people, then 
government is "dissolved" and the body of the nation can choose a substitute. 
Belsham stated explicitly that the revolution Whigs' concept of government as 
contract, "much more nearly resembles a delegation, or trust" because "it is 
designed for the advantage and benefit of one of the parties", and revocable 
upon reasonable grounds. And Rous returned to the concept repeatedly from 
different angles - regarding royal authority as a "trust" in the individual 
monarch created for the "sole benefit" of the people; asserting that government 
is not a "property" of those holding it, only a "trust" from the people; opining 
that the people have not only a "perfect right", but, in certain circumstances, 
the duty to resist government, as all power exercised by a part is a trust 
derived from the whole community for their benefit and held only by their 
consent; and attacking Burke for being like the old defenders of the divine 
right of kings, that would not allow the people to judge of the breach of the 
"trust". Gerrald put things in even starker terms when he asserted (without 
mentioning Locke) that: "The power of all legitimate government is a 
lodgement, not a gift; we trust much, but we part with nothing". Other radical 
writers, aware of the criticism against the concept of the people judging of the 
trust/ s breach as profoundly destabilizing of government, attempted to show 
that such a political tool would be used only in extreme cases, by referring 
explicitly to Locke's treatment of the problem. Thus Daniel Stuart noted 
Locke's discussion, in the Second treatise, of the supposed reluctance of 
peoples to change their form of government. And Towers quoted from the 
same source (ST sec. 225), as proof that nations dethrone rulers only in 
circumstances of clear and sustained wrongs. The author of The political crisis, 
evidently not fearing such criticism, simply asserted that, on the basis of
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Locke's Second treatise (sec. 168), the people are those who shall be the judges 
of a situation when the "trust" is forfeited.77
(iii) Consent - the meaning of the term consent, as used by radical writers of 
the 1790s is often ambiguous. As well as being variously used to describe 
individual or collective assent, various adjectives that were sometimes added 
to the term, like "tacit" or "majority" revealed very different interpretations of 
what such consent (whether individual or collective) actually consisted. The 
obvious problem was that accepting an idea of individual consent came very 
close to allowing some kind of universal political right, an idea even the great 
majority of radicals were not prepared to embrace. Thus most radical authors 
using the term, seem to have shirked from defining the term too clearly, 
employing it instead as a general description pertaining to an ill-described 
"people", while preferring to refrain from spelling out the details of what 
such consent consists in, or how it should be gauged. Some authors attempted 
to support their use of the concept, while avoiding treating it concretely, by 
referring directly to Locke's authority. Such was the case with Belsham, when 
he asserted that the base of civil power is the will and the consent of the 
people, while adding that this opinion had been upheld by Blackstone too, 
when the latter was "animadverting upon the same general position, as 
advanced by Mr. LOCKE". Similarly, Rous declared he was merely repeating 
"a doctrine taught by Locke and Sidney, that a legitimate Government can have 
no other foundation than the consent of the people". Other writers went some way 
towards addressing the concrete meaning of the term. Christie, for example, 
while writing approvingly of the French National Assembly assuming 
"supreme power", opined that the act was sanctioned by the whole nation, at
77 Price Discourse p. 14; [Anonymous], The confederacy of kings against the freedom of the world
(1792) PW vol. Ill p. 188; Belsham Examination p. 96; Rous Thoughts pp. 3,12,19, 27; [Gerrald] 
British convention p. 90; Stuart Peace p. 331; Towers Thoughts pp. 114-115; [Anonymous] The 
political crisis pp. 116-119. See also Priestley Letters p. 330, treating the concept without using 
the term trust.
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first "by tacit consent, which was all that could at that time be done", later by 
"innumerable addresses" and last by a "general deputation" to complete the 
solemn "confederation of the people". Although not completely clarifying the 
issue, it plainly emerges from this account that "tacit consent" was acceptable 
to Christie only as a temporary necessity, and that a "general deputation" was 
needed to complete the expression of consent -  a deputation that in the 
French case, it should be remembered, had been elected by universal (male) 
suffrage. It was quite unusual for a writer to spell out, like Thomas Cooper 
did, that he saw the people only as "a multitude of individuals", and their 
political authority as only their aggregate rights, so that authority or 
dominion could be exercised only over an individual who had given his (or, 
as he notes approving of Wollstonecraft's Rights of woman - her) "own 
consent".78
(iv) Natural rights - closely connected to the concepts discussed above 
(particularly consent), the notion of men's "natural" rights, reason and 
equality, was treated by radical writers more straightforwardly. It is evident 
that many radical authors understood and stressed the importance of a 
juridical, Lockean supposition of pre-social human attributes determining the 
relations between individuals and political society, and conveyed by the term 
"state of nature" -  rather than the actual historical stage (as envisaged for 
example by Rousseau). For Locke, though he held the state of nature to have 
been (indeed to still be in the case of primitive societies) a historical stage, 
based his political theory on this state's juridical attributes, on rights and 
reason inherent in "natural" men.79
78 Belsham Examination p. 90; Rous Thoughts pp. 10,13; Christie Letters p. 201; Thomas Cooper 
Reply pp. 98-99.
79 Laslett Two pp. 98-100. ST sec. 13-14,19,49,101. For the divergence between Locke's 
juridical state of nature and Rousseau's historical one, and the treatment of the issue in 18th 
century thought see Ogden "State" pp. 21-22,33.
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Radical writers based their claim for natural rights mainly by identifying 
them with a natural state of reason. Indeed, often such writers seem to have 
understood reason as something exactly opposed to actual history: the 
conflict between history and nature they saw as being about man having or 
not having "natural", pre-social reason and right. The obvious consequence 
being that, if man had qualities that existed in him before and irrespective of 
society, then he was its creator and master; if he lacked such qualities, he 
became the creature and subject of society. Such a message, claiming that true 
reason was the complete opposite of ideas fashioned by society, was delivered 
already in the title of Yorke's 1793 tract Reason urged against precedent, which, 
in its attempt to establish this principle brought in the text a number of 
excerpts and paraphrases from Locke's Second treatise. The same was true of 
Thelwall's treatment of the subject. He proposed that the term "Nature" had 
two completely different meanings in current political discourse: for himself 
and those who thought like him it stood for what is true and can endure the 
"test of reason”, while for those who thought like Burke, it was everything 
having "the hoar of ancient prejudice upon it". He then added that the 
principles of the 1688 revolution and of Locke were those of "the code of 
Nature" (later in the text Thelwall brought his opposition between a-social 
reason and history to its logical conclusion, rejecting the notion that a 
historical law of nations existed, and hence dismissing completely the 
writings of Grotius and Pufendorf).
Joseph Towers, as always making his case-more brusquely, claimed simply 
that the "principles of Mr. LOCKE are certainly much more perspicuous, than 
the account of the rights of men given by Mr. Burke, and they are founded on 
unquestionable reason". In the same vein, Mary Wollstonecraft drew a sharp 
contrast between nature, which she associated with truth and reason, and 
between social artifices, which she viewed as false and distorted. Thus she 
claimed the progress of civilization in Europe was being stopped by
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hereditary property and honors, through which "man has been changed into 
an artificial monster"; and accused Burke of proposing a system that would 
put authority in place of "Nature and Reason". A similar point of view, 
though in a more controlled style, was displayed by the author of The political 
crisis, who answered the anti-radical argument according to which in a time 
"prior to any social compact in society" there would be no laws, with the 
Lockean assertion that even in such a state, there existed in men the law 
precedent to all human institutions, "REASON", which is the law of nature. 
For this and its other claims, instead of proof, the text contented itself with 
referring to the authority of, and to verbatim quotations from Locke's Second 
treatise. Rous addressed the issue of natural equality (while denying the 
notion of an irrevocable contract), by affirming that the truth "seems to be 
what Mr. Locke has taught. All Men are by nature equal". Nevertheless, Rous 
refrained from drawing consequences from this natural equality to practical 
political rights of individuals. Belsham went further when, attempting to 
answer criticism (directed by Burke and others against France) of the notion 
that men are naturally equal and entitled to equal rights, he proposed that 
this notion "we have long been taught by Mr. Locke, and others in this 
country, to consider as a simple, just and noble principle, lying at the very 
foundation of all just reasonings on the subject of Government".
Paine, as usual without acknowledging the obvious Lockean derivation, put 
the anti-historical view in characteristically blunt terms, and claimed that all 
accounts of creation agreed on "the unity of man; by which I mean that man is 
all of one degree, and consequently that all men are bom  equal and with equal 
natural rights, in the same manner as if posterity had been continued by 
creation instead of generation, the latter being only the mode by which the 
former is carried forward". Consequently, he argued that to every one, when
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bom, the world was as new "as it was to the first man that existed, and his 
natural right in it is of the same kind".80
The four concepts discussed above were not usually treated as separate
notions, but rather -  as is evident in many of the examples given -  appeared
in connection with one or more of the others. A good example of the concepts
being treated together, all four appearing as part of one cohesive ideological
whole, is a paragraph from Joseph Towers' Thoughts. In it, while criticizing
what he terms Burke's "most abstruse" and "most obscure" theory of
government, Towers brought forth the purportedly obvious to all, explicitly
Lockean, maxims and principles respecting government (previously
presented by him in a 1782 pamphlet devoted to defending Locke's ideas
from Josiah Tucker's attack) which asserted:
That all legitimate government is derived from the consent of the 
people; that men are naturally equal, and that no one has a right to 
injure another in his life, health liberty, or possessions; and that no 
man in civil society ought to be subject to the arbitrary will of 
others, but only to known and established laws, made by general 
consent, for the common benefit. That no taxes are to be levied on 
the people, without the consent of the majority, given by 
themselves, or their deputies. That the ruling power ought to 
govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary 
dictates, and undetermined resolutions. That kings and princes, 
magistrates and rulers of every class, have no just authority but 
what is delegated to them by the people; and which, when not
80 Yorke Reason pp. 67-84; Thelwall Rights pp. 445, 405, 450; Towers Thoughts pp. 116-117; 
[Anonymous] The political crisis pp. 114-117; Mary Wollstonecraft, "A vindication of the rights 
of men" in S. Tommaselli (ed.), Mary Wollstonecraft, A vindication of the rights of men and A  
vindication of the rights of woman (Cambridge, 1995) pp. 9, 64, and on pp. 44-45 where she 
asserted that Locke would have thought little of the Commons' eloquence (praised by Burke), 
as he believed it was more often employed to dissemble the truth than to "support cool 
judgment"; Rous Thoughts p. 13; Belsham Examination p. 63; Paine Rights p. 85, and in a 
footnote on p. 126, he brought forth the notion of "a compact between God and man", as the 
relation in which man stands "in his individual person towards his Maker -  and which, 
therefore is prior to society, and cannot be changed or altered by human law or authority. 
This also means that governments cannot interfere in this relation".
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employed for their benefit, the people have always a right to 
resume, in whatever hands it may be placed.81
Thus, in almost all of the prominent radical writings of the 1790s are found 
recurring references to Locke and his ideas, their authority invoked in aid of 
the radical argumentation, whether general or specific. All radical tracts 
which mentioned Locke, either in passing or with a serious treatment of his 
ideas, expressed support for his notions. But perhaps most important, in their 
support for Locke's ideas and the use of his name, there was no real difference 
between radical writers. Writers from the three groups previously discussed, 
whether espousing moderate or extreme political proposals, were united in 
their embrace of Locke and his views. Moreover, as the above examples 
amply illustrate, radical authors explicitly positioned Locke as the antithesis 
of the views held by Burke. It will evince no great surprise then, that there is 
not even one case in which a radical text presents Locke and Burke as holding 
the same political principles, and in fact all of the radical texts treating Locke 
and his ideas, which also mention Burke, present the two as holding 
diametrically opposed political theories. In other words, all of the important 
texts on the radical side of the revolution debate employed Locke's ideas (and 
almost all, his name also) as part of their theoretical argumentation, and a 
clear attempt can be seen in these texts, to present Burke's ideas, as the 
fundamental antagonists of Lockean political concepts. Any treatment of 
Burke's relationship with Locke and his ideas, must address this rendition of 
him by contemporary radical writers as a staunch anti-Lockean.82
81 Towers Thoughts pp. 96-97. The name of Towers' 1782 tract was A vindication of the political 
principles of Mr. Locke in answer to the objections of the rev. Dr. Tucker, Dean ofGlocester [sic].
82 Most direct in putting forth the Locke versus Burke dichotomy were writers like Towers, 
Belsham and Thelwall, but it was extant, whether implicitly or explicitly, in all radical writers 
who mentioned both thinkers. See, for example, Towers Thoughts pp. 96-97; Belsham 
Examination pp. 63-65; Thelwall Rights pp. 447-448; Mackintosh Vindiciae pp. 364-365; [David 
Williams], Lessons to a young prince by an old statesman, on the present disposition in Europe to a 
general revolution (1791, 6th edition) PW vol. Ill p. 77; Rous Thoughts pp. 12-13.
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In order to complete the perspective on the character and meaning of the 
Lockean dimension of the revolution debate, it is now necessary to turn to the 
views expressed by Loyalists. Compared to the treatment of Locke and his 
ideas by radical authors, among loyalist writers the treatment evinces far less 
uniformity, with loyalist authors who refer to Locke -  far fewer in numbers 
than radical ones -  adopting a range of attitudes, from positive or at least 
neutral to negative. However this range is not evenly distributed. Perhaps the 
only loyalist text displaying a thoroughly Lockean language and 
argumentation, Judge Ashhurst's famous Charge, curiously did not explicitly 
mention Locke at all. The Charge is described by m odem  scholarship as a 
harsh loyalist reaction to the spread of radical ideas. But a perusal of the text 
shows that it attempted to defend the British constitution against the danger 
of Jacobinism from within a Lockean framework. Ashhurst, for example 
justified legal restraints on individuals only as necessary for civil liberty to 
subsist, because "if every man was left to the free and uncontrouled exercise 
of his own will (as in a state of Nature), no man could be secure in his person 
or property". He continued with the argument that men "in a state of Nature, 
as there was no security to property" did not appropriate things further than 
for their momentary necessity, but when they "formed themselves into a state 
of civil society" the consciousness of each in the security of his property 
induced the habits of industry as he looked to the future. He further argued 
that "mankind (on entering into Society) should give up into the hands of the 
governing power of the State, that species of Liberty which resulted from a 
perfect equality in all men". In short, Ashhurst assumed a state of nature and 
a "perfect equality" in it, and described security of property and defense of 
rights as the reason for the creation and retention of the civil order.83
83 William Henry Ashhurst, Mr. Justice Ashhurst's charge to the Grand Jury for the county of 
Middlesex (1792) PW vol. VII pp. 215-218. Claeys terms the Charge as neither polite nor 
parliamentary, but rather more akin in style to the "brawl" of a sailors' tavern. See Claeys
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There were some loyalist writers who explicitly and favorably mentioned 
Locke, but these were all cases of quite general references to his reputation as 
an important thinker, without any treatment of his actual ideas. Such were 
David Rivers' anonymously published Cursory remarks (1792) which while 
ridiculing Paine's claim to be the great harbinger of the rights of man, 
sardonically remarked that, as for "LOCKE and MONTESQUIEU, they 
undoubtedly had some faint glimmerings of light on this important subject" - 
but not much more. Similarly, Alexander Peter in his Strictures on the character 
and principles of Thomas Paine (1792), disparaged Paine's "arrogance bordering 
on insanity" in claiming there was no British constitution, and retorted to it 
with a list of "illustrious characters" who had knowledge of such a 
constitution, among which he numbered Addison, "LOCKE" and Hampden. 
As is evident, in such cases Locke appeared merely as one among a number of 
prominent names, with no argument made based directly on his views -  and 
in all cases, the context was of an attack against Paine (thus the main intent 
seems to have been to establish some distance between Paine and Locke) It is 
instructive to see that writers who took this approach espoused moderate 
loyalist views, with none expressing support for Burke and his ideas, and 
some rather negatively disposed towards them.84
"Introduction" PW vol. I p. xxxviii. For Burke's low opinion of Ashhurst's ideas (concerning 
other matters) see COR vol. VUI p. 344.
84 [Rivers] Cursory p. 130 -  unusually among loyalists, Rivers was a dissenting minister, but 
he publicly broke with dissenters in 1798 over their disloyalty to the state, publishing 
Observations on the political conduct of the Protestant dissenters [1798?]. Alexander Peter,
Strictures on the character and principles of Thomas Paine (1792) PW vol. VI pp. 137. Another 
example was Sir Brooke Boothby, an author whose place in the loyalist camp was at best 
precarious, who mentioned Locke twice: in his anonymously published A  letter to the Right 
Honourable Edmund Burke (1791, 2nd edition) PW vol. II p. 80, wrongly claiming that Locke had 
limited hthe duration of his Carolina constitution to a hundred years; and in his Observations 
on the Appeal from the new to the old Whigs and on Mr. Paine's Rights of man (1792) PW vol. VI p. 
223. A slightly different case was that of the Letters to Thomas Payne (1792) which brought 
Locke's ideas from the Essay to prove Paine was abusing words by not annexing to them the 
ideas they were intended to convey. See [Graham Jephson? -  attribution uncertain], Letters to 
Thomas Payne, in answer to his late publication on the rights of man. By a member of the University of 
Cambridge (1792) PW vol. V pp. 366.
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Next could be found a large group of loyalist authors who, while mentioning 
Locke favorably in one part of their text, in other parts attacked obviously 
Lockean ideas. The inevitable effect was of undermining Locke's authority at 
the same time it was being invoked. These tracts were all convoluted and 
contradictory (some in a spectacular manner), so that it is often unclear if their 
damaging reflections on Locke owed more to the author's conceptual 
confusion than to a deliberate attempt. One such example Robert Nares' 
Principles of government deduced from reason (1792). After presenting the 
fundamental Lockean premise (without mentioning Locke's name) "that every 
man has naturally and essentially a right to govern himself or to be governed by his 
own consent" as perfectly false, Nares' text went on to quote Locke (indirectly, 
from Blackstone's Commentaries) as supporting the rule of a King over the 
inconveniences arising from his mischief, and to add that Locke's "authority" 
upon "this subject will, doubtless, be considered with respect". Another 
example was Sir Lawrence Parsons' Thoughts on liberty and equality (1793), 
which attempted to support the existing British constitution by a curious mix 
of Lockean and anti-Lockean arguments. Parsons opened the discussion by 
asserting that: "The chief end of civil society, Mr. Locke, in his Treatise on 
Government, says, is the preservation of property; men, in a state of nature, 
having different dispositions and faculties, some will acquire a greater 
property than others". Later in the text Locke (together with Montesquieu) 
was appealed to as an authority proving that limited monarchy was the best 
constitution, and Paine reviled for not understanding this. But then Parsons 
proceeded to reject some of Locke's most important political principles, 
among other things denying a natural right of majorities over minorities and, 
the people's right to change the constitution.85
85 Robert Nares, Principles of government deduced from reason, supported by English experience, and. 
opposed to French errors (1792) pp. 12, 89-91; Lawrence Parsons, Thoughts on liberty and equality
(1793) pp. 6,15-16, 24-25,58. Other examples are William Hamilton, Letters on the principles of
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Other cases of loyalist writers' undermining of Locke and his ideas appear to 
be intentional, in a sometimes circuitous, but nevertheless effective manner. 
Such writers brought up Locke's name in the context of some political idea 
they were considering and, while showing respect for Locke's reputation, 
simultaneously introduced arguments that directly refuted the latter's 
position on that idea. Such was the case with William Cusack Smith's 
anonymously published Rights of citizens (1791), which used the ingenious 
device of employing arguments from thinkers high in the radical pantheon, 
like Rousseau and Locke, in order to refute them by each other's ideas. Thus, 
attempting to undermine the Lockean notion that there is a natural right to 
redress wrongs, he quoted in an apparently praising tone, "the opinion of no 
less wise a man than Locke" (from ST sec. 107), to show that there can be no 
injury where there is no property. Cusack Smith then asserted that since in the 
state of nature there was no property, neither was there an "injury", and 
hence there could not exist a natural right of redress. Similarly, William 
Thomson's 1792, A  letter to Dr. Parr, while rejecting the notion of an a-priori 
constitution, brought as an example the constitution written for the Carolina 
Colony by the "celebrated Mr. Locke", and then explained that only when this 
a-priori constitution was laid aside and another one adopted, the colony 
started to thrive. The same is true for the anonymous text (attributed to Sir
the French democracy, and their application and influence on the constitution and happiness of Britain 
and Ireland (1792-1793 -  originally published in four parts) PW vol. VII, pp. 139-142; (John St. 
John], A letter from a magistrate to Mr. William Rose of Whitehall, on Paine's Rights of men [sic]
(1791) PW vol. V pp. 183, 204 201,189-190,192-193; [Anonymous], Dialogues between a reformer 
and an anti-revolutionist (1794) pp. 2-3, 6-9 (this text while purporting to defend Locke was 
quite Hobbesian -  see particularly pp. 61-62); [Anonymous] Fourth letter, which on pp. 295- 
297 mocked Paine's method of "syllogysm" [sic], sardonically asking how far might 
"Aristotle or Locke" admire its form -  setting Locke as a great logical thinker, but later in the 
text, natural rights are derided; and the anonymous Principles of order and happiness under the 
British constitution. In a dialogue between our parish clerk and the squire (1792), pp. 13-14, where 
the "Squire" character, weaning the "Clerk" from revolutionary ideas, explained that Paine's 
putting the rights of man above the law "directly contradicts Mr. Locke (whom w e are not yet 
prepared to exchange for him)". But the text then went on to deny that any man ever lived in 
a true state of nature.
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George Dallas), Thoughts upon our present situation (1793), which labeled as 
unnecessary Paine's exposition of "axioms" applicable only in a state of 
nature, such as men being bom  free and equal -  to which man, being a 
"rational animal" is anyway not fitted -  since they already had "been much 
better explained to us by Mr. Locke, and other able writers". The apparent 
praise of Locke as an "able writer", in effect placed him among those who 
wrote about inapplicable ideas, and even worse, it implied he was the 
intellectual precursor of the dangerous revolutionary Paine. In short, such 
writers, designated Locke as "wise", "celebrated" and "able", while openly 
rejecting his fundamental political theories.86
Next there were those loyalist writers who rejected Locke and his ideas 
straightforwardly and explicitly, but without offering any detailed refutation 
of the whole or of particular ideas. The harshest terminology towards both 
Locke and his ideas, was usually that employed by American loyalists who 
had been forced by the rebellion to flee the colonies. Such was the case with 
Isaac Hunt's Rights of Englishmen (1791), which, while denying Paine's idea of 
contract, asserted the failure of "[t]he whole tribe of republican writers, from 
the great Apostle Locke down to his disciples Messrs. Price and Priestley", in 
their attempt to establish the said idea as the "origin of government". Equally 
damning was Jonathan Boucher in the 1797 version of his text, On civil liberty,
86 [William Cusack Smith], Rights of citizens, being an examination of Mr. Paine's principles, 
touching government. By a Barrister (1791) PW vol. V pp. 272-273, 276; William Thomson, "A 
letter to Dr. Parr", appendixed to Parr's Sequel p. 173; [Sir George Dallas], Thoughts upon our 
present situation, with remarks upon the policy of a war with France (1793) pp. 14-15.A somewhat 
different case was that of the anonymous The two systems of the social compact, and the natural 
rights of man examined and refuted (1793). This text after rejecting the notion of natural rights, 
which it identified with Price and Paine, as de-legitimizing all governments not based on 
universal suffrage, proceeded to criticizing the notion of social compact, which it identified 
with Locke -  and Burke. In attempting to distance Locke from the natural rights views of 
Price and Paine, the text merged Locke's and Burke's views on contract, and in the process 
displayed a comical failure to understand the substance of Locke's political ideas. See 
[Anonymous] Two systems (1793) pp. 26-27, 6-7, 8-10,20-21. The DNB attributed the pamphlet 
to Thomas Green. But considering the lackluster manner and content of argumentation in this 
case, as compared to Green's other writings, the attribution seems to me extremely unlikely. 
See Sir Leslie Stephen, The dictionary of national biography (1885-1903) vol. XXIII pp. 497-498.
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passive obedience and non resistance, where, after dissenting from various
Lockean ideas, he remarked that Locke's principles were merely those of the
English civil war, "new-dressed", and that "there is hardly a principle or
project of any moment in Mr. Locke's Treatise, of which the rudiments may
not be traced in some of the many political pieces which were then [at the
time of the civil war] produced". However, the most prominent among
writers who caustically berated Locke in the 1790s was not a refugee from
America, but rather the prolific loyalist author and editor John Gifford. In his
A letter to the Hon. Thomas Erskine (1797), after declaring as Erskine's "grand
principle" the notion that that all lawful government is an emanation from the
whole people, Gifford (giving as his source the eight chapter of ST, covering
sections 95-122) claimed this was
a principle which has been before advanced by that arch­
propagator of wild conceits, that wholesale fabricator of fantastical 
systems of polity, (accuse me not of political blasphemy!) John 
Locke, who had scarcely given birth to this shapeless abortion, 
when he crushed it at a stroke, by proving the impossibility of its 
existence. He was compelled to acknowledge that 'the coming into 
society upon such terms would be -  only to go out again'.
A short time later, Gifford published A second letter to the Hon. Thomas Erskine 
(1797), to which he added a postscript citing, and attempting to refute, the 
criticism directed at his first Letter by the three prominent radical literary 
reviews. He addressed the reviewers' criticism of his attack on Locke by 
stating: "I was aware that, in attacking the Great Father of Democracy, Mr. 
Locke, I had administered a pill too bitter to be swallowed by those Critics, 
who regarded that philosopher as their grand idol, and who, in warmth of 
their zeal, extended their veneration to his modem disciples, the Republicans 
of France".87
87 Isaac Hunt, Rights of Englishmen, an antidote to the poison now vending by the transatlantic 
republican Thomas Paine (1791) pp. 15-16; Boucher, "Civil" pp. 531-532 (in his attempt to show
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Other loyalist writers rejecting Locke's ideas adopted a more respectful
manner and directed their criticism at particular political ideas of Locke, but
his wider culpability was very much obvious. Such was the case with Thomas
Green's An examination of the leading principles of the new system of morals (1799),
where the writer, in his attempt to refute sense-based utility as a possible
basis for a moral and political order, identified Locke as the central influence
that facilitated the wider public acceptance of the erroneous principles
founded on such a base:
The system of philosophy advanced by Mr. Locke, a System the 
most level to common apprehension, the most applicable to 
common life, and eventually the most popular and operative that 
was ever offered to the world, - by exploding all occult principles 
either of belief or action, and reducing the latter, simply to a desire 
of personal pleasure and aversion to personal pain, as it resolved 
the former, into a perception in each individual of the agreement or 
disagreement of his ideas, had fully prepared the public mind for 
the reception of this doctrine.
Another case was Gilbert Francklyn's anonymously published A  candid 
inquiry into the nature of government, and the right of representation (1792), a 
respectful but firmly anti-Lockean text. Francklyn, quoting at length from the 
ST, pointed out various places where he believed Locke's argumentation to be 
defective. He noted that when asked to be shown the point in history where
how low had Locke's esteem sunk, Boucher quoted from Gifford's Erskine attack); Gifford 
Erskine p. 56; Gifford Second Letter pp. 79-80. The attacks on Gifford were in The Monthly 
Review of July 1797, The Critical Review of July 1797 and The Analytical Review of May 1797. 
Gifford did not attempt a detailed analysis and rebuttal of Locke's political ideas, maintaining 
that "the principles of Locke will be analysed [sic] by a more able pen" -  referring to was that 
of his good friend and ideological companion, John Bowles, then in the process of composing 
a comprehensive attack on Locke. For Gifford's reply see his Second letter pp. 71-80. In 
addition to his pamphlets, Gifford also hammered on about Locke as the source of 
revolutionary ideas in the Anti-Jacobin of which he was editor, see Andrews British pp. 147, 
109. It is worth considering that loyalist criticism of Locke could be detected not only in 
pamphlets and periodicals, but also among the many "anti-Jacobin" novels published in the 
1790s. In Sophia King's Waldorf; or, the dangers of philosophy (1798), the eponymous hero is led 
astray by the speculative ideas and devious schemes of "the new philosopher Herdi Lok". 
Lok's instructions are that man should decide his course solely by his own "never erroneous" 
reason, while keeping the heart in subordination. See Grenby Anti-Jacobin pp. 79-80.
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"equality of man" existed, "although Mr. Locke states this objection in its full 
force, in order to confute it, he rather evades than answers it, - he in a manner 
confesses he cannot give such an instance". He also remarked that Locke 
could not supply actual examples by which to support his political principles, 
and in the one attempt to do so, the example (Francklyn refers his readers to a 
quote from ST sec. 105, discussing Venice) directly confuted them. A further 
target for Francklyn's criticism was Locke's negation of children's 
subordination to their parents.
An additional example in this group is the anonymous An humble address to 
the most high, most mighty and most puissant the sovereign people (1793), an anti­
revolutionary text of sardonic style, but serious arguments. The author 
testified to "great respect for the opinions of Locke, but I apprehend he has 
used expressions too loose and general in his Essay on Government, which 
are liable therefore, to be greatly misunderstood, or misinterpreted". To 
illustrate the "loose" expressions, the author raised a number of rhetorical 
questions as to the meaning of several important assertions by Locke. Among 
these questions: what is the criterion of positive laws' goodness or obligation, 
and of the extent of their agreement with the law of nature? Who shall be the 
common interpreter of the law of nature? The author believed that such 
questions necessarily led to the self-defeating final problem, to the effect that, 
"[n]o such person being discoverable, has every man a right to erect a tribunal 
in his own breast, and to determine whether the powers that rule act 
according to the law of nature and ought to be obeyed ?".88
88 Green Examination pp. 350-351; [Gilbert Francklyn], A candid inquiry into the nature of 
government, and the right of representation (1792) pp. 21, 22-25; [Anonymous], An humble address 
to the most high, most mighty and most puissant, the sovereign people ([Dublin], 1793) pp. 20-21. 
Another example is Thomas Lionel Freeman's 1793 An address to the disaffected subjects of 
George the third, which, while considering the concept of liberty, brought two definitions, one 
from Justinian's Corpus, the second from Locke's Essay (book II, chapter 21, paragraph 8), and 
then declared neither to be correct, for, according to him, both assumed man in a situation 
that never existed: "Independence". See Freeman Address pp. 360-361.
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Finally there were a small number of loyalist authors, who produced some of 
the most intellectually substantive loyalist texts, in which they combined a 
factual and respectful language together with a systematic condemnation of 
Locke and his ideas. Tatham's Letters to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke on 
politics is an interesting and rather well written text, which was one of those 
most ferociously attacked by radical authors. Formally addressed to Burke, 
Tatham's pamphlet was a closely argued attempt to support Burke's 
Reflections against its opponents, the "philosophical politicians", those who 
"assume to be great philosophers". Educated "in the school of a Locke and a 
Rousseau, and enamoured of the perfect commonwealth of Mr. Hume" the 
"philosophical politicians" cherish the sentiments of "the subversion of all 
kinds of governments, and an incessant desire of change in every polity, till 
their own ideal city be established". Attempting to present an avowedly 
Aristotelian alternative to the "political speculations of our m odem  sect of 
philosophical dreamers", Tatham did not focus his attack only on Locke and 
his ideas. But singling out from the "modem sect" the Lockeans Price and 
Priestley (he also mentioned Lofft's Remarks), he made clear that among the 
sources of their notions among earlier thinkers, Locke's name and his ideas 
(especially that of contract) figured most prominently.89 
If Tatham's censure of Locke's ideas was still relatively contained, 
approaching them as the source for derivative ills, Samuel Cooper's The first 
principles of civil and ecclesiastical government, (1791) directed its criticism far 
more explicitly. Seizing on Priestley's claim to present fundamental principles 
of government according to "Lord Somers, Mr. Locke, and Bishop Hoadley", 
Cooper savaged him as a "bigot to the infallibility of Locke", while being a
89 Thatham Letters pp. 22, 64, 88-89, 93-94, 97-98,102-103.1. Kramnick identifies Tatham as the 
most vocal denouncer of Locke (together with Josiah Tucker), but he overlooks the 
importance and resonance -  at least equal if not greater than Tatham's -  of the attacks on 
Locke by Samuel Cooper, Gifford and Bowles. Indeed none of the latter three is even 
mentioned by Kramnick. See Kramnick "Republican" pp. 652-653.
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skeptic to the authority of Christ. Ignoring Somers and Hoadley, Cooper
concentrated solely on Priestley's debt to Locke's political ideas - presenting
his own views of those ideas, and their relation to Burke's, thus:
I can so easily conceive, that Mr. Burke may differ from Mr. Locke's 
principles in his treatise on government, without forgetting them, 
that I am utterly unable to conceive, how they can possibly be 
admitted by any one, who has been previously habituated to much 
thought and deep reflection, before he happens to read them, 
wither in consequence of his own choice, or in obedience to the 
command of his tutor. That Mr. Locke, must always stand 
deservedly very high, in the temple of fame, it would be folly or 
injustice to deny. But, that he was not ALWAYS clear in his first 
principles, nor right in his deductions from them, even in ANY of his 
works, and more particularly in those, upon CIVIL GOVERNMENT, 
may be asserted with truth, because it is capable of demonstration.
Burke's political principles were thus explicitly opposed to Locke's, and the 
tatter's found wanting, with Cooper opinion of Locke's ideas put in an even 
starker light by his later observation that from the first moment he tasted 
Locke's "principles upon government" they never appeared to him to have 
the flavor of the "well of truth".90
While Tatham and Samuel Cooper concentrated their efforts more on 
defending their own (and to a great extent what they presented as Burke's) 
views of the commonwealth, than attacking Locke's theory, it was John 
Bowles who produced the most systematic and sustained refutation of that 
theory. Among his many writings against the revolution during the 1790s, 
Bowles devoted significant efforts to describing the fundamental theoretical 
failings of the revolutionary approach to political constitutions, gradually 
identifying Locke's ideas as the primary source for these. His first effort in 
this direction was Thoughts on the origin and formation of political constitutions
90 Samuel Cooper First pp. 27-28, 32-34, 37. For reactions in the periodical press to Cooper's 
pamphlet and to his belief that he had "demolished the principles of Mr. Locke and his 
followers", see Andrews British p. 29.
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(1795), which addressed the latest French attempt at constitution, presented a
quite Burkean analysis of a constitution as "originally founded upon power,
of which it is but a modification, and it cannot be derived from any other
source. All Government is power, variously combined". In the course of time
it acquires "the accumulative force derived from habit, education, attachment,
confidence, respect for antiquity, religious principle, and even from prejudice
itself", and these "moral influences", themselves constituting its principal
strength, themselves become stronger every day. Three years letter, Bowles
published The retrospect (1798), a collection of his tracts, in which he added to
the (somewhat modified) text of the Thoughts a lengthy section described as
his "Reflections on Mr. Locke's System". Bowles claimed that "The source of
those erroneous and ruinous systems, which, in modem times, have assumed
the dignified name of Philosophy, is a mistaken idea respecting the origin of
Government, and, indeed, of society", the idea being that "a state of society
was preceded by, what they call, a state of nature". Such "crude and
unnatural speculations" Bowles continued, had long floated in the minds of
men, and disturbed the peace
when they acquired an unfortunate respectability and influence, 
from being seriously adopted and strenuously supported by Mr. 
Locke. That writer moulded [sic] them into a system, which has 
since been the creed of a party, who, under the denomination of 
Whigs, consider themselves as the only friends to civil liberty.
Bowles proceeded to attempt and show by lengthy quotes from the "Treatise 
on Civil Government" how "Mr. Locke is certainly the best possible evidence" 
to such system's impracticability. He sardonically pointed out a list of men's 
incredible capabilities in the state of nature, without which they could never 
create a contract, that are supplied by Locke "by the sole effort of 
imagination": to surmount the lack "of a common language" and thoroughly 
understanding each other "framing such a wonderful connection, which, 
according to him, has no foundation in nature"; to "inspire them at once with
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confidence and harmony" so that they overcome "that mutual fear and
animosity, which are natural to mankind"; to lead such "untutored brutes"
with "a prophetic impulse to understand that though they can create the
commonwealth by consent, to manage it majority rule will be needed. After
dissecting Locke's ideas, Bowles charted the historical course by which after
the "leveling doctrine of a natural equality of rights" had afforded a pretext for
many discontents and insurrections "[a]t last arose a sect of Philosophers,
with Mr. Locke at their head, who inculcated these principles as a system"
teaching that "the whole frame of society originated in the individual exercise
of natural and unalienable rights", that the members of society are "at all
times, intitled [sic] to dissolve the bonds which they had voluntarily formed"
and bring "before their High Tribunal the persons, whom they had invested
with authority". These ideas had generated in England those termed by
Bowles Locke's "coadjutors", the "Prices and Priestleys of m odem  times"; and
in France, the revolution. Thus,
If Mr. Locke were to rise from his tomb, and behold the fruits 
which have been produced by his tree of liberty, which, after 
languishing for a century in this Country, has, at once, attained a 
luxuriant maturity, by being transplanted into Gallic soil, he 
would, himself, lay the axe to the root of that tree. -  He would 
implore forgiveness of God and Man, for the mischief he had 
unintentionally done -  for the very large share he had had in 
causing the inexpressible miseries which, for these nine years, have 
afflicted the human race.91
To complete the picture of loyalist writers' attitudes to Locke and his ideas, it 
is convenient to examine their treatments of the four principal Lockean terms,
91 John Bowles, Thoughts on the origin and formation of political constitutions. Suggested by the 
recent attempts to frame another new constitution for France (1795) pp. 23-24; John Bowles, The 
retrospect; or a collection of tracts, published at various periods of the war. Including some reflections 
on the influence of Mr. Locke's theories on government, in producing that combination of anarchy and 
oppression, which has assumed the name of Jacobinism (1798) pp. 290-297, 300-301, 312-314, 318- 
320. Bowles is described by Sack as "arguably second only to Burke himself in his impact on 
the formation of right-wing ideological opinion in the 1790s". See Sack Jacobite p. 244.
81
that have been already been identified and considered in the discussion of the 
radical writers of this period.
(i) Contract - Loyalist writers who addressed the term contract, usually 
displayed an understanding of the radical's attempt, rooted in Locke's 
thought, to establish the existence of two separate contracts -  one social, 
another political (with the latter often conditional or no contract at all). There 
were loyalist writers who simply denied the term bore any relation to truth. 
However, most loyalist writers addressing the term chose to assign it a 
different meaning. They treated it as denoting the framework of obligations 
necessary for political society to exist, but they rejected not only the 
possibility of a contract having been (or ever being) an actual event, and 
denied the possibility of dissolving it. According to this interpretation of 
contract, there was no possible distinction between the contract's social and 
political elements, therefore making it impossible to dissolve one part without 
irretrievably destroying the whole. Furthermore, such a contract was declared 
not an agreement between independent individuals, but an obligation men 
incurred irrespective of their consent (famously defined by Josiah Tucker in 
the term, borrowed from civil law, "quasi-contract").92
Tatham is an example of those who denied the concept of contract completely, 
asserting that the existence of an actual compact was "a mere fiction of Mr. 
Locke and others, to give a plausible foundation to the science of politics, 
without any foundation in itself, and has been productive of a specious train 
of political falsehoods". He added that that even if the existence of such a 
compact was allowed, it would be so ancient that innumerable changes 
wrought on it along times and states meant its original form could not 
anymore be regarded as an authority in the polity. Hunt, after denying either 
"Locke" or his disciples to have established "'personal individual compact' as
92 Tucker Treatise pp. 141-146. See also OED vol. XII pp. 1002-1003. The term derived from the 
roman "ex quasi contractu", and was connected to the wider concept of "negotiorum gestio".
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the origin of government", offered his own understanding of the contract as 
"founded in nature, coeval with society, and recognized by tacit consent". 
Gould on his part, while defending Burke from his detractors, scoffed at 
attempts by a radical like Towers, who had "taken great pains to prove the 
existence of an original contract between King and people" -  since Burke had 
never denied this, and in fact expressly mentioned its existence. What Gould 
denied was the inference made by radicals that parliament dethroning a 
particular King for "a breach of the compact", meant it had a right to change 
the constitution. And Green offered a rationale for the reticence towards 
dissolving the contract, by asserting that in the past the English when finding 
something wanting in the polity, amended it, but "prudently declined 
dissolving Government, least the social particles which are compacted 
together and regulated by it might fly off" and would demand greater 
exertions to reunite them than could be foreseen.93
(ii) Trust -  Attempting to assign to this term too a meaning that was different 
from that espoused by radicals, those loyalist writers who addressed trust 
were on the whole more unanimous in their attitudes than when treating 
contract. The efforts of loyalists were directed at retaining the idea that 
government is accountable, while at the same time rejecting views according 
to which the judge of such accountability is the population at large. This
93 Tatham Letters pp. 48-49; Hunt Rights pp. 15-16 (where Hunt remarked that the 
establishment of a new government in America showed there was not an entry of each 
individual into a contract); Gould Vindication p. 89; Green Slight observations p. 216. See also 
{Anonymous], Rights upon rights with observations upon observations (1791) PW vol. V p. 106, 
about the "compact" of government supposing a "combination of the whole strength of 
society in opposition to the freedom of the individual", for the purpose of general defense. 
For a different loyalist view, denying any sort of contract, see [Anonymous] Cursory remarks 
p. 119, where the argument is made that unfortunately for both those who maintain an 
original contract between magistrate and people, and "those who wish now-a-days to see 
governments begin again from the chaos of anarchy", the confusion and unsettled 
circumstances at times of revolutions or of new settlements of constitutions mean that the 
opinions of the citizens are even less attended to than in the common course of 
administration. On conservative attitudes to the term contract, see Dickinson Liberty pp. 298- 
299.
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distinction was made by asserting that while a particular person acting as 
trustee (like the King), might in some circumstances be replaced, the terms of 
trusteeship (the constitution) must remain fixed. In other words, loyalist 
writers defined as the subject of trusteeship not the population but the 
constitution. Accordingly, Cusack Smith described the relation between the 
people and the King as being that of "a principal trustee of their liberties", 
and stressed he is "not their servant". In other words, the subject of 
trusteeship is the constitutional liberties, not the political will of the people. 
This view was put forward more directly by the anonymous author of A  letter 
to Mr. Pain, who wrote that the British King, Lords and Commons had been 
declared "the perpetual and hereditary Guardians", the trustees, of the British 
constitution, and that to "them alone are confided our civil and religious 
liberties; they hold them in trust for us and our heirs for ever". Thus the 
British government was described as the trustee for the constitution -  not for 
the people. The same point was made, by implication, in Gould's dismissal of 
Catharine Macaulay's claim that Burke made the house of representatives 
redundant when he opined that the King and the Lords were "several and 
joint trustees" to the whole (and not only some parts) of the kingdom. Gould's 
reply was that Burke simply meant that King and Lords were securities to the 
people, not their representatives. Bowles set things even more clearly, when 
he attacked the contention of a "set of visionary speculatists", adopted and 
supported "by Mr. Locke", that "the powers of Government are merely a 
trust, created by the People, which they, at all times, are intitled to recal [sic], 
and to vest, at their discretion, in other hands". Instead, Bowles argued, a 
constitution is "the spontaneous production of time and circumstance. It is an 
effect rather than a cause. It is produced a posteriori-never a-priori. It is 
governed by a thousand influences, over which man has no control". But it 
was Tatham who rejected the concept of a trust from the people in the starkest, 
terms. Attacking thinkers who held that civil authority is a trust from the
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people, legal government is the choice of the people, and magistrates are 
removable at the people's pleasure, he argued that "enlightened" principles 
such as those could not fail to bring polity and government to "a blaze".94
(iii) Consent -  Loyalists adopted towards this term a range of attitudes 
which, apparently different, were all directed at defusing the individualistic 
political implications of the term. Some writers rejected the term altogether; 
those who accepted it attempted to neutralize its individualistic implications 
by defining it as a very general kind of political acquiescence, thus implying 
that to bring about a change in the frame of government, something close to 
unanimity was needed. One prominent example of a loyalist author outright 
denying consent was Nares, who opined that since wisdom and goodness 
have a right to govern, it is then perfectly false "that every man has naturally 
and essentially a right to govern himself, or to be governed by his own consent". 
Nares also denied that large bodies of men have such an essential right of 
"governing themselves", since what individuals lack, the aggregate of 
individuals cannot have. Gifford too, forcefully attacked those like Erskine 
who told "the people, in direct terms, that they have an unquestionable right 
to destroy the Government whenever they please, because you say it exists 
only by their consent". For Gifford, such assertions were doubly improper, 
because fomenting unrest at a particularly problematic time for Britain, and 
because these "ideas of the origin of Government are extremely erroneous". 
Other loyalist writers conceded consent but treated it as a general and 
collective political assent, instead of an individual Capacity. Sewell described 
the English constitution as "established by general Consent of the whole 
English Nation". Addressing the legitimacy of the hereditary succession in 
the Protestant line asserted in 1688, Hawtrey proposed that "the nation
94 [Cusack Smith] Rights p. 285; [Anonymous], A letter to Mr. Pain [sic], on his late publication
(1792) PW vol. VI p. 159; Gould Vindication p. 99; Bowles Retrospect pp. 288-289, 291-292. 
Thatham Letters pp. 45-47, 61-62.
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acquiesced in that establishment, and thereby made it its own act as much as 
if the universal body of the people had personally consented to and approved 
of it". The anonymous author of Considerations explained that in England the 
"general consent" of the "great body of the people" to their institutions 
greatly exceeded that of other peoples. The anonymous author of A  rod in the 
brine asserted that everywhere "Governments have been established by 
universal consent".95
(iv) Natural rights -  this was the term most widely and harshly attacked by 
loyalist writers, probably because farthest removed from the accepted 
rhetorical formulas of the English political tradition. Some writers simply 
denied the actual existence of a state of nature. Hawtrey, saw the 
philosophers' "state of nature, which they dwell so much upon, and from 
whence they would derive the rights of man", as inconsistent with the 
account of the origin of the human race in the Bible. Freeman too rejected as 
contrary to scripture the concept of "Rights of Man, as they are said to exist in 
a State of Nature", but added that even if such state did exist, it would not 
have been one of freedom and equality but rather a rude and violent 
condition, in which men would soon turn to reliance on the strong and the 
wise. Other writers concentrated on denying any beneficial dimension 
assigned to the state of nature. Such was the case with Tatham, who rejected 
the notion of pre-social"natural rights" to life, liberty or property, asserting 
that the natural rights of a man are properly civil and social rights dependent 
on the support of the government or polity. Similarly, Bowles wrote that a 
state of society "may with propriety be called the natural state of M an...". He
95 Nares Principles pp. 12-13; Gifford Erskine pp. 165-166; Sewell Rejoinder p. 167; Hawtrey 
Various opinions p. 70; [Anonymous] Considerations p. 94; [Anonymous] A rod p. 22. In some 
cases when discussing consent, the language employed comes close to the Lockean idea of 
tacit consent, but the notion of such consent being in the individual is never conceded. See 
Thomas Hearn, A short view of the rise and progress of freedom in modem Europe, as connected with 
the causes which led to the French revolution (1793) PW vol. VI p. 354; [Anonymous] Cursory 
remarks p. 121; Hunt Rights pp. 15-16; and Tatham Letters pp. 70-72.
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added that in what is "erroneously called a state of Nature" inequality is 
destructive to all peace and order, favoring the strong and vicious, while the 
inequalities of society are in truth calculated for the benefit of all. Vincent 
attacked the political philosophy of the state of nature, writing that "[s]ome 
philosophers, perhaps, may be rash enough to assert that society ought to be 
dissolved. But to this we cannot assent, because a state of nature, for one evil 
it removes, induces a thousand more noxious and more destructive; it does 
not better the conditions of the poor, but destroys all the other classes in the 
community; it does not relieve the poor from oppression, but deprives them 
of protection and support".
More specifically, the idea of natural equality (whether connected to the state 
of nature or not), as dangerous and spurious in character, was a theme taken 
up by virtually all loyalist writers, even relatively moderate ones. Such was 
the case with Thomson, who denied outright the idea that all men are "equal 
by nature". For Dallas notions such as men being bom  free and equal 
"explained to us by Mr. Locke, and other able writers" are applicable only to a 
state of nature - to which man is not fitted, since created a "rational animal" 
he is fitted for society. Dallas did not claim here for man a pre-sodal natural 
reason but rather proposes that reason and society are coeval, "a state of 
reason, which begets society", in which men are not equal, since their societies 
are so different. And the anonymous author of Rights upon rights added that 
men are not bom  free equal or independent: they are dependent on their 
parents during infancy; in their modification of mind and body they are more 
unequal than any of the animals; and only with mutual help among men can 
they overpower the power of those who would subdue their independence in 
a "state of nature". The anonymous author of A  rod, illustrating what an 
actual state of nature was, sarcastically remarked towards Paine that it is the 
Hottentots "as they have no other honors among them, are in full possession
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liberty, and in their manners nearly approaching to the first ages of the world, 
he must, if consistent with himself, esteem most happy".
Other writers yet, approached the issue from another angle. Without treating 
the state of nature at all, they focused instead on the problem of natural rights 
being indefinite. For Green, natural rights of man (just as the divine rights of 
governors) were useless jargon. The reason he gave was that since rights are 
only "a claim under law admitted by both parties", if the particular law of a 
society is set aside, and an attempt is made to derive rights from some 
superior law -  of nature, of god, of religion -  then, unless this law is 
"expressed in some universally acknowledged code" (which had not yet been 
discovered), only endless errors and contradictions follow. Claims fluctuate 
and vary with opinions, clash with each other, and "destroy themselves, and 
confound all order and society, and peace and comfort". While someone will 
consider every law whatsoever as an infringement of his natural rights, 
another will assert a privilege of persecuting those who differ from his views. 
Jones too stressed the problem with claiming rights when different groups of 
people disagreed about them: since there was no law above rights to decide 
between claims, the question had to be settled by a civil war. On his part, 
Gifford warned (particularly at a time, when "the right of resistance and 
insurrection has been openly preached by the modem apostles of liberty") 
from the ever increasing "stock of imaginary rights". It was Samuel Cooper 
who displayed one of the most sustained and systematic rejections of all ideas 
of natural rights and natural reason, explicitly connecting them to Locke. 
Cooper expressed surprise at finding Priestley "seriously defending Locke's 
notions" that all men are bom  free and equal; was suspicious of Locke's use of 
the term reason as a kind of weapon by which a man can at any time "subdue 
the instincts, desires, inclinations, and passions of our nature", since when 
there is no "moral science" or law to enable one to direct his reason, this 
becomes merely the choice between passions and instincts; and asserted that
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"the mistake, which led Mr. Locke in to this maze of error", was his belief in 
natural rights. Cooper also pointed to the anarchic trend inherent in all 
notions of so-called natural rights, because if such "RIGHTS were 
NATURAL;- then GOVERNMENT would be UNNATURAL". After 
concluding that politics and reforms in government should not deal with 
rights that one may whish to have, rights that were by definition 
"INDEFEASIBLE", Cooper proposed that political discussions should only 
address the rights one is entitled to by the constitution under which he lived, 
together with such further particular rights that could be acquired, and be 
compatible with the welfare of one's fellow subjects.96 
The best example of a closely argued and comprehensive rejection of all four 
concepts, explicitly connecting them to Locke, is in Bowles' Retrospect. He 
rejected, each in its turn, the ideas that "the powers of Government are merely 
a trust, created by the People", that "Government derives its origin from 
individual consent, and that it is always subordinate to that will", and that 
there exists "a natural equality of rights". Moreover, he repeatedly assaulted the 
idea of the contract as doubly fallacious - in historical terms because Locke's 
state of nature was a "mere phantom of the brain" in which men never were 
bom  or could subsist even for one day; and in practical terms because 
government "is originally founded upon Power, of which it is but a 
modification, and cannot be derived from any other force".97
96 Hawtrey Various opinions p. 89; Freeman Address pp. 357-358; Thatham Letters p. 34-38; [John 
Bowles], Dialogues on the rights of Britons. Between a farmer, a sailor, and a manufacturer (1792) 
PW vol. VII p. 259; Thomson "A letter..." p. 175; William Vincent, A discourse addressed to the 
people of Great Britain, May 13th, 1792 (1792) pp. 7-8; [Dallas] Thoughts pp. 14-17; [Anonymous] 
Rights upon pp. 105-106. See also John Somers Cocks, A short treatise upon the dreadful tendency 
of levelling principles (1793) PW vol. VII p. 348; [Anonymous] Remarks on Mr. Paine's pamphlet 
pp. 30-33; [Anonymous], Remarks upon the principles and views of the London corresponding 
society (1795) PW vol. VIE p. 214; [Anonymous] Rod p. 7; [Thomas Green], Political 
speculations, occasioned by the progress of a democratic party in England (1791) PW vol. VII p. 32; 
[Jones] Penny-worth p. 283; Gifford Erskine pp. 167-168; Cooper First pp. 34, 51-53, 69-74,156, 
159-160.
97 Bowles Retrospect pp. 291-292, 317, 300-301, 288-289,3.10.
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It transpires then, that among loyalist writers of the 1790s there was to be 
found a range of attitudes to Locke, going from rating him among the greatest 
of thinkers to execrating him as subversive and dangerous. But, this range 
was not evenly spread. Those expressing positive attitudes did so only curtly 
and in the most general and rhetorical terms, avoiding any substantive 
treatment of Locke's ideas and never even mentioning, let alone quoting from, 
the Two treatises (while the Essay was mentioned and even quoted a few 
times); this attitude may have reflected a realization of the problematic if not 
outright destructive import that many of Locke's political ideas could have on 
the established constitution. Those who expressed apparently ambivalent 
attitudes to Locke, were quite flimsy in their praise, while being specific and 
forceful in their censure of many among Locke's fundamental political 
principles. Those articulating adverse attitudes to Locke and his ideas did so 
directly, and many times extensively and in stark language. Thus even 
authors who expressed some support for Locke's ideas or reputation, were 
rather guarded about it. In those cases where he was commended this was 
done either rather ambiguously or only very generally, and not one 
significant loyalist author can be found that explicitly presented Locke and his 
ideas as the foundation of the British political system. On the other hand, 
those loyalist authors who expressed negative comments about Locke, did so 
forcefully, and most also address his ideas, sometimes in an extended fashion. 
However, it is relatively unusual to find within loyalist writings, explicit 
connections of Locke's ideas to the principles French revolution, such as 
Bowles' assertion that the "system, which, in a few years, has ravaged one 
half of Europe, is lineally descended from the principles taught by Mr.
Locke". Indeed, it is somewhat surprising to find that, although the great 
majority of loyalists who treated Locke were not favorably disposed towards 
him, so many of them expressed their criticism in veiled or implied form. This 
approach becomes even more marked, when it is considered that, as it has
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been shown above, so many radical texts explicitly embraced Locke and his 
ideas as their own. The most probable explanation for this attitude is the great 
reputation that Locke still enjoyed. Certainly all loyalist texts openly 
criticizing Locke also acknowledged his greiat repute, and often expressed 
expectations that their criticism would earn them accusations of what Gifford 
described as "political blasphemy". It is likely that this was the reason many 
loyalist authors who attacked clearly Lockean ideas abstained from 
mentioning Locke's name at all.98
Accordingly, this review of loyalist writers' attitudes to Locke, tenders 
support to the views of scholars like I. Kramnick, who had correctly claimed 
that Tory and clerical writers "often singled out Locke as the sinister influence 
behind radical agitation", but offered only weak demonstration of this point. 
While it refutes the claims of scholars like E.L. de Montluzin that most 1790s 
conservative writers agreed "with many of John Locke's ideas", although they 
rejected his view that government originated with a contract, "since the idea 
had been pre-empted by the Radicals" and believed instead in a "prescriptive 
Constitution". The clear majority of loyalist writers treating Locke criticized 
(often quite harshly) all of his main ideas, including those of natural rights, 
consent and trust. As for the idea of an original contract as the basis for 
government, this was actually supported by most loyalists, many of whom 
recognized in Locke's theory precisely an attempt to avoid the obligation of 
such a political contract. Furthermore, Montluzin's claim that a prescriptive 
constitution was the prevalent view among loyalists, does not bear scrutiny 
when the wide range of political theories their writings offered is 
considered.99
98 Bowles Retrospect p. 318; Reflections pp. 86-87. About radical claims upholding the Lockean 
parentage of the revolutionary ideas see also note 64 above.
99 Kramnick mentions attacks on Locke by Bishops Horsley and Home who were perpheral to 
the 1790s debate, Richard Hey and William Paley who did not explicitly attack Locke's 
politics, and a quote from the Anti-Jacobin, which proves the opposite of his claim -  lamenting
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A final point concerns the high degree of correlation between loyalist writers 
ignoring or actually expressing reservations about Burke's ideas, and their 
articulating positive attitudes to Locke. Thus, the anonymous author of Letters 
to Thomas Payne rejected Burke's proposition that the 1688 settlement is in 
principle binding on posterity, while John St. John in his Letter, claimed that 
Burke's assessment of William the conqueror's constitutional status was 
incorrect. Other loyalist pamphlets which embraced Lockean propositions 
(without mentioning Locke himself) and criticized Burke's views, were the 
anonymous Constitutional letters, which, though directed against Paine, 
espoused Lockean views -  such as regarding a constitution more sacred and 
inviolable the nearer it approached "to the restoration of the rights of nature" 
-  while distancing itself from Burke's principles "in his fallen state of political 
apostacy [sic]"; and the anonymous An address to the Right Hon. William Pitt, 
which presented the Lockean assertion that "the power of Kings results from 
the consent of the People", while accusing Burke of defending despotism.100 
This correlation, though not absolute, was also significant among the loyalists 
who criticized Locke. Although some of those who attacked Locke some 
expressed only lukewarm support for Burke, most of the loyalist writers who 
explicitly and directly rejected Locke and his ideas, and all of those who 
attempted to do so in an extensive and intellectually serious manner, such as 
Francklyn, Tatham, Samuel Cooper and Bowles, indicated an affinity with 
Burke's views.101
radical writers7 perversion of Locke's principles. See Kramnick "Republican" p. 651, 
Montluzin Anti-Jacobins p. 45 note 36.
100 [Jephson?] Letters pp. 364-365, 371; St. John Letter pp. 209, 212; [Anonymous] Constitutional 
letters pp. 147,149-150; [Anonymous], An address to the Right Hon. William Pitt, on the 
probability of a revolution in this country (1792) PW vol. VII pp. 176,182. See also Hearn Short 
View pp. 352-354. The only case I have found, in which it is claimed that Locke and Burke 
agreed, is the Two systems' spectacular misrepresentation of Locke's ideas, discussed above.
101 Tatham's Letters was addressed to Burke, and explicitly attempted to defend the Reflections 
from its attackers, and Burke had expressed his approbation for Tatham's book on scientific 
method The chart and scale of truth (1790). Samuel Cooper's First was a defense of Burke's
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Thus the dichotomy explicitly proposed by many radical authors between the 
ideas of Locke and Burke, was to a great degree mirrored in the loyalist camp 
too. With these considerations, this study now turns to the discussion of 
Burke's ideas, in the revolutionary debate.
Reflections from Priestley's attack, and Cooper also wrote to Burke on 10th November 1790 a 
private letter expressing his admiration for the Reflections. Bowles actively corresponded with 
Burke since at least 1791, and in March 1796 sent him a number of his published pamphlets 
(among them Thoughts on the origin and formation of political constitutions and The dangers of 
premature peace), as a mark of his "feeble endeavours" under Burke's "banners". Burke replied 
that in the latest writings by Bowles and by "Mr. Gifford" on the war with France the "whole 
substance of the cause is to be found", and added that if he will eventually publish his 
"Regicide Letters", he shall refer to their efforts in its beginning or a postscript, for "It is to 
betray a cause, not to do full justice to our fellow-labourers". It is not known what contacts 
with the ailing Burke (died July 1797), if any, Bowles had at the time he was composing his 
"Reflections on the influence of Mr. Locke's theories on government". But in a letter of 
January 1797, Burke had informed William Windham that he would have liked, but was too 
ill, to attend a proposed dinner with a small party consisting of "[French] Lawrence, Sir 
Wiliam Scott, Walker King and [John] Bowles". Thus Burke indicated that the latter was at 
this time close to the innermost circle of devoted Burkeans. See COR vol. VIII pp. 414-415 vol. 
IX pp. 224-227. See also Charles William, Earl Fitzwilliam and Sir Richard Bourke (eds.), The 
correspondence of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke; between the year 1744, and the period of his 
decease, in 1797 (1844) vol. IV pp. 341-342.
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3. Debating Burke - the perception of Burke's ideas in the 1790s
Among radical writers there was a wide range of attitudes towards Burke and 
his ideas. Many texts treated Burke's views by reducing all issues to ones of 
personal character or motive only. Moreover, this was done many times in a 
crude and abusive language, which refused to grant any merit whatsoever to 
the target of its attacks, and liberally employed malicious remarks and 
innuendos. Such displays could be found not only among tracts of negligible 
importance, but also in many of the more serious texts, in which gratuitous 
and crude remarks appeared alongside otherwise substantive attempts to 
refute Burke's ideas. Accordingly, Burke was variously accused, sometimes 
explicitly, many times implicitly, of having been educated at the Jesuit 
seminary at Saint Omer (thus casting on him the suspicion of being a crypto- 
Catholic), having a heated or even distempered mind (that is, being mentally 
unbalanced), of being personally corrupt (usually alleging he had been 
bought by a secret pension from the crown), and so on.102 
As to actual treatments of Burke's ideas, these ranged from claims that Burke 
suffered from a "total want of argument" or nearly so, through the related 
accusation of holding views that amount to "political Mysticism", to depicting 
him as a "Republican of the old Roman school! or, in other words, a high-
102 [Anonymous], Short observations on the Right Honourable Edmund Burke's Reflections (1790) 
PW vol. I pp. 57-72; John Thelwall, Sober reflections on the seditious and inflammatory letter of the 
Right Hon. Edmund Burke to a noble Lord (1796) PW pp. 330-340. Examples of graceless remarks 
by moderate radical writers were Macaulay's denigration, in her anonymously published 
Observations pp. 127,136-138, of Burke's thought as tending to irrationality and agitation, and 
Wollstonecraft's accusation of Burke, in her Vindication (p. 45), of having produced the 
"paradoxical" Reflections to attempt and revive his fading fame. Burke noted that those 
writing against him (especially about his religion), including Wollstonecraft and Macaulay, 
"can do nothing in a public discussion without something personal about their adversary". 
See COR vol. VI p. 215. In some cases however, radical authors expressed respect for Burke, 
even when strongly disagreeing with his views. Such was the case with John Butler, Brief 
reflections upon the liberty of the British subject; in an address to the Right Honourable Edmund 
Burke, occasioned by his late publication on the French revolution (c. 1792) PW vol. Ill p. 349 which 
termed Burke "the world's greatest senator". Another example was Christie Letters p. 179. See 
also on this subject Clark Reflections p. 97.
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toned aristocrat", or, most often as holder of the "rankest Tory" principles, a 
defender of "the High Tory doctrine of an inherent hereditary right in the 
Monarch, independent of the choice of the people".103 In many cases, the same 
author did not refrain from raising, within one text, a number of mutually 
exclusive accusations against Burke's political argumentation, such as being a 
defender of divine right kingship and of government by aristocracy, or as 
lacking an argument and being an ideological Tory.104 
Among loyalists too, approaches to Burke varied. Most loyalist texts 
mentioned Burke favorably, some showering him with lavish praise. But 
among loyalist texts that mentioned Locke or Lockean principles favorably, 
there were some with a critical attitude to some of Burke's opinions. Some 
coolness or only guarded support towards Burke and his opinions was also 
discernible among writers connected to the High Tory circle.105 
Burke's place within Anglican opinion requires elucidation. This aspect of 
Burke has been particularly neglected by scholarship and cannot be fully 
discussed here. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind some general
103 "[W]ant of argument" in Joel Barlow, Advice to the privileged orders, in the several states of 
Europe, resulting from the necessity and propriety of a general revolution in the principles of 
government (1792-1793, published in two parts) PW vol. HI p. 266; see also Belsham 
Examination p. 96; Wollstonecraft Vindication p .7; Mackintosh Vindiciae p. 273. "Mysticism" in 
Thomas Cooper Reply p. 9; see also [Williams] Lessons p. 90. "[A]ristocrat" in Thelwall Sober 
pp. 341-343; see also Mackintosh Vindiciae p. 271. "[R]ankest Tory" in [Scott] Letter p. 162; 
[Belsham] Historic p. 74. See also Priestley Letters p. 318; Christie Letters p. 165; Barlow Advice 
p. 266. For descriptions of Burke as a Filmerian (implying of course anti-Lockeanism) see 
Bousfield Observations p. 99; Thelwall Rights pp. 447-448; [Belsham] Historic pp. 95-96. And for 
Filmerianism implied see Boothby Observations p. 273 and Paine Rights p. 65. For descriptions 
of Burke as a Hobbesian, see Macaulay Observations p. 124; Williams Lessons p. 86. But see also 
Mackintosh Vindiciae pp. 306, 386, where Burke is opposed to Hobbes (with the latter 
positively viewed).
104 [Anonymous] Defence of the constitution p. 4; Barlow Advice p. 266; Mackintosh Vindiciae pp. 
271-273.
105 Recent scholarship has established that even among High Tories, Locke's treatment was far 
from uniform. William Jones damned Locke with Voltaire as being at the source of the 
contemporary attempts to destroy Christianity, and Lockean concepts such as "consent" and 
"contract", certainly proved obnoxious to High Tory writers. But at the same time, as 
prominent High Tory as Robert Nares, expresses an attitude that is at least ambiguous. See 
Gunn Beyond pp. 183-184; Nares Principles pp. 89-91. A study of the relations, intellectual and 
personal, between the High Tories and Burke is still wanting.
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points. Although accused throughout his public life of being a crypto- 
Catholic, and certainly not belonging, intellectually or socially, to the High 
Tory circle, Burke was in fact a devoted Anglican, publicly committed to 
safeguarding the role of the established church in the state.
Moreover, he was socially very close to an exceptionally large number of 
figures who would climb to prominent church positions, an issue which has 
not yet been substantially treated by Burke scholarship. From the handful of 
Burke's close associates for many years at the Annual Register, three 
eventually reached top echelons of the Anglican Church: Walker King became 
Bishop of Rochester, Richard Laurence became Archbishop of Cashel and 
William Markham became Bishop of Chester and later Archbishop of York 
(second in the Anglican hierarchy). Markham was even godfather to Burke's 
son Richard, who entered Oxford early to study under him. Other friends of 
Burke who climbed high in the Anglican hierarchy were Thomas Barnard, 
Bishop of Killaloe and Kilfenora and later of Limerick, Ardfert, and Aghadoe; 
John Douglas, Bishop of Carlisle and later of Salisbury; Richard Marlay, 
Bishop of Clonfert and later of Waterford; and Thomas Lewis O'Beime Bishop 
of Ossory and later of Meath (curiously, O'Beime was bom  a Catholic and 
educated for the priesthood at St. Omer, but later converted to Anglicanism). 
Finally, it should be observed that probably the greatest praise and support 
for Burke's ideas, within the literature of the revolution debate, was to be 
found among Anglican clergymen who attempted to offer a response to 
radicalism that was different from High Toryism. Among these were William 
Sewell, Charles Hawtrey, Samuel Cooper, Edward Tatham and William 
Atkinson (although his authorship of an anonymous text is uncertain).
Tatham publicly asked for Burke's guidance in setting forth the correct 
political principles to be used against the dangers of Lockean radicalism.
It appears then, that many loyalists suspected that Burke was proposing a 
political ideology that was neither the pragmatic truisms employed by
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moderate loyalists -  often employing Lockean terms -  nor the ideas of the 
High Tories, but rather something else, (perhaps connected to the world of 
Anglican traditions and ideas).106
Having established that Burke's ideas were generally viewed as essentially
anti-Lockean, the question arises of what kind of anti-Lockeanism it was. I
propose that it was exactly the context of the attempt among loyalists to reject
the Lockean political framework without adopting a High Tory position that
an important insight into Burke's ideas was offered by a small number of
writers (both loyalist and radical). The starting point for a consideration of
this insight on Burke's position is that it was perceived as countering the
Lockean argument, discussed above, of a dissoluble contract, establishing a
trust for the individuals living in the state, subject to their consent, with the
base for this political structure being the system of natural rights. Thus the
alternative would have to be a theory justifying an indissoluble political
society, allowing at most a limited role for trust or consent, and rejecting the
system of natural rights. Paine certainly grasped this point when he made one
of his main targets in the Rights of mart, what he saw as Burke's idea of an
inter-generational political obligation. Paine asserted that
[ejvery age and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all 
cases, as the ages and generations which preceded it. The vanity 
and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the most 
ridiculous and insolent of tyrannies. Man has no property in man; 
neither has any generation a property in the generations which are 
to follow.
106 The title for William Sewell's anonymously published A rejoinder to Mr. Paine's pamphlet, 
entitled, Rights of man; or an answer to Mr. Burke’s attack on the French revolution (1791), speaks 
for itself. See also Hawtrey Various p. 64, who termed Burke's Reflections as "admirable 
performance"; [Atkinson?] Concise p. 191 strongly commended Burke's response to the 
revolution; Cooper First pp. 225-226; Tatham Letters pp. 1-2. To these might be added the 
anonymous author of Answer to Dr. Priestley, who described himself as an Anglican "lay- 
divine" and vigorously defended Burke's ideas against Priestley's.
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He continued to claim that he was "contending for the right of the living, and
against their being willed away, and controlled and contracted for, by the
manuscript-assumed authority of the dead", while Burke was "contending for
the authority of the dead over the rights and freedom of the living". Paine
argued that Burke's purpose was ultimately to set up an "Immortal power",
as if saying "O! parliament, live forever!". And putting things in a practical
light, Paine added:
The circumstances of the world are continually changing, and the 
opinions of men change also; and as government is for the living 
and not for the dead, it is the living only that has any right in it.
That which may be thought right and found convenient in one age 
may be thought wrong and found inconvenient in another. In such 
cases, who is to decide, the living or the dead?107
Another radical author pointing in the same direction was Mackintosh, who 
in a note near the end of the Vindiciae stated that to him, the only thing having 
the air of an argument in Burke's latest two pamphlets (the Appeal, and Letter 
to a member of the National Assembly), was that a majority had not the right to 
change the system of government.108
Among a number of loyalist writers too there was the recognition of this 
argument, and an attempt made to defend Burke's view on it. Tatham noted 
that though most of England's best laws were made before he was bom, he 
was nevertheless happy to continue living by them, considering himself free.
107 Paine Rights pp. 63-66. On p. 204 he proposed that Burke had formed his political creed on 
the principle of "binding and controlling posterity to the end of time, and renouncing and abdicating 
the rights of all posterity forever". Other radical authors who recognized this argument were 
Macaulay who denied that men, whatever the constitutional circumstances, could "bind their 
posterity, to all succeeding generations, in the permanent chains of an unalterable law"; 
Belsham who sarcastically described Burke's Appeal, as one "from the living to the dead"; and 
Williams. See Macaulay Observations p. 124, Belsham Examination p. 21, [Williams] Lessons pp. 
90-91.
108 Mackintosh Vindiciae p. 386. Against this argument Mackintosh brings a quote from 
Hobbes (of whom he approves, terming him sarcastically a "PROFANE PHILOSOPHER") to 
the extent that there are those who, not knowing to distinguish between the people as 
multitude and the people as contained in the body of sovereignty, ascribe to the former what 
belongs only to the latter.
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Such an argument treated the issue as merely an ongoing practice, without 
touching on its merits, or lack of; other loyalist authors treated the point more 
substantively.109
Bowles touched on the practical dimension too, in his anonymously 
published A protest against T. Paine's 'Rights of man' (1792) when he 
commented that since continued obligation to laws is necessary for the order 
and existence of a state, so, until they are abrogated or modified, laws of past 
parliaments are indeed invested with authority. But in later writings Bowles 
treated the matter more substantially, arguing that men do not make their 
constitution, but rather it "is governed by a thousand influences, over which 
man has no control. It partakes of the genius-manners-habits-national 
character-climate-and all the absolute and relative circumstances of a 
Country". In effect each country's historical constitution shaped its people. 
Thus, a nation's constitution could be fundamentally altered only by a break­
up of the generational chain, by
the establishment of some violent despotism, some ferocious 
system of tyranny, that may, by the influence of terror, maintain 
itself, until ancient impressions be almost effaced, and the 
recollection of former happiness be nearly extinct; until the steady 
adherents of the former system be cut off, by the axe of the 
executioner, or by a natural death; and until a new generation shall 
have arisen, trained up in habits of fear and servile submission.110
Another writer who offered a similar interpretation of this issue was Charles 
Harrington Elliot, who emphasized the continuing effect of legal obligations 
transacted in the past, rhetorically asking: "Are public treaties, bequests, or
109 Tatham Letters p. 72. Another example of this claim (albeit without connecting it 
specifically to Burke) was [Green] Political speculations p. 35. Paine's answer to this argument 
was that "although laws made in one generation often continue in force through succeeding 
generations, yet they continue to derive their force from the consent of the living. A law not 
repealed continues in force, not because it cannot be repealed, but because it is not repealed; 
and the non-repealing passes for consent". See Paine Rights p. 66.
110 [John Bowles], A protest against T. Paine's 'Rights of man': addressed to the members of a book 
society (1792,5th edition) PW vol. VI p. 48; Bowles Retrospect pp. 288-289, 327-328.
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any other public and equitable transaction that took place before the birth of 
any man now living, obligatory at this day? Are the grants and leases made 
some centuries back, still to be considered as respectable muniments? And 
shall not the most solemn and exalted contract or compact that a whole nation 
could collectively make, be sacredly observed by that nation while the 
conditions on the other side are scrupulously fulfilled?". But Harrington Elliot 
did not rest with this argument, and he addressed the wider issue of inter- 
generational obligation by denying that in politics there ever can be, a real 
generational separation. He described how by the accession of George II to 
the throne in 1727, though five monarchs and close to 40 years had expired 
since 1688, many of those active in the rise of William III to the throne were 
still alive, active and "[i]n gradual coalescence with younger legislators, they 
still preserved in the senate a sort of collegiate identity, which by the same 
means is continuable to the end of time". In other words, far from shirking 
accusations about attempting to effect political immortality, Harrington Elliot 
accepted and reveled in the possibility, explicitly stating that thus "[t]he king 
and people, like a sole and an aggregate corporation, will descend together in 
legal and political immortality...". In somewhat similar terms Frederick 
Hervey's New friend expressly proposed that the binding of one generation by 
another meant the British could consider themselves in a collective capacity 
immortal. Thus "the nation, as one whole, always complete, though always 
changing, is perfectly capable of making a lasting compact". Such a collective, 
for Hervey, was not a biological one, since it could be joined by new citizens 
who would "derive their claim to its protection, from their adoption of its 
laws and customs".111
111 Charles Harrington Elliot, The republican refuted; in a series of biographical, critical and political 
strictures on Thomas Paine's Rights of man (1791) PW vol. V pp. 322, 326-326; [Hervey] New 
friend p. 75. Another loyalist author treated the subject on a more abstract level, opining that 
even the most primary political society would not be calculated merely for the happiness of
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But it is with two other authors, one radical and one loyalist, that the
interpretation of Burke's ideas on this issue was most developed, and I
believe, most penetrating. The first of these was Capel Lofft, whose Remarks,
unusually for the period, managed to oppose Burke and his ideas forcefully,
while displaying a serious attempt at understanding and describing them,
while retaining in the main a tone that was respectful, honest and to the point.
Lofft described thus what he understood as Burke's idea of polity:
Government with him, seems a kind of interest, of which the 
usufruct only is in the Nation, as a private estate under settlement 
is in the present possessors: and to him it is, apparently, at least 
doubtful, whether the People, under any subsisting government on 
earth, have a right to make the system which their ancestors have 
left them, other than they found it. They may, it seems, in extreme 
cases, remove the Tyrant; but if the root of tyranny is interwoven in 
their political Constitution, they must, in obedience to the 
obligations contracted for them by their Ancestors, retain the 
radical vice so established, because it has been established.112
In other words, Burke's polity is like a foundation, whose funds established in 
the past can be managed by the present trustees (who can be changed if they 
do not fulfill their role), and even added to, but the principal terms of the 
fund must be adhered to, and cannot be changed.113 
The second, and the most important text approaching Burke's political 
foundations in such a manner, was William Cusack Smith's anonymously 
published The rights of citizens (1791). This text is particularly significant, since
its immediate participants, since one of their first impulses would be considerations for the 
future of their children. See [Anonymous] Remarks on Mr. Paine's pamphlet p. 31.
112 Capel Lofft, Remarks on the letter of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, concerning the revolution in 
France, and the proceedings of certain societies in London, relative to that event (1791, 2nd edition) 
PW vol. n  p. 280.
113 In opposition to what he saw as Burke's principles, Lofft stated his own, very much 
Lockean view of constitutional change thus: "Every law, I apprehend, which is not merely 
declaratory of immutable principles (for these derive their obligation from an independent 
and immutable source) may be repealed by the same authority by which it is enacted: an 
ordinary law by the ordinary power of the legislature under their general trust; a 
constitutional law by the constitutional power of the People under a special trust, committed 
to the legislature for that particular purpose". See Lofft Remarks p. 284.
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its views are known to have been endorsed by Burke himself. Cusack Smith 
had sent a copy of the tract, a theoretical refutation of Paine, requesting 
Burke's approval, and he was not to be disappointed. Burke replied with a 
letter praising the tract, and adding that in fact some of the ideas in the text 
coincided with those of his own Appeal (then not yet published) -  even 
asserting that those points where they coincided about refuting the "specious 
folly of the rights of men", had been handled by Cusack Smith "much more 
fully, and much better". Before the end of 1791, Cusack Smith published a 
second edition of the pamphlet, which, as well as including the letter of 
endorsement, was dedicated to Burke. It was the beginning of a personal and 
intellectual relationship that was to last until Burke's death.114 
In the tract Cusack Smith denied that there could be a discussion of a 
generation as completely distinct from those immediately before or after it. In 
his view, a generation was an ideal being, fluid and diffuse, that could not be 
disconnected and considered separately. The only case in which distinct 
generations could be discussed, was when they were distinguished by a great 
amount of time. Furthermore, he observed that "[t]he very names by which 
we designate nations, as Greeks, Romans, & c. imply a unity of existence 
carried through successive and connected generations". Hence, adjoining 
generations were not separated, but rather there were "at all times different 
generations" existing together.115
114 COR vol. VI pp. 302-304. In the same letter of July 1791 Burke agreed with Cusack Smith's 
critique of the Reflections as being too much concerned with the concrete, and too little with 
theory, but justified himself by his intention in the piece - reflecting upon a political event, 
and not "reading a lecture upon theorism [sic] and principles of Government". For their 
subsequent personal and intellectual relations, see COR vol. VII pp. 3, 355-356, and vol. VIII 
pp. 118-121,127-133, 243-245.
115 [Cusack Smith] Rights pp. 245-246. On p. 264 he pointed out that by various claims and 
suppositions -  particularly by supposing the English to be 'organized' in a permanent 
political setting -  Paine too was found to look on the people as bound by their ancestors, 
despite his claims to the contrary.
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Turning to the more general question of the nature of the polity, he stated the 
principle he subscribed to by explicitly treating Paine's ideas. He addressed 
the rhetorical question about who is to decide about the convenience of 
legislation from one age to another, the living or the dead? Cusack Smith 
asserted the answer to be "both; or if you please, the living, - profiting by the 
experience of the dead". He continued to reject the claim of a majority having 
a right to change the constitution, describing it as "the claim of a part of the 
People -  in right of its numbers to overturn the subsisting establishment -  and 
frame a government for the whole". Cusack Smith proposed that if the right of 
the majority was not merely based on their strength being superior to the 
minority -  and hence on arbitrary force -  it must be based on "an anterior 
contract entered into by all the individuals of the incipient community among 
themselves" to vest the majority with such a right. In other words, to the 
notion that even a majority is bound by the basic terms of the constitution, 
which was supported by many (including Paine), he added the idea that the 
constitution cannot be essentially changed.116
After disposing of the claims for sovereignty in the majority, Cusack Smith 
treated the question of the extent of the sovereignty of parliament. He wrote 
in a note that
if the person - or the body in whom the whole executive power is 
lodged -  be also a branch of the legislature -  as is the case in 
England -  any attempt of such power to alter itself -  and assume 
the whole legislative authority -  or a greater share of it than is 
vested in him by the constitution -  is arbitrary and an usurpation; - 
but the compleat sovereign legislative power may alter itself so far 
as is not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the 
constitution.
The same point was later reiterated in a more concise manner, asserting that 
"the principal part of the national will is with us lodged in a majority of the
116 [Cusack Smith] Rights pp. 256, 260-261.
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people" while at the same time "the sovereignty of this majority is qualified
and abridged", by the fundamental principles of the constitution.117
Finally, uniting the various strands of his argument, Cusack Smith offered his
general view of what a constitution like the British one was, a view which, as
we have seen, Cusack Smith assumed to be reflective of Burke's own views
about government, and which was indeed eventually endorsed by the latter.
This view proposed that a constitution is a thing antecedent to government,
belonging to all generations, and fixed in its principles, so that each
improvement in it had to be referred back to a period -  whether actual or
supposed -  of "original establishment", thus gaining for it "a title paramount
to that of government". Therefore, he added:
I give the living generation the right of altering and improving, 
which their advocate Mr. Paine would deny them, and would in 
return bestow on them the dangerous privilege of demolition: - A 
constitution, like the Nation which takes benefit from it, is a 
permanent being, composed of fugitive parts; or rather 'tis a gem 
which the wisdom of each successive age has been employed to 
polish, 'till it attains a lustre which would astonish those who dug 
it from the mine.118
117 [Cusack Smith] Rights pp. 251,262. He asserted the same principle again when on p. 267 he 
wrote that in a constitution the rights of the legislature to alter it must be subordinate to its 
"fundamental principles" which could not be altered.
118 [Cusack Smith] Rights p. 286.
104
PART II -  Edmund Burked political ideas
1. The "Bane of the Whiggs" - Burke on Locke and his ideas
A thorough study of Burke's attitude toward Locke and his ideas presents a 
number of significant difficulties, arising both from the source material, and 
from the need to assess its historical context. Within his voluminous output, 
Burke explicitly treated Locke or his ideas only in a relatively small number of 
places, and of those, some are of a problematic nature. There are only about a 
handful of instances in Burke's writings where Locke is explicitly mentioned, 
none of them very extensive. Other texts by Burke, like speeches he is 
reported to have delivered, are of disputed reliability, and in some cases they 
have unfortunately not yet been treated in the definitive scholarly edition of 
his works. Since many of the instances in which Burke treats Locke explicitly 
are connected to the latter's Essay, the political dimension of his treatment 
becomes even narrower.119
The paucity of explicit source material by Burke on Locke has resulted in a 
tendency by scholars to rely heavily on the accepted assumptions about the 
status that Locke and his ideas enjoyed in Burke's time, when interpreting the 
latter's texts. However in the past decades, scholarly studies have 
undermined the previously accepted assumption, according to which Locke's
119 Volumes IV and X of the WS, which have yet to appear, will cover various material from 
the year 1781 onwards, including the particularly important Appeal. An example of the 
problems with texts still untreated by the WS is that of Burke's speech addressing the debate 
on 7th May 1782 about William Pitt7s proposal for a reform in parliamentary representation. It 
appears that the speech was never delivered, but a draft that Burke prepared was published 
in King7s and Laurence's Works and subsequently in the PH. However, J.G.A. Pocock, having 
inspected the manuscript, claims that the published version is incomplete, so that until the 
appearance of this text in the WS, it should be treated with added caution. See Pocock Politics 
p. 225.
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status in the 18th century was that of the ultimate authority on Whig 
constitutional doctrine.120
These circumstances have contributed to widely different interpretations of
the relation of Burke's ideas to Locke's. However, an attempt will be made
here to show that a careful consideration of the extant material can enable a
more precise description of this relationship. Interpretations of Burke's
thought as essentially parallel to Locke's ideas, such as A. Cobban's assertion
that even after the revolution in France "Burke was convinced that he rather
than Fox had preserved the traditions of Locke", were formerly widespread,
but have for the most part subsided. But B.T. Wilkins, and F. A. Dreyer, are
among scholars still stressing Burke as being generally, in Wilkins' words,
"within the Lockian tradition which he alters but does not destroy". Dreyer,
albeit conceding some differences between Burke and Locke, holds that
Burke's [political] theory was orthodox Whiggism in the sense that 
it was compatible with Lockean principles. Many of Burke's most 
important principles were in fact Lockean. In some respects Burke 
is more developed and richer than Locke, but in no respect did 
Burke adopt arguments which placed him in fundamental 
opposition to Locke.121
i2° Probably most influential in the reassessment of Locke's status in his time and throughout 
the 18th century have been the studies by R. Ashcraft and M. Goldie. See for example Ashcraft 
Revolutionary and M. Goldie (ed.), The reception of Locke's politics - from the 1690s to the 1830s 
(Pickering and Chatto, 1999), 6 volumes.
121 Cobban Burke p. 55, and in the introduction to the 1960 reprint (p. xiv) Cobban remarks 
that he is even more convinced of Burke's affiliation to Locke's ideas, than when the book 
was originally published. "Lockian tradition" Wilkins Problem pp. 19,23. "Lockean 
principles" Dreyer7 s Burke's pp. 5, 68-69, 81-84. Dreyer concedes that Burke may have 
believed the true principles of old Whiggism were different from the principles of Locke's 
Two treatises. Indeed he notes that "[i]t is significant that when Burke expounded old 
Whiggism in the Appeal he did not cite Locke". But for Dreyer the bottom line remains that 
Burke's affiliation to the Old Whigs does not contradict a Lockean interpretation of his 
theory, and though there are differences between Burke and Locke, "in basic political theory, 
Burke adhered to a Lockean framework". Dreyer acknowledges that most students of Burke's 
theory do not accept this view, but he points out even among them such as F. Canavan and L. 
Strauss, accept that Burke did argue at times on Lockean premises. Other examples of Burke 
viewed as close to the Lockean tradition see W.D. Love, "'Meaning7 in the history of 
conflicting interpretations of Burke" in The Burke Newsletter 7 (1965-1966) pp. 526-538; D.
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A m iddle ground is occupied by such as F. O'Gorman and J. Conniff, who 
propose that although Burke accepted some parts of Locke's theory, he 
though t it unsatisfactory and combined it with additional ideas to develop a 
new  theoretical compound. According to O'Gorman, Burke's achievement 
w as to  cast a defunct Whiggism in a fresh mould, fusing elements from Locke, 
Bolingbroke and the neo-Harringtonians, into an ideological synthesis all his 
own: "[f]rom Locke he received his fundamental assumptions about the 
British constitution", from the post-Lockean Whigs the view of a balanced 
constitution in which hereditary nobility plays a dominant role. For Conniff 
Burke accepted Locke's psychology but saw it as an insufficiently dynamic 
explanation of man, and thus added to it a time dimension.122 
The change that has occurred in the last decades, in the way Locke's place in 
18th century Britain is viewed, has greatly strengthened the claims of those 
w ho see a conflict between the theories of Locke and Burke. The scholars who 
describe a general opposition between the thought of Burke and that of Locke, 
such as F. Canavan and J.L. Pappin III, subscribe for the most part to the view 
(originating mainly with L. Strauss and P.J. Stanlis) of Burke as a defender of 
the traditional natural law position against the new natural rights school 
associated with Locke. For Canavan the products of Burke's mature mind 
reveal a "progressive though unavowed revolt against Locke's philosophy",
Cameron, The social thought of Rousseau and Burke (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973) 
pp. 149-150, claiming that Burke was close in spirit to Locke's ideas on political liberty.
122 According to O'Gorman Burke rejected Locke's idea of contract, and believed the location 
of sovereignty was unalterably settled, but accepted Locke's views on the nature of the 
constitution and on toleration, particularly the Lockean idea of the right of the individual to 
his ow n  religious opinion. Conniff seems to view Burke as being initially a Lockean, who 
after failing in his early attempts to find an empirical psychological basis for values, turned in 
a Hum ean direction, adding the historical dimension to the empirical psychology, thus 
becom ing "a Humean philosopher in action". Another scholar adopting a middle view is H. 
T. Dickinson, who holds that Lockean notions like the original contract and natural rights 
were unimportant to Burke's view of civil society, although he did not directly repudiate 
them. See O'Gorman Burke pp. 15-17, 63; Conniff Useful pp.10-11, 50-51; Dickinson Liberty p. 
295.
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replaced by a theory strongly resembling Christian Aristotelian theory (but 
Canavan cautions that Locke's theory always retained an influence so that 
"Burke to a large extent spoke the language of the social contract theory, and 
especially of its Lockean version: it was, after all, the language of his time.
Nor was his thought ever wholly divorced from Locke's"). Pappin goes 
further in directly asserting that it is the . .tradition of individual rights that 
Burke opposed and that he traced back to the political philosophy of John 
Locke". However, it should be stressed that not all scholars who accept this 
conflict, see its source in any debt Burke might have owed to medieval natural 
law ideas. J.C.D. Clark, noting Burke's debt to 1688, remarks that this did not 
mean he was principally indebted to Locke. Instead, he argues that for Burke 
and most of the subjects of George I and George II, what defined and 
described Whiggery were texts like Sacheverell's trial and political 
achievements such as those of Lord Somers. Thus, for Clark, "[a]s a 
mainstream Whig, Burke argued against (without citing) Locke's extremist 
doctrine in Two Treatises of Government (1690) that people had a right to 
dissolve civil society at any time and for any reason they considered 
adequate". While I. Hampsher-Monk proposes another explanation, 
suggesting that Burke's opposition to Locke's doctrines about recoverable 
natural rights, were the continuation of a strand of English political thought 
having its source among the ideas of John Selden.123 
It is best to bear in mind that descriptions of Burke's alleged affinity to 
Locke's ideas are often unclear. For example, the distinction between Locke's
123 Canavan Reason pp. 205, 88-89. Pappin "Burke's" pp. 115-127. Clark Reflections pp. 86-87, 
and on pp. 37-38 he claims that "Burke implicitly rejected (if he knew of it) Locke's argument 
in his Essay Concerning Humane Understanding (1690) that the antiquity of an idea did not 
confer prescriptive authority". I. Hampsher-Monk, A history of modem political thought 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1992) pp. 270-272. An earlier scholar who regards Burke as opposed to 
Locke's ideas, is F.J.C. Hearnshaw, who writes that while Burke outwardly "bows down and 
worships" when coming across a "distinctly Lockian idea", only to circumvent it and "knock 
it over from behind". See F.J.C. Hearnshaw, The social and political ideas of some representative 
thinkers of the revolutionary era (G.G. Harrap, 1931) pp. 92-98.
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idea of contract, and his view of the relations between rulers and ruled as a 
trust, is seldom made clear by scholars treating Burke's attitude to them. This 
is the case with J.C.D. Clark, when he implies that Burke's contractual view of 
government as an agreement between rulers and ruled, was also Locke's -  
which it wasn't. Such descriptions many times also suffer from an attitude 
that regards Locke's epistemological and political writings as one coherent 
system -  regardless of the problematic, indeed glaring inconsistencies 
between the two (of which Locke himself was not unaware).124 
As the above examples make clear, the claims about Burke's attitude towards 
Lockean ideas touch on various general concepts in the thought of the two, 
and attempt to explain the relationship between these concepts (often using 
for support evidence for the perceived context of these concepts at the time).
It is surprising to find that no significant attempts have yet been made to 
elucidate the issue by way of a detailed examination of particular discussions 
by Burke, of concepts and even of expressions that could be traceable directly 
to Locke. Indeed, lacking is even an attempt to learn about Burke's attitude to 
Locke through a detailed treatment of all of the instances where the latter is 
explicitly mentioned in Burke's writings. I shall attempt shall attempt such an 
examination in the pages that follow.125
An examination of Burke's position on Locke and his ideas should first 
consider why is it that the latter's name appeared so sparsely in the former's 
writings, indeed being completely absent from all of Burke's greatest political
124 See Clark Reflections pp. 86-87; Conniff Useful pp. 50-51. About the inconsistencies in 
Locke's work see Laslett Two pp. 81-82.
125 Even Pappin, who explicitly claims that Burke not only opposed the tradition of individual 
rights, but actually traced it back to "the political philosophy of John Locke", does not offer 
any kind of evidence for this claim. Not even one instance is produced by Pappin, where a 
position by Burke is actually directed at Locke or his works. Examples of Burke's ideas are 
produced and sometimes confronted with Locke's, but in no case are they claimed to be 
directly aimed by Burke at Locke. Pappin brings only one actual reference to Locke's 
writings, but even that is not claimed to be a target for Burke. See Pappin "Burke's" pp. 115- 
116.
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works. Whatever his attitude to Locke's ideas, Burke obviously did not 
believe mentioning him would aid his cause. There are three possible 
explanations for Burke's avoiding the use of Locke's name: Burke did not 
agree with Locke; Burke agreed with Locke but thought bringing him up 
would harm his cause; Burke did not write or speak on matters relevant to 
Locke or his ideas. The second and third explanations are seriously 
undermined by Burke's deep involvement in political disputes in which 
Locke's ideas not only seem a most obvious and easy support to arguments 
he was making, but were indeed made by other participants in the disputes at 
the time. At the time the Thoughts on the cause of the present discontents (1770) 
appeared, resentment against the ministry often took the form of Lockean 
arguments, and Burke could have easily employed them, but in the pamphlet 
Locke and his ideas were completely ignored. Even when Burke claimed in 
the text that the people did not really wish for revolutions, he did not 
connected the idea to Locke's similar position, but rather to a quote from the 
Due de Sully (17th century French statesman). Moreover, the passage that 
Burke quoted from Sully argued that revolutions were caused by weak 
government, directly contradicting Locke's famous contention that 
revolutions were caused by too strong a government.126 
During the American conflict many supporters of the Colonists' cause raised 
Locke's argument limiting the sovereignty of parliament on those not 
represented in it, Burke held on to a much more difficult path which, while 
supportive of particular American claims, nevertheless, refused to concede 
any measure of parliamentary sovereignty.127
126 Discontents pp. 255-256.
127 Burke owned both the 1751 edition of Locke's Works, and the 1764 edition of the Two 
treatises. For examples of possible indirect treating of Locke and his ideas see Sheriffs pp. 317- 
318, which seems at least partly directed at the damage inflicted to good government by 
Lockean (and other kinds of) speculations, in the context of the American conflict.
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In his struggles against the abuses of British rule in Ireland and India, Burke, 
even when appealing to natural law, never argued on Lockean lines. This was 
especially evident in the unpublished Tracts relating to the Popery laws 
(composed around 1765), where Burke employed more than anywhere else in 
his work arguments and terms involving natural law. Burke described the 
legislation that severely restricted the inheritance, marriage and education 
possibilities of Irish Catholics, as a transgression of natural law, but at the 
same time pointed out it was transgressing against the common law too, in 
effect basing his claims on an inextricable blending of the two. Moreover, 
none of the rights he claimed for the Catholics of Ireland, were individual or 
political, instead he demanded for them rights that were supposed to enable 
them to lead honest and purposeful family-centered lives.128 
In the Appeal from the new to the old Whigs, where Burke described the origins 
and history of the Whig political tradition, and attempted to trace his own 
descent from this tradition, Locke is not mentioned nor even hinted at -  while 
a long list of 1688 Whigs, many of them half-forgotten, are mentioned and 
often quoted at length. It appears then that Burke's reluctance to use Locke's 
name, was maintained on repeated opportunities when it would have been 
not only possible but very convenient to do so.129
The next stage in this examination of Burke's attitude to Locke and his ideas, 
will be to look at all the known instances of Burke's explicit references to 
Locke in his published and unpublished writings and speeches. Among these, 
the instances in which Burke mentioned Locke in works published during his 
lifetime amount to only two cases -  both from the beginning of his career, 
indeed his first and second published writings, when not yet 30 years old.
128 Popery pp. 437, 453-455,465-467. For India see Impeachment pp. 353-367.
129Appeal throughout but see especially pp. 143-146,158-159. It should be noted that in his 
writings about politics, Burke certainly did mention -  though not copiously - and sometimes 
quote, from thinkers such as Cicero, Aristotle, Selden, Vattel and Montesquieu.
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The first case is A vindication of natural society. Published in 1756 it purported 
to be a letter from an elderly nobleman to a younger one, discussing the faults 
of politics and indeed of political society, recommending personally a retreat 
from politics and ideally the setting up of a natural society. The text satirized 
the attempts by some writers on politics to "compass the Designs they 
pretend to have in view, by the Instruments they employ"; at the same time it 
had as an even more important "Under-plot" (Burke's term), the exposure of 
the dangers which such reasonings pose to all established government and 
religion. Such a text has to strike a balance between undermining a set of 
ideas, while presenting them in a manner plausible enough for the satire to 
work. The result was that both at the time of its publication and in subsequent 
scholarship, many aspects and sometimes even the whole character of the 
Vindication have been seriously contested. A treatment of all the different 
aspects and interpretations of the Vindication cannot be carried out here. It 
suffices to point out that Burke found it necessary to add an explicatory 
preface to the second edition, stressing the satirical intent of the piece -  after 
some readers had found its arguments rather too convincing.130 
It is often claimed that the Vindication was directed specifically against 
Bolingbroke and his ideas, but although the latter was certainly one of the 
piece's targets, Burke himself stated in the preface, that he was addressing not 
a particular writer but a certain mode of argumentation prevalent among
130 Vindication pp. 143,136. Indeed some contemporaries (such as William Godwin), and some 
later scholars have maintained that the Vindication was actually not a satire but a true 
expression of Burke's views or an aspect of them, at the time. See for example M. Rothbard, 
"A note on Burke's A vindication of natural society" in Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (1958) pp. 
114-118.
Regarding the claims that Burke's views progressively changed during his career, it is 
remarkable to see how much his opposition to the views satirized in the Vindication, 
especially as concerned religion and the origins of government remained constant in the forty 
years after its publication. Especially interesting would be a study of the many parallels 
between this work and the 1796 Letter to a noble Lord. If the Vindication is to be seen as a non- 
sarcastic statement of Burke's views at the time, these views must have been spectacularly 
reversed within a few years.
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"several" writers. In fact Bolingbroke's name did not appear even once in the 
original text of the Vindication (it was present only in the preface, although his 
ideas seem to have been alluded to a number of times, most noticeably in the 
similarity of the title to a work by Bolingbroke), while other thinkers like 
Hobbes and especially Machiavelli were awarded direct mention and 
treatment of their ideas.131
Locke was explicitly mentioned in the Vindication once, when the fictional 
noble writer discussed how despotism degrades human nature, and wrote 
that this consideration made "Mr. Locke say, with great justice that a 
Government of this kind was worse than Anarchy". But this very praise of 
Locke's argument, that anarchy is preferable to tyranny, was made ridiculous 
by the fictional nobleman's view of all governments as tyrannies. Plainly, this 
treatment of Locke was critical in its tendency -  it alerted the reader to the 
serious problem with claiming that anarchy (and especially advocating it - 
that is, revolt) was preferable to tyranny, when any government can be 
claimed as tyranny. It was exactly this charge that Burke repeatedly threw, 
almost 35 years later, at the revolutionaries in France, accusing them of 
purposely painting a dichotomy between their own notions of liberty and 
whoever opposed these, so that men would become reconciled to their 
"proceeding and projects", out of conviction that there was no other option 
between tyranny and revolution.132
It is worth noting that in addition to this explicit reference, the Vindication 
contains a large number of allusions to Locke's political ideas, some of them
131 For the view of the Vindication as directed predominantly at Bolingbroke see the 
introduction to the text in WS vol. I, pp. 129-132. For a view emphasizing the attack against 
other thinkers see F. Pagano's "Introduction" in his Edmund Burke, A vindication of natural 
society (Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1982) especially pp. xi-xxi. Pagano's "Burke's view of the 
evils of political theory: or, A vindication of natural society" in Polity 17 (1985) pp. 455-457 
suggests that in the Vindication there is a refutation of Locke's view of the state of nature, 
natural rights and men's political motivation.
132 Vindication p. 157; Reflections pp. 227-231. Compare to ST sec. 225.
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significant. Three brief examples will suffice as illustrations. The first is the 
Vindication's treatment of the terms state of nature, natural society and 
political society. These terms touch on the theories of several thinkers: "State 
of Nature" was rendered famous by Hobbes in his Leviathan but widely 
employed by later thinkers; "Natural Society" was Bolingbroke's; "Political 
Society" was prominently treated by Locke in the seventh chapter of his 
Second treatise. But the meaning assigned to the terms in the Vindication, and 
the relationship between them, are suggestive of Locke's theory far more than 
that of any other thinker (including Bolingbroke). The second example is the 
Vindication's attack on the abuses that judges and laws bring on men when 
society finds it inconvenient "having every Man the Judge of his own Cause". 
In other words, the legitimacy of political society as an adequate substitute for 
man's natural right to judge is undermined. Obviously this remark is directed 
at the problem with every man's right to judge in his own cause, that Locke 
had presented as the reason that made political society necessary. The third 
example is from near the end of the Vindication, where the text proposes that 
men renounce artificial society and artificial religion and bring themselves 
"into perfect Liberty". The proposition immediately evokes Locke's famous 
and recurring assertions in the Second treatise, that the state of nature is a 
"State of perfect Freedom" and a "State of Liberty". In effect Locke's justification 
of political society is put into doubt by pointing to his own extolling of the 
perfect freedom men have in the state of nature. Moreover, the Vindication's 
undermining of Locke's theory by the employment of naturalistic arguments, 
strongly suggests that the whole naturalistic premise is fallacious.133
133 Regarding the first example see Vindication pp. 138-139, and compare to ST sec. 4, 6,14,15, 
48, 77, 83, 84 87, 220, 221. Regarding the second example see Vindication p. 172, and compare 
to ST sec. 13,20. Regarding the third example see Vindication p. 183, and compare to ST sec. 4, 
6. For additional examples of parallels compare Vindication p. 144 to ST sec. 103; Vindication p. 
158 to ST sec. 94 (in the footnote); Vindication p. 182, to ST sec. 199-204. See also Vindication pp. 
138-139,142,155,172.
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The second case in which a text published by Burke explicitly mentioned 
Locke, was his 1757 work about human understanding A  philosophical enquiry 
into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful. In a number of places 
Locke's ideas on cognition from his Essay were explicitly treated, the most 
important of which was section XTV of the text, named "Locke's OPINION 
Concerning DARKNESS, Considered". In this section Locke's assertion that 
darkness does not naturally inspire terror was addressed, and while 
conceding that "[t]he authority of this great man is doubtless as great, as that 
of any man can be", Burke "with all deference to such an authority", rejected 
it completely, upholding instead a view completely opposite -  that darkness 
did inspire terror. Locke was briefly mentioned in three more places in the 
Sublime: when Burke refuted Locke's definition of pain as only the removal of 
pleasure (and vice versa), seeing the two instead as independent sensations; 
when Burke commended the view (not peculiar to Locke only) that the faculty 
of judgment consists in finding differences; and when Burke attested to his 
agreement with Locke, who had claimed "with his usual sagacity" that most 
general words were taught before the particular modes of action to which 
they belonged were presented to the mind. There are several other places in 
the Sublime where Burke's ideas seem to touch on Lockean notions, in some 
instances possibly alluding to particular passages in Locke's work, but these 
do not alter the picture established by the explicit treatments of Locke in this 
work -  Burke accepted some of Locke's ideas on cognition, and disputed 
others, while maintaining throughout his respect for the latter's reputation 
and authority in such matters.134
After these two works from the 1750s, Burke never again published one 
explicit word on Locke, but in his unpublished output there were a number of 
places where the latter is mentioned. There are two minor instances where
134 Sublime pp. 185-320, and particularly pp. 294-295, 201, 212, 310-311.
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Locke is briefly touched upon, and both were fairly censorious. The first, the 
only one found in Burke's correspondence, is in a letter Burke sent in 1759 to 
Adam Smith. Expressing his appreciation for the latter's just-published Theory 
of moral sentiments, Burke found in the book only one fault -  that Smith is "in 
some few Places, w hat Mr. Locke is in most of his writings, rather a little too 
diffuse". This remark m ight seem to be relevant only to Locke's style, but it 
could also indicate a fear from attempts to put "diffuse" terms into political 
practice. Loyalist texts of the 1790s often described the language of Locke's 
political theories, as suffering from "expressions too loose and general", 
which tended to destabilize politics.135
The second instance is an unpublished and unfinished manuscript, dated June 
1776, on the subject of education, where, while discussing a number of writers 
who treated the issue, Burke wrote that "Locke has wrote [sic] an express 
Treatise [on education]. It is not equal to his great reputation. But it shews 
[sic] he thought it w orthy of the anatomist of the H um an understanding".136 
In addition to these instances there exist a num ber of places where Burke is 
recorded as having mentioned Locke's name either in a parliamentary speech 
or in drafts for a speech. The sources for this m aterial are notoriously 
problematic, since the record of Commons debates from the period was 
created by collecting material of varied origin, like reports in the press, 
individual MP's notes, and later recollections of participants or onlookers. As 
is to be expected, such records and reports can be seriously incomplete, 
sometimes even making conflicting claims. Bearing in mind these limitations 
and w ithout losing sight of the unsatisfactory nature and import of these 
sources, it is nevertheless worthwhile to review and include such material in 
the consideration of Burke's position on Locke. I have identified four cases 
during Burke's 30-odd years as an MP (1765-1794) in  which he is reported as
135 [Anonymous] Puissant pp. 20-21. See also Samuel Cooper First pp. 33-34.
136 COR vol. I pp. 129-130; Education p. 243.
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having mentioned Locke explicitly in the House of Commons. Additional 
cases may perhaps be identified in the future as the WS is completed, or as 
other material from the period is researched.137
The earliest recorded mention of Locke by Burke in the Commons, is from the
debate on the King's Speech of 13 November 1770, when he was addressing
the growing discontent being sown by ministerial policies both in America
and in England. Particularly contentious was the ministry's refusal to accept
the repeated elections of John Wilkes, after he had been convicted of libel, as
representative for the county of Middlesex (which included the cities of
London and Westminster) in February, March and April 1769. The Commons
decree, in May of that year, that the candidate repeatedly defeated by Wilkes,
Colonel Henry Luttrell, would sit as the representative for Middlesex, was
criticized by many as illegitimate. In his speech Burke remarked that
I do not say that we are not a legal House of Commons, I do not 
countenance the insolence of Westminster and the capital; but I 
must and will say, that many sober and good citizens, who are 
swayed by the authority of Locke, and other constitutional 
politicians, may have their doubts on this head. They may suspect 
us to be a House of Commons only de facto, and not de jure. When 
such an opinion prevails, is it safe for us, at such a critical period, 
to take upon ourselves the odium of imposing taxes, and all the 
other burdens and evils necessarily attending upon a war?
Burke's comment, in addition to being a general censure of "Locke, and other 
constitutional politicians" swaying many sober good citizens, also regarded 
negatively the particular view taking hold among some, according to which
137 Burke was elected MP for Wendover on 23 December 1765, and took his seat in the 
Commons on January 1766 serving continually -  but switching to represent Bristol on 3 
November 1774 -  until 9 September 1780 when he retreated from the Bristol electoral contest 
in the face of certain defeat. Elected as MP for Malton on 7 December 1780, he re-entered the 
Commons on January 1781 and remained its representative until retiring on 24 June 1794 
(immediately following the completion of his duties to the Hastings trial), in favor of his son 
Richard, who was elected on 18 July 1794. But Richard died on 2 August 1794, before he could 
take his seat in the House.
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the Commons would be only "de facto, and not de jure" legitimate. This 
sentence may allude to a specific passage in Locke's Second treatise, where, as 
justification for the right of resistance, it is stated that there were instances 
when by his actions "a King, ipso facto, becomes no King", so that "the People 
may of right" (jure suo) take arms against him (this being a quote Locke took 
from the writings of the absolutist thinker William Barclay (c. 1545-1608), to 
show that even he conceded a right of resistance in certain cases).138 
The second parliamentary reference to Locke by Burke is in the draft to the 
speech he delivered on 6 February 1772 about a petition by Anglican non­
conformists (most of them clergymen) requesting the repeal of the 39 articles 
as a test for those ordained as priests in the established church. This is an 
especially problematic text, as there are several and seriously conflicting 
reports about both the written draft of the text, and the speech actually 
delivered. Thus both the text, and any inference from it, should be 
approached with added caution.139 In the draft of the speech, as it appears in 
the Parliamentary history, Burke castigated the dissident petitioners by 
proposing that "[i]f the Church be, as Mr. Locke defines it, 'a  voluntary 
society, & c/ then it is essential to this voluntary society to exclude from this 
voluntary society any members she thinks fit, or to oppose the entrance of any 
upon such conditions as she thinks proper", adding that "this is Mr. Locke's
138 pH vol. XVI p. 1069; ST sec. 235,237. Burke's speech is brought by the PH from the reports 
in the London Museum for the year 1771, and the Gentlemen's Magazine for 1771. The two 
reports are almost identical, but only the first has Burke explicitly mentioning Locke. See PH 
vol. XVI pp. 1045-1046. The numerous and often conflicting sources for this speech are 
acknowledged in the WS vol. II pp. 334-336, which brings only an extremely short version of 
the speech, as was recorded in the diary of Matthew Brickdale MP, and in which none of the 
issues appearing in the quoted paragraph, appear.
139 There are significant discrepancies between the speech as printed in the PH from the King 
and Laurence Works, and as appearing in the WS based on the report in the Middlesex Journal. 
Burke's touching on a number of Lockean terms such as "rights of nature" and his explicit 
mention of Locke's position on the church as a voluntary association, are reported in the PH, 
but not in the WS, which however notes that the speech as delivered seems to have included 
various points that are not to be found in extant drafts. The reliability of the reference to 
Locke in the actual speech remains unclear. See King and Laurence, Works vol. X p.1-20; PH 
vol. XVn pp. 275-285; WS vol. II pp. 359-364.
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opinion, the advocate for the largest scheme of ecclesiastical and civil 
toleration of Protestants; (for to Papists he allows no toleration at all)". 
Additional comments made by Burke in this text criticized a number of 
Lockean terms and ideas explicitly employed by the petitioners. He was 
censorious towards the resorting "to the original rights of nature" in some 
cases when it suited the petitioners while not in others. But he was especially 
averse to the appealing to "the rights of nature" against existing political 
institutions. Pleading to "original liberty" by its overcoming of the authority 
of such institutions, in effect destroyed it. Moreover, it was a meaningless 
destruction, for political institutions were inevitable, and the "principle of 
necessity of human affairs" meant that new institutions with similar authority 
would eventually be established.140
J.C.D. Clark, treats the text of the speech as dependable, but, curiously, seems 
to view the above comments as indicating Burke's agreement with Locke's 
position on religious toleration. Such a view not only ignores the conditional 
"if" that Burke put at the beginning of his remark, but it misses the whole 
point of the aside. Burke clearly intended to charge the position with 
hypocrisy, by showing the inconsistency both of the petition's Lockean 
argumentation, and of Locke's own intolerant attitude to the toleration of 
Catholics.141
The trend of Burke's comments in this passage was unmistakably anti- 
Lockean. Furthermore they bore witness to his identification of the 
petitioners' arguments w ith Locke's ideas: even though the petition did not 
actually mention Locke's name, Burke explicitly linked it to their arguments.
If any of Burke's comments here are even partially dependable, they reveal
140 PH vol. XVII pp. 251-254. Among the Lockean terms and ideas employed in the petition 
were the "...rights, competent to them...as men" and "...the right of private judgment". The 
Lockean terminology was intertwined in the petition with a militant protestant language, 
which against its own professions of tolerance, was almost comically abrasive and intolerant 
towards Catholicism.
141 Clark Reflections p. 265, in the notes.
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that he used Locke's opinions on religious toleration as a mean to show the 
self-contradictions in the petitioners' Lockean arguments. In addition they 
bore a not-too-veiled criticism of Locke's reputation as a great advocate of 
toleration, in the mordant remark that the latter's scheme was intended only 
for Protestants, while it "allows no toleration at all" to Catholics (as indeed 
the petition itself, which for all its talk of religious toleration for protestants, 
included a harsh attack on Catholicism). Burke's aspersions at the hypocritical 
employment by the dissenter petitioners of Lockean "natural" rights 
argumentation, and his rebuking of the prospect of revolt implied in such 
argumentation, were certainly in line with his attitude to this issue, as already 
noted, in the Vindication, and to which he would return to in such later works 
as the Reflections and the Appeal1*2
A  third and rather inconsequential reference to Locke in Burke's speeches is 
from 13 March 1780 during a debate on the abolition of the Board of Trade (a 
clause of Burke's Establishment Bill). Burke ridiculed the claim, made by one 
of the speakers, William Eden, which held that the fact illustrious literary 
names like Locke and Addison were among past members of the Board, could 
be an argument against its abolition. Burke is recorded as having paid "an 
elegant compliment to Mr. Locke, Mr. Addison, and Mr. Prior" but denied 
anything in the volumes of the board of trade could be considered as the 
literary production of these authors.143
142 See PH vol. XVII pp. 275-285. Compare to John Locke, A letter concerning toleration (1689): 
"A church, then, I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their 
own accord in order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge 
acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls". About Burke's attacks on 
rights of nature and right of resistance arguments as justifying revolutions, while upholding 
his view that only extreme "necessity" justifies revolt, and that too to defend the constitution 
and not destroy it. See Reflections pp. 100-102; Appeal pp. 150-151.
143 Eden (from 1789 Baron Auckland in the Irish Peerage) was a politician and diplomat, 
whose pamphlet from 1795 would be the immediate cause for Burke writing his Letter to the 
Earl Fitzwilliam. In the 1780 debate, Eden, criticizing the proposed abolition of the board, 
proposed Burke peruse the 2300 volumes of that board's proceedings, finding in them that 
among past members Addison, Prior, Molesworth and Locke. Burke ridiculed the idea that he
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The final reference to Locke in Burke's speeches is from the debate of 11 April 
1794 on the "Bill for enabling French subjects to enlist as British soldiers", one 
of Burke's last parliamentary appearances, before his retirement on 24 June 
1794. After C.J. Fox raised a number of objections to the proposed bill, Burke 
rose to reply with a m ordant and at times quite sardonic speech. Burke's 
central argument was that the service of French soldiers under the British flag 
was legitimate by the acknowledged principles of the "lex talionis" (law of 
retaliation). He argued that since the French revolutionary government had, 
by its conduct, "forfeited all pretension to allegiance" of its subjects, the latter 
were in their turn entitled to retaliate similarly. Burke asserted that the law of 
retaliation was part of the "law and practice of nations", and added that 
"Locke is of the same opinion relative to the lex talionis; and though I do not 
subscribe to all that he had advanced, his authority is on every subject of great 
weight". In this, his last known mention of Locke, and the only one from the 
period of the revolution in France, Burke used Locke's authority to counter 
Fox's arguments, and then added his own assessment of the proper weight 
which should be ascribed to Locke's ideas. Though some of Locke's 
propositions were erroneous, his opinions should always be accorded 
consideration. Unfortunately, Burke did not specify which of Locke's ideas he 
did not accept, or if there were particular areas in which Locke's opinions 
were more reliable than others. However, it should be remembered that in 
this case Burke was attempting a specific refutation of Fox. Since Fox was an 
avowed Lockean, the effectiveness of employing Locke's authority to refute 
him required that this authority should not be questioned too much. In effect, 
Burke attempted to distance himself from Locke's ideas, as far as was feasible 
without completely undermining his use of the latter's authority against Fox.
should read the 2300 volumes, sardonically remarking that if the proposal is defeated, the 
massed volumes would make for a glorious mausoleum: "The comers of thy cenotaph shall 
be supported by Locke, by Addison, by Prior and by Molesworth!". See PH XXI pp. 235-239.
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In such a context Burke was quite censorious of Locke. Indeed, given the 
generally sardonic tone which Burke adopted toward Fox in much of this 
speech, it is possible that the whole employment of Locke and the respectful 
tone towards his authority, was merely sarcastic.144
An assessment can be now attempted, of all known instances in which Locke 
was explicitly mentioned by Burke. Notwithstanding the relatively small 
number of cases, and even allowing for doubtful reliability in some, the 
picture that emerges is fairly clear: Burke was very critical of Locke. 
Expressing public regard for Locke's reputation, mainly as the author of the 
Essay, he as often as not disagreed with the latter's ideas on human 
understanding. In private, Burke criticized both Locke's style and his treatise 
on education. Towards Locke's political ideas, Burke was consistently and 
sometimes harshly censorious. In both the Vindication and in parliamentary 
speeches, as drafted or delivered, where Locke is mentioned, there appears 
time and again, whether implied or overt, one overarching denunciation: 
Locke's political ideas, by their tendency to overrule the decisions of existing 
governments with direct appeals to natural rights, and their unguarded 
allocation of the label tyranny, tended to undermine the legitimacy of all 
governments and to introduce the option of revolt into all political conflict. 
This attitude by Burke reflected Locke's high reputation for his authorship of 
the Essay; with the political writings on the whole neglected for a long time, 
but increasing in importance from the 1770s onwards, after being employed 
to legitimate radical proposals for political reforms. Accordingly, Burke, while 
maintaining an attitude of respect towards Locke's Essay, was censorious 
towards his political ideas. The need not to alienate the many in the English
144 PH vol. XXXI p. 422, and compare to ST sec. 8,10-12 (but the exact term lex talionis is not 
employed).
As examples of Fox's avowed Lockeanism see his 1783 speech reported in PH vol. XXIII p.
864, and his 1793 speech reported in Charles James Fox, The speeches of the Right Hounourable 
Charles James Fox in the House of Commons (1815) vol. V p. 115. Burke directly attacked the 
, latter speech in his Observations pp. 402-452. See also PH vol. XXX p. 922.
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establishment (including undoubtedly many of his own political associates) 
who still embraced Locke's high reputation would explain the relative 
scarcity and circuitous nature of Burke's explicit invocations of Locke's name. 
The importance of such a strategy would grow during the 1790s, when Burke 
concentrated his political efforts -  on top of his writing efforts -  on 
encouraging the largest numbers possible from among the Rockingham 
Whigs to break with Fox, to join Pitt's government, and to abide by that 
partnership. A direct theoretical diatribe about the merits of John Locke could 
only have harmed those efforts. Thus the tantalizing claim made in Henry 
Yorke's Spirit of John Locke (1794), that "Edmund Burke, the Knight Errant of 
Feudality, declared in the House of Commons, that 'Locke's Treatise on Civil 
Government, was the worst book ever written'", has found as yet no 
corroboration -  but seems to reflect the direction (albeit not necessarily the 
tone) of Burke's attitude to Locke's political ideas.145 
The review of all of Burke's explicit treatments of Locke, has shown the 
former as a decided if generally guarded critic of the latter's political ideas. If 
this material exhausted all of Burke's direct treatment of Locke's ideas, it 
would be hard not to conclude that, although Burke objected to Locke's 
political theory, it should be counted among many ideas and issues that were 
only of relatively peripheral concern to him. However, much of Burke's work 
bears directly on central aspects of Locke's political ideas without the latter's 
name being mentioned. Indeed several of Burke's most important works, and 
particularly the Reflections and the Appeal, were to a large degree sustained 
attacks on the most fundamental assumptions of Lockean political theory. The 
first pages of the Reflections, devoted as they were to refuting claims that 1688
145 Concerning Locke's reputation, see Dunn "Politics" pp. 45-80 and Goldie's Reception - 
especially vol. IV: "Political reform in the age of the French revolution, 1780-1838". For 
Yorke's claim about Burke see [Henry Redhead Yorke], The spirit of John Locke on civil 
government revived by the constitutional society of Sheffield (Sheffield, [1794]), p. viii. The claim 
concludes Yorke's introduction to the small pamphlet, which consists in a text paraphrased 
from Locke's Second treatise. See also in Kramnick "Republican" p. 655.
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had not gone far enough, amount to a rejection of the interpretation of that 
event as a (to paraphrase Pocock) Lockean moment. Burke asserted that the 
English in 1688 practiced "a close conformity to the practice of their 
ancestors"; that the Declaration of Right was a "renunciation" of elective 
monarchy, and a total submission of that generation and "their heirs and 
-posterity for ever" to the existing constitutional system; that the nation, though 
free to take whatever course it wished, did not think changes in the 
constitution "within their commission". Burke directly denied that if a 
government contravened the compact of constitution, there occurred a 
"decomposition of the whole civil and political mass, for the purpose of 
originating a new civil order out of the first elements of society". Instead, 
what transpired in 1688 (and according to him, should happen in all such 
cases) was a regeneration of the deficient parts of the old constitution, 
through the parts not impaired, acting "by the ancient organized states in the 
shape of their old organization, and not by the organic moleculae of a 
disbanded people". The whole argument directly negated the key Lockean 
image of political society as a collection of independent individuals.146 
Many other statements in the Reflections plainly tended in the same direction. 
Such was his remark about the speculatists being "always at issue with 
governments, not on a question of abuse, but a question of competency, and a 
question of title", an effective rejection of Locke's whole endeavoring to assert 
that political legitimacy was to be found only in governments' conforming to 
natural rights and consent. The same approach informed Burke's observation 
that the "new fanatics of popular arbitrary power", in their dogmatic 
insistence that there is only a single form of lawful government in the world, 
resembled the "old fanatics", followers of absolute monarchy by divine right. 
Similarly, Burke's assertion that "the science of constructing a
146 Reflections pp. 103-107.
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commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other
experimental science, not to be taught a priori", certainly seems directed
against the arguments of Britain's Lockean reformers.147
The Appeal was, if anything, an even more sustained attack on the
fundamental premises of the Two treatises. As already indicated above, Burke
ignored Locke's name in his description of the history and content of the
traditional political views of the Whigs. About Locke's ideas the text was far
less reticent. It related at length Burke's outlook on political society, its
essence captured in the passage where he asserted that
Our country is not a thing of mere physical locality. It consists, in a 
great measure, in the antient order onto which we are bom. We 
may have the same geographical situation, but another country; as 
we may have the same country on another soil. The place that 
determines our country is a social, civil relation.
The passage succinctly relates the distinctly anti-Lockean tenor of the Appeal, 
rejecting contract as a consensual agreement of individuals, the viability of a 
dissolution of government, and by implication natural rights.148 
These remarks and many others in the Reflections and the Appeal should not be 
seen as merely refutations of some points in Locke's political theory. Instead 
they amount to an evident and principled rejection of the whole theoretical 
purpose of Locke's Two treatises, as was avowed in the latter's own words: to 
"justifie [sic]" 1688 as an event which established William Ill's title to kingship 
"in the Consent of the people" as "the only one of all lawful Governments", and 
which manifested the people of England's love of "their Just and Natural 
Rights".™
147 Reflections pp. 110-lll("new  fanatics"), 147-149 ("always at issue"), 152-153 ("the science").
148 Appeal pp. 207, and see also 211-215,228-231.
149 John Locke, Two treatises of government (1690) in "The preface". Indeed Burke explicitly 
denied Locke's assertion in the said Preface, as it had been reiterated by Price, that the King 
who owes his crown to the choice of his people was, (in Burke's words) "the only lawful
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But, as much as such examples convincingly establish the manifest anti-
Lockean import of Burke's political outlook, they still come short of
definitively connecting this import to John Locke. For, it still could be argued
that Burke and his contemporaries regarded these attacks as aimed only at
Lockeans like Priestley and Paine. In various places, Burke's words against
the Lockeans seem to imply they had a common ideology, which it would be
hard not to trace back to Locke. Such was the case when, in a letter of June
1791 to Earl Fitzwilliam, Burke described the genesis of the Appeal, two
months before its publication, as directly connected to his finding out that
both the Reflections and himself were being accused of apostasy from the
principles of the Whig party, and
that great, and almost systematick pains were taken to discredit 
that work [the Reflections] in the Party, to gets its principles 
disclaimed; and of course (for medium there is none) to get the 
Principles of Paine, Priestley, Price, Rouse [sic -  Rous is meant], 
Mackintosh, Christie &ca &ca &ca magnified and extolled, and in a 
sort of obscure and undefined manner to be adopted as the Creed 
of the party.
Similarly, in a letter to French Laurence from August 1791, Burke remarked 
that not only Mackintosh but "indeed all the writers against me are, either 
Paine with some difference in the way of stating, or even myself".150 
Possibly, particular labels or descriptions, which Burke affixed to the 
Lockeans might have been associated by contemporaries with an intellectual 
tradition in which Locke was included. One such label was "speculatists", 
employed by Burke at least from 1780 to describe the radicals as an 
extraneous ideological element appended to the Whigs. Another example is 
Burke's repeated indication during the 1790s that he had "reason to be
sovereign in the world". See Reflections p. 98. For other examples of direct refutations of 
Locke's interpretation of 1688 see Reflections p. 116 and Appeal p. 147.
150 Letter to Fitzwilliam COR vol. VI pp. 271-276. Letter to Laurence COR vol. VI pp. 311-312 -  
in this letter Burke admitted to not having read Mackintosh, relying instead on the report of 
the text by his son Richard.
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persuaded, that it was in this country and from English Writers and English 
Caballers, that France herself was instituted in this revolutionary fury". The 
"speculatists", "Writers" and "Caballers" to which Burke was referring 
clearly comprised the Lockean radicals of his own time, like Price and 
Priestley, but also their (unnamed) intellectual predecessors. Burke hinted 
that the strain of speculative ideas in England was longstanding when he 
remarked that unlike the French, to which such ideas were "new", the English 
were "long satiated" with "bold speculations". Further research might 
establish the degree to which contemporaries associated such comments by 
Burke directly with Locke. At present such material may serve as adjunctive 
support for the general tendency of Burke towards his ideological 
opponents.151
Fortunately, I have found at least two cases in which it can be shown that 
Burke took upon himself to confront seriously and comprehensively the 
political principles of John Locke; instances when Locke and his ideas were 
directly addressed -  not merely some element or part of it but its whole 
framework, not incidentally or parenthetically but clearly and distinctly. One 
such case can be found in Burke's Observations of 1793, a text which will be 
discussed at length below, in the chapter dealing with sovereignty. The 
second and more important case, offering the most extensive and obvious 
attack on Locke and his political ideas, was Burke's draft of the "Speech on a 
motion made in the House of Commons, the 7th of May 1782 for a committee 
to inquire into the state of the representation of the Commons in parliament".
151 For "speculators", "Writers" and "Caballers" see COR vol. vol. IV pp. 294-299; Fitzzoilliam 
pp. 83-84; Reflections pp. 143,147-149. For "long satiated" see Assembly p. 318. But C.C. 
O'Brien claims that Burke's consistent position from the time he wrote the Vindication to the 
Reflections, was that the source for radical ideas in Britain were the French "philosophes". See 
C.C. O'Brien, The great melody: a thematic biography of Edmund Burke (Chicago, Chicago 
University Press, 1992) pp. 450-452. For examples of SCI books from 1780 repeatedly and 
explicitly appealing to Locke's authority in their demands for reform, see I. Kramnick, 
Republicanism and bourgeois radicalism (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990) pp. 183-184.
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In the first half of the 1780s England witnessed a surge in discussions and 
proposals concerning political reform. This development was probably an 
effect of the American conflict and the constitutional debate that surrounded 
it. Most of the important advocates of constitutional reform (many of them 
dissenters152) had gained prominence and respectability by their support of 
the American colonists, and among them were Major John Cartwright, John 
Jebb, Richard Price, Granville Sharp, Richard Brinsley Sheridan, Christopher 
Wyvill, Thomas Day, John Home Tooke, Thomas Paine and Capel Lofft. 
Many of these were in 1780 among the founders of the Society for 
Constitutional Information (SCI), directed at effecting political reform in 
England itself. Members of the SCI and other radicals published at this time 
many pamphlets, appeals and petitions, containing proposals for political 
reform, many of them overtly Lockean in language and content. Burke was to 
become a long-standing opponent of the SCI. Indeed, the animus which the 
Reflections later meted out to radicals and their societies might very well have 
derived from a built-up apprehension from the damaging effects of their 
activities since the 1780s.153
152 Burke identified appeals to natural rights as typical of the dissenting approach at least 
since his Speech on conciliation with America (1775), where he claimed that dissenter churches 
had sprung, unlike that of other Christian denominations, "in direct opposition to all 
ordinary powers of the world; and could justify that opposition only on a strong claim to 
natural liberty. Their very existence depended on the powerful and unremitted assertion of 
that claim". See Conciliation pp. 121-122.
153 Among the prominently Lockean pamphlets from these authors were: Granville Sharp's 
Declaration of the people's natural right to a share in the legislature (1774), John Cartwright7s The 
legislative rights of the community vindicated; or, take your choice (1776), and Richard Price's 
Observations on the nature of civil liberty (1776) -  the last two made their debt to Locke's ideas 
explicit. About the SCI and its later activities see Clark Reflections p. 68. Richard Price's 
sermon delivered on 4 November 1789 to the meeting of The Society for Commemorating the 
Revolution in Great Britain (commonly known as the Revolution Society), and published as a 
pamphlet; the SCI's renewed activity cheering on the French revolutionaries; and Henry 
Flood's (the SCI's chairman at the time) introduction (with the blessing of C.J. Fox) of a 
proposal for parliamentary reform on 4 March 1790 - amounted to a resurgence of the radical 
offensive of the 1780s against the constitution, within a far more volatile and dangerous 
situation.
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An additional shock to the political stability of the time was administered by 
the "Gordon riots", which engulfed London in June 1780. What started as 
popular Protestant demonstrations against a proposal for relief of legal 
restrictions on Catholics, headed by Lord George Gordon, turned into violent 
disturbances in which the mob effectively controlled the capital for a number 
of days, causing destruction and intimidating government. The disturbances 
were finally extinguished by armed troops, at the cost of hundreds of deaths 
among rioters. It has sometimes been suggested that Burke's anti-reformist 
opinions can be traced to his traumatic experiences during the riots, in which 
his own life was threatened. But although the events of June 1780 probably 
deepened Burke's suspicion of popular politics, he had already delivered a 
speech comprehensively opposing a reform proposal by radical MP and 
London Alderman, John Sawbridge, about the duration of parliament, almost 
a month before the riots.154
At this time of ferment and unrest among various improbable proposals (like 
the Duke of Richmond's proposal of universal male suffrage, defeated in the 
House of Lord's without a vote), two reforms were most seriously considered. 
One was a shortening of the duration of parliaments (then septennial), 
repeatedly and unsuccessfully submitted to the House of Commons by 
Sawbridge. Another was a reform in the parliamentary constituencies (in 
order to make them more representative), principally promoted by the 
younger William Pitt. During his first years in parliament, while rapidly 
rising to power, he put his reform proposal to the vote first in 1782, then in 
1783 an attenuated version, and an even more circumscribed one in 1785 
(when already Prime Minister). Soundly defeated each time, he abandoned 
any more attempts after the third failure.155
154 Duration pp. 588-602.
155 Charles Lennox, 3rd Duke of Richmond and Lennox, unsuccessfully introduced in the 
House of Lords on the 3rd of June 1780 a radical bill which included plans for annual
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Burke did not hide his hostility towards all of these reform proposals, 
speaking at length against Sawbridge's motion in 1780, composing a lengthy 
draft of a speech against Pitt7 s proposal of 1782, and speaking briefly against 
the proposal of 1785. In the debate of 1783 Burke also attempted to address 
the House, but it is reported that "Mr. Burke rose to speak, but many 
members rising to leave the House at the time, he declined speaking". 
Unfortunately, we can only speculate about what the content of Burke's 
intervention would have been, particularly as he had risen just after Fox had 
completed a speech (in favor of Pitt's proposal) which asserted that "Sydney, 
Locke, and others, writing on the constitution, had speculated far beyond 
what was practicable; yet much good resulted from their speculations, and 
they were great helps to the practicable beauty of which so much was 
boasted".156
Burke's animosity towards the proposed reforms was not merely a result of
disagreements about policy. Instead, he believed the debate about reform
reflected the influence of a dangerous ideology which had infiltrated his
party, the Rockingham Whigs, and which threatened to tear it apart. His
views and concerns for this period are accurately displayed in a letter from as
early as the 27th September 1780, to Joseph Harford (a Bristol friend and a
radical). Burke's predominant concern in the letter was from
the admitting of any Visionary Politicians among us. We are 
sufficiently secured (by our exclusion from the Court), from the 
mercenary of the Tribe. But the Bane of the Whiggs [sic] has been 
the admission among them of the Corps of Schemers; who in 
reality, and at bottom, mean little more than to indulge themselves 
with Speculations; but who do us infinite Mischief, by persuading
parliaments, universal manhood suffrage and 558 equally populous electoral districts. In 1783 
Richmond accepted Pitt's offer to join the ministry, and soon lost all further interest in reform. 
Sawbridge (brother of Catharine Macauley), had already published in 1770 the anti-Burke 
pamphlet Observations on a pamphlet, entitled, Thoughts on the cause of the present discontents.
156 PH vol. XXIII p. 864.
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many sober and well meaning people, that we have designs 
inconsistent with the Constitution left us by our forefathers.157
In other words, there was among the Whigs a group that, instead of 
maintaining the party's traditional commitment to the constitution, supported 
an ideology of "Speculations". These "Schemers" seemed not to pose any 
serious threat to the state, but they undermined the Whig party's reputation 
as loyal to the constitution. Burke clarified that his problem was not with the 
views of some insignificant member of the party, but rather that "some of our 
capital Men entertain thoughts so very different from mine". As examples he 
mentioned the Duke of Richmond's proposal for universal manhood suffrage 
and annual elections, and Sir George Savile's support for more frequent 
elections. Burke conceded that with the party's leader, the Marquess of 
Rockingham and indeed with majority of the party, he did not differ 
materially, yet he predicted that the party's capability of making an efficient 
opposition would be seriously hampered with some of "the first Men of their 
Age and their Country" supporting reform; as for himself, he foresaw a 
predicament in which "I must either fly in the face of the clearest light of my 
own understanding, and the firmest conviction of my own conscience, or I 
must oppose those for whom I have the highest value".158 
That Richmond, Savile, Fox and others among the Whigs, were arguing their 
"Speculations" on Lockean, indeed on Locke's premises and ideas, seems
157 "Letter to Joseph Harford" of 27 September 1780 in COR vol. IV pp. 294-299. Burke added 
in the letter a comment on the Westminster elections where Fox had been pressed to declare 
his support for various radical proposals - which he ignored, but was elected nevertheless: 
"You see in what sort of way Westminster was carried. There is in that City a sort of Whiggs, 
perfectly resembling the corrupt part of ours, and who would have done just as much 
Mischief, if they had been under any head. Fortunately they were not, and therefore instead 
of being detrimental to the Cause, their activity rendered them very useful". See also in this 
context Fox's letter to Burke concerning the election in COR vol. IV pp. 282-284; and Burke's 
"Letter to the chairman of the Buckinghamshire meeting" in COR vol. IV pp. 226-229.
158 See COR vol. IV pp. 294-299. And Burke's mistrust of Richmond, sown in the early 1780s 
did not abate even a decade after the latter had joined Pitt's administration and served in it 
loyally. See F.P. Lock, "Unpublished Burke letters 1783-96" in English Historical Review 112 
(1997) p. 137.
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hardly disputable -  and will be demonstrated below. But before proceeding, it 
is important to emphasize how this period of intense debate about reforms 
coincided, not incidentally, with the great surge in interest in the political 
theory of Locke, amplified by the American rebellion. Such writers as Soame 
Jenyns, Richard Watson, Baptist Noel Turner, Matthew Dawes and William 
Paley all published in the early 1780s texts dealing with Locke's political 
ideas. But by far the most important work, provoking in its wake an entire 
pamphlet disputation, was Josiah Tucker's fundamental repudiation of 
Locke's politics in his A treatise concerning civil government (1781). This spirited 
controversy about Locke's political principles was being carried out in the 
early 1780s, publicly enough to w arrant a publication on the controversy itself 
- such as The Dean and the squire (1782), a satirical poem that outlined an 
imaginary conversation between Tucker (the Dean) and Jenyns (the squire), 
who "both stand stubborn as rock/Against the principles of Locke". Many 
aspects of the relationship between Burke and Tucker are unclear, but they 
certainly knew each other's work (though on the same side of the American 
controversy, they exchanged some blows in their pamphlets, apparently 
becoming reconciled in 1778), and Burke almost certainly owned Tucker's 
Treatise. At any event, the MP's addressing issues of representation -  
including Burke -  could hardly have lacked at least some familiarity with the 
general arguments in a controversy as public as this, and with the central 
place Locke's theory occupied within it.159
159 See Malcolm McGregor [William Mason], The Dean and the squire (1782). Among the works 
touching on Locke's political theory published in the early 1780s were: Soame Jenyns' 
Disquisitions on several subjects (1782); Richard Watson's anonymously published An answer to 
the Disquisition on government and civil liberty; in a letter to the author of Disquisitions on several 
subjects (1782); Baptist Noel Turner's The true alarm: a sketch of a refutation of Mr. Locke (1783); 
Matthew Dawes' The nature and extent of supreme power, in which Mr. Locke's theory of 
government is examined and explained (1783); and William Paley's ’The duty of submission to 
civil government explained’ in his The principles of moral and political philosophy (1785).
Among the pamphlets addressing Tucker's Treatise of 1781 were John Cartwright's The 
people's barrier against undue influence and corruption [1780]; James Dunbar's Essays on the
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It is against this background that the significance of the following 
parliamentary debate, and Burke's draft of a speech addressing it, should be 
considered. On the 7th of May 1782, William Pitt the younger, at only 23 years 
of age a rising star in the Commons, proposed the creation of a committee to 
inquire into the state of parliamentary representation. The proposal, though 
eventually defeated, occasioned a significant debate, which -  in spite of the 
notorious deficiencies of parliamentary records for the time -  supplies a 
picture of the main arguments for and against such reform at that time. 
Though he is not recorded as having spoken in the debate, Burke composed a 
speech addressing it (evidently intended for some later use), thus supplying 
his views on the subject in direct response to the arguments and ideas 
presented in that debate.160
Pitt argued his proposal on an interpretation of the tradition of the ancient 
constitution. According to this interpretation England's constitution had 
achieved an effective perfection since before the Norman conquest, perhaps 
even in the woods of Germany, and had continued essentially unchanged 
since, with occasional restorations to original purity when faults and
history of mankind [1781] (both of these reacting to a pre-publication copy circulating among 
Tucker's friends); James Ibbetson's A dissertation on the national assemblies under the Saxon and 
Norman governments, with a postscript addressed to the Dean of Glocester [sic] (1781); Sir William 
Jones' anonymously published The principles of government, in a dialogue between a scholar and a 
peasant. Written by a member of the Society for constitutional information (1782); Joseph Towers' 
Vindication of 1782; and Tucker's two ripostes -  "The evil consequences arising from the 
propagation of Mr. Locke's democratical principles", in his Four letters on important national 
subjects (1783), and his anonymously published A sequel to Sir William Jones's pamphlet on the 
principles of government, in a dialogue between a freeholder in the county of Denbigh and the Dean of 
Glocester [sic](1784). For these texts and their context see Goldie's Reception -  especially vol. 
IV. See also Kramnick Republicanism pp. 173-175,187-190. On Burke and Tucker see COR vol. 
Ill pp. 132-133,180 and notes. See also Pocock Virtue pp. 169-184.
It is very likely -  though not certain -  that Burke owned Tucker's Treatise, since the two 
existing lists of the contents of Burke's library include that book. The lists were posthumous, 
compiled when the library was being sold (in 1813 and 1833), but they evidence only minor 
additions to the library. See "Catalogue of a library of books late the property of the Rt. Hon. 
Ed. Burke decsd" see manuscript in Oxford University Bodleian library, MS 16798; S. Deane, 
Sales catalogues of libraries of eminent persons, vol. viii -  Politicians (Mansell Publishing, 1973) pp. 
179-240.
160 The debate is reported in PH vol. XXII pp. 1416-1438.
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imperfections had accumulated as a result of political mishandling. Moreover, 
since, according to this view, the first principles of the constitution could be 
easily identified and restored, it followed that now too it would be possible 
and desirable to clear the impurities that had crept into it, and restore its 
original state. Pitt described his proposal as "moderate reform of such defects 
as had imperceptibly and gradually stole in to deface" the constitutional 
fabric, so that the representative branch had "far departed from its original 
purity". Thus, he insisted, his was "not innovation, but recovery of 
constitution". He proposed to do this by examining "the quality and nature of 
that branch of the constitution as originally established, and compare it with 
its present state and condition".161
This view, holding that since the original principles of the ancient constitution 
could be clearly identified and restored, current political practice could (and 
should) be reformed in order to correspond with them fully, has been 
convincingly described by J.G.A. Pocock as "the ideology of the Ancient 
Constitution". Pocock described as close to, but distinct from this view 
another ideology, termed by him "prescriptive conservatism", held, among 
others, by Burke. This latter view, accepting the premise of an ancient and 
continuing constitution, nevertheless proposed that the ancient constitution 
had evolved historically according to circumstances, and as such could not be 
reduced -  never mind restored -  to original principles, but only accepted as a 
whole. That this was indeed Burke's view, can be observed in many instances 
throughout the years, in which he touched on Britain's early constitutional 
history, such as the fragment from 1757 where he observed "of what a 
visionary nature those systems are, which would settle the ancient
161 PH vol. XXII pp. 1416-1417.
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Constitution in the most remote times exactly in the same form, in which we 
enjoy it at this day".162
But it appears to me that Pocock's characterization of these two views, though 
essentially correct, is misleadingly labeled by him. By exaggerating the 
distinction between the two views, it obscures the fact that they were part of 
one tradition, and that there were many who held intermediate positions 
between them. Indeed it conceals the debt and continuing connection, which 
Pocock himself acknowledges, between Burke's view and the tradition of the 
ancient constitution. Since both ideologies believed in some kind of 
continuing ancient constitution, and employed the term explicitly, they 
should be seen as different branches of the same trunk, and I will address 
them thus: the first, embraced among others by the younger Pitt (at least in 
1782), can be termed "originalist", since it held the constitution to have been 
originally perfect and remaining so; the second, held among others by Burke, 
could be labeled as "historical" since it held that the constitution developed 
with time, and that by and large its current state was the best expression of its 
principles. It should be emphasized that, while the "historical" interpretation 
of the ancient constitution tradition, for obvious reasons, was solely the 
province of loyalists, the "originalist" interpretation was appealed to by many 
radicals too (with the name of Algernon Sidney most prominently invoked as 
authority for such an argument).163
162 Abridgment p. 443, see also pp. 430, 435; Fitzwilliam p. 82.
163 For a general discussion of the problem and of the debate of 7 May 1782, see Pocock Politics 
pp. 202-232. Elsewhere Pocock traces Pitt's reformist argumentation to Bolingbroke. See 
Pocock Virtue p. 94. George Tomline, the younger Pitt's tutor, friend, secretary and later 
biographer, reported he had explicitly reprobated Locke's "notions on the origin of civil 
government, as unfounded and of dangerous tendency". It should however be remembered 
that Tomline was from 1787 an Anglican Bishop. See in G. Tomline, Memoirs of the life of the 
Right Honourable William Pitt (1821) vol. I, p. 9. For another view picture of Pitt's intellectual 
makeup see Sack Jacobite pp. 83-84.
Sidney7 name was repeatedly invoked by radical texts, perhaps more than any other. Many 
times he and Locke were paired as twin authorities for political reform. Examples of the 
innumerable references to Sidney in radical texts from the last three decades of the 18th
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However almost all of those recorded as speaking in support of Pitt's 
proposal, found the grounds for their arguments very far from those of the 
ancient constitution. Only one speaker, Charles Howard (styled with the 
courtesy title of Earl of Surrey), was recorded as favoring Pitt's proposal 
solely on grounds that might be regarded as those of the ancient constitution 
tradition, while another speaker, Sir Horace Mann, was reported to have 
supported reform in principle but stated that "now was not the proper time" 
for it. All other speakers recorded as supporting reform in this debate, among 
them Sawbridge, Savile, George Byng, C. J. Fox, Richard Sheridan and Sir 
Charles Turner, whether implicitly or explicitly, indicated their case as 
grounded in the theory that demanded what Turner described as a "fair and 
equal representation" in the Commons -  an immediately recognizable 
reference to the familiar assertion by Locke in his Second treatise, about the 
people having a right to "a fair and equal Representative".164,
Most direct about both the background and import of these ideas was another 
one among such speakers, John Courtenay, about whose speech it was 
reported that he
confessed himself a warm friend of the motion, from a thorough 
conviction that a regulation was extremely necessary: he read a 
passage from Locke highly in favour of the regulation, and put a 
simile to the House: supposing, that he had an old mansion which 
had run to decay by the neglect of the steward, the upper part 
destroyed by a nest of [jackjdaws, and the lower part undermined
century are: Rokeby Considerations p. 10, Towers Vindication p. 36, Parr Sequel p. 96, Yorke 
Spirit p. vii and Mackintosh Vindiciae pp. 364-365. An example of a radical text offering an 
extensive treatment of the ancient constitution argument see [Obadiah Hulme], An historical 
essay on the English constitution (1771). See also Dickinson Liberty pp. 204-205. Among those 
loyalists criticizing the radical use of the "originalist" interpretation of the Ancient 
Constitution were Young, who ridiculed the claims that an original purity of the constitution 
was to be found in "the woods of Germany", Josiah Tucker, and of course Burke. See Young 
Example p. 164 and Pocock Ancient pp. 46-47, 238-239.
164 ppi vol. XXII pp. 1422-1423,1429-1433. Compare to ST sec. 158. The recurring and often 
explicit allusion to Locke by the term "fair and equal representation", used among other by 
Wilkes and Price, is treated in Kramnick Republicanism pp. 173-175 and S. Blakemore, 
Intertextual war (Associated University Press, 1997) pp. .180-181.
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with rats -  what would be necessary in that business? why, 
certainly, to pull the mansion down, and erect a new building in its 
stead; but he made no doubt people would say, what, destroy that 
old fabric, that place that was the admiration of your ancestors: no, 
do not touch it! He would answer, yes, I am determined to make 
the estate as valuable as possible.165
That the ideas propounded by these speakers were understood by those 
taking part in the debate as very distant from Pitt's is plainly reflected in the 
answer most prominently reported by contemporary records, that of Thomas 
Pitt, William's much older cousin. Thomas warned his cousin from espousing 
the principles embraced by those who spoke in favor of his proposal; and 
later accepted William's protestation that the latter had in fact disclaimed the 
principle of equal representation in his opening remarks. In his speech 
Thomas touched on William's particular proposal only marginally, 
concentrating his criticism instead on the notion which "[t]heorists, it seems, 
have endeavoured to establish as a maxim, that that nation only can be free 
where no individual in it is governed but by laws to which he has given his 
assent in person, or by the mouth of one he has personally deputed to give 
that assent for him: freedom, therefore, is stated to consist in equal personal 
representation" -  an obvious an indictment of Locke's principles. Against 
such ideas Thomas Pitt argued that being "a balance against the power of the 
crown" was the "true and only principle" in the origin and purpose of the 
British parliament; and that the proposal to institute a committee would only 
serve to "open a general shop to receive all the projects of the wildest of the 
projectors". Moreover, he remarked, those who believed equal representation 
could be admitted in principle and then qualified, were wrong, since "the 
principle must be carried through, or it must be abandoned", because if equal 
representation "is a natural right, all have the right or none; there is no
165 PH vol. xxn, pp. 1431-1432. Of rather idiosyncratic views, Courtenay supported Pitt's 
proposal for reform of May 1782, but opposed the later.proposals of 1783 and 1785.
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medium". Thomas Pitt's arguments can be described in the main as those of 
"historical" interpretation of the ancient constitution (and his tone at times 
was quite Burkean), regarding the function of the constitution as it had 
evolved at that time, as the true expression of its original principles. 
Incidentally, Thomas was the elder Pitt's nephew previously mentioned, to 
whom, when at university, Locke was recommended as instructive reading 
material.166
The setting of the debate to which Burke reacted, can be thus summed up: 
William Pitt argued for an "originalist" restoration of an ancient 
constitutional purity, and Thomas Pitt presented the "historical" 
interpretation to the constitution as it had developed. Both Pitts rejected the 
political principle of "equal personal representation", espoused by almost all 
speakers who supported reform, and connected within the debate by those 
opposing and supporting it, to Lockean "natural right", and indeed to Locke 
himself.167
In his text Burke first distanced himself from those speakers who stated they 
had no principled objection to change, and opposed it merely in particular 
circumstances. He placed himself clearly among those believing that "no
166 Dunn "Politics" pp. 57-59; PH vol.XXII pp. 1424-1429. About William's disclaiming equal 
representation see p. 1433. In his 1783 proposal for reform, William's disclaiming of such 
Lockean principles was even more unambiguous, asserting: that "his idea of representation 
was this, that the members once chosen, and returned to parliament, were in effect, the 
representatives of the people at large, as well of those who did not vote at all, or who, having 
voted, gave their votes against them, as of those by whose suffrages they were actually seated 
in the House"; and the "innovation founded on doctrines subversive of liberty" which saw as 
legitimate only a House of Commons elected by all the men in the kingdom, he rejected as "a 
mere speculative proposition, that may be good in theory, but which it would be absurd and 
chimerical to endeavour to reduce to practice". See PH vol. XXIII p. 831 (and he reiterated the 
same position in 1785 too, see PH vol. XXV p. 435). In 1783 Thomas Pitt came to support 
William's amended proposal for change in representation, claiming it to be "extremely 
different" from the one he had opposed a year before. See PH vol. XXIII p. 863.
167 Pocock, who describes the debate as presenting both a "rationalist doctrine based on a 
Lockean theory of natural right" and a modified form of the "ancient constitution" argument, 
focuses on Burke's answer to Pitt. While acknowledging that some of the speakers in this 
debate were "Lockeans", Pocock's treatment fails to underscore the fact that these "Lockeans" 
were the vast majority of speakers in favor of reform. See Pocock Politics pp. 227-229.
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essential alterations are at all wanting" in the constitution, and that it is 
"never prudent or safe to be meddling with the fundamental principles and 
ancient tried usages" of the constitution.168
Proceeding to deal with those supporting change, Burke divided them into 
two groups, based on the (for him totally different) grounds upon which they 
called for constitutional alterations. The first, characterized by Burke as 
"juridical", grounded change "in the nature of a claim of right, on the 
supposed right of man as man"; the second, characterized as "political", 
grounded change on a claim of discrepancy between the current practice of 
political representation, and the "theory of its institution". These were 
obviously the two ideological grounds for reform that the debate had 
witnessed: the first were the Lockean advocates for "natural rights" and 
"equal personal representation", the second was William Pitt's "originalist" 
version of the ancient constitution theory. This second view was dismissed by 
Burke almost offhandedly by pointing out that while the natural rights view 
"claims a personal representation", that of the ancient constitutionalist 
"rejects it with scorn and fervour". By observing that such reformers were 
cooperating with men holding principles completely at odds with their own, 
he strongly implied either intellectual inconsistency or political obtuseness on 
their part.169
Concentrating on what he called the "right of man as man" group (to whose 
arguments, he pointed out, nine in ten supporters of constitutional change
168 It appears that the speech was never delivered. Pocock claims that the version published in 
past editions of Burke's works is incomplete - unfortunately the WS have not yet published 
their volume covering this period. See Pocock Politics p. 225.
169 Representation pp. 93-95. For a discussion of the historical and juridical traditions of social 
theorizing in the late 18th century see I. Hampsher-Monk, "John Thelwall and the eighteenth- 
century radical response to political economy" in The Historical Journal 34 (1991) pp. 8-12. In 
1785, Burke was even more severe in his censure of Pitt's proposal for reform, accusing him of 
assisting by his proposals only the views that he opposed, for "[t]he doctrine which had 
gained so much ground, and in conformity to which this plan had now been introduced, was 
that of universal representation". See PH vol. XXVpp. 469-470.
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subscribed), Burke observed that those who "plead an absolute right" of
natural political representation, cannot accept this representation to be
anything but a personal one. This is because
all natural rights m ust be the rights of individuals; as by nature 
there is no such thing as politick or corporate personality; all those 
ideas are mere fictions of law, they are creatures of voluntary 
institutions; men as men are individuals and nothing else.170
From this naturalist political premise, he draws their principles as laying 
down that: "every man ought to govern himself", that "where he cannot go 
himself he must send his Representative", that "all other government is 
usurpation", and that any such government "far from having claim to our 
obedience, it is not only our right, but our duty, to resist it". Despite the 
modest extent of the current demands (a small reform in representation), the 
"extent of the principle", if accepted makes the outcome inevitable. The 
principle negates the fundamental justification, not only the current state of 
representation, or even of the existing House of Commons, but of the whole 
system of British government. For Burke the implication was that to even 
attempt a dialogue based on the British constitution, with those holding such 
principles would be ridiculous, since that constitution was completely 
irrelevant to them.171
In short, Burke was comprehensively opposing his own view (which he held 
to be also that embodied in the British constitution) of the polity as a "politick 
or corporate personality", to a "natural rights" ideology, that was not only 
distinctly Lockean, but to anyone acquainted with the terminology and 
references of those who supported it in the debate -  as Burke certainly was -  
specifically Locke's. It is hardly possible to view these assertions by Burke, 
against those he described alternatively as holding "right of man as man",
170 Representation pp. 94-95. See the similarity of wording and use of the term "politick 
personality" in Appeal p. 211.
171 Representation p. 95.
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"natural rights" or "juridical" views, as anything other than the principled 
rejection of Locke's most famous political assumptions: individual natural 
political rights; the politic or corporate personality as a mere legal fiction; each 
man's right of governing himself directly or by representative, all other 
governments being usurpations; a right of resistance. All of these principles 
are explicitly enumerated by Burke, and then described not only as irrelevant 
to the British constitution, but even nugatory to its existence.172 
Burke's articulation of the grounds on which those opposed to constitutional 
change on principle -  among which he counted himself -  stood, is also 
instructive of the notions he was attempting to confute. Burke asserted 
against the "natural rights" claims, that the British system was based on "a 
prescriptive Constitution"; a constitution "whose sole authority is, that it has 
existed time out of mind". Consequently, all attempts to challenge the 
constitutional setting should be rejected on the grounds that the British 
constitution is prescriptively "settled" in its parliamentary form, and the same 
is true of the "the judicature, the whole of the federal capacity, of the 
executive, the prudential and the financial administration". The import of this 
argument was wholly anti-Lockean, for its emphasis on the "settled" nature 
of the constitution, denied the whole premise of Locke's Second treatise -  that 
there exists a right in the people to alter the frame of the polity.173 
As has been amply attested, throughout Burke's works are numerous 
examples of his antipathy to notions of Lockean natural rights (in their 
various appellations). He characterized them as simplistic, not to say 
primitive, and their effects as a threat to the very fabric of states founded on
172 About individual natural rights and politic or corporate personality as legal fictions see ST 
sec. 95,96,128,158; about every man governing himself directly or by representative see ST sec. 
88,140,157,158; about all other governments being usurpations see ST sec. 90, 94; and about 
the right of resistance see ST sec. 208, 212. It could have been argued that these notions were 
not exclusively Locke's, but the latter had been explicitly mentioned and quoted in the 
debate.
173 Representation p. 96 and ST sec. 212.
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constitutions like the British one. However, what is still lacking is a 
persuasive explanation of why he regarded such notions as not merely 
misguided, but seriously dangerous to the British political system.174 
Such an account, I believe, can be found in Burke's description in his 1782 
speech draft against reform of representation of the Lockean demands for 
"natural rights" and "equal personal representation" as based on "juridical" 
grounds (while Pitt's historical claim for change was described as "political"). 
When this remark is added to others, like his observation from 1790 in the 
Appeal, that founding government on "imaginary rights of men", is at best "a 
confusion of judicial with civil principles"; and to his assertion from 1792, in 
the Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, that "contrary to the system of the insane 
reasoners", political, prudential decisions, differed from those "of the 
judicature", it emerges that Burke identified the Lockean approach to politics 
as legalistic, and ascribed the source of its baneful effects to the inappropriate 
mixing of legal and political concepts. This insight can also go a long way 
towards explaining many of the negative characteristics Burke attributed to 
natural rights arguments -  such as being abstract, simplistic and 
unrealistically perfectionist -  as a by-product of this legal approach to 
politics.175
Burke did not reject the employment of legal concepts and terms within 
political discourse, and introduced them at various times in his arguments. 
What he opposed was an approach that regarded judicial positions as 
separate from and paramount to, politics. His own view of the place of law in 
politics, which he presented as the traditional one within the British 
constitutional tradition, was of a "science of methodized and artificial equity",
174 In 1756 the Vindication's treated Lockean notions of natural rights as preceding political 
society; in 1772 the "original rights of nature", see PH vol. XVIII pp. 275-285; in 1782 "Right of 
Man as Man", see Representation pp. 93-94; in 1795 "Canon of the Rights of Man", see 
Fitzwilliam pp. 101-102.
175 Representation pp. 94-95; Appeal pp. 256-258; Langrishe p. 600. See also Reflections p. 151.
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with "corporations established for it's conservation". Legal arguments could
and sometimes should be employed in political deliberation, but only as part
of a process involving considerations of policy or prudence, and only within
the established political traditions and institutions. He claimed that the British
system of law and liberty was based only on the “antient constitution of
government", and that to know the "spirit" of this constitution, it was
necessary to look for it in "our histories, our records, in our acts of Parliament,
and journals of Parliament". He opposed the view that would position an
abstract and speculative legalistic logic, as supreme to all arguments from
political history and practice. Such an approach accepted as valid only
"natural" individuals and rights, thus justifying the creating and dissolving at
will of all it saw as "voluntary institutions", including government. It
regarded such institutions as nothing more than technical and functional
"fictions of law", essentially denying the existence of political society as a real
entity with a "politick or corporate personality".176
In Burke's description of the introduction of such a politically abstract
approach to France, his customary revulsion to revolutionaries seems to be
surpassed by amazement. He related his conversations with Lord Camden
(Chief Justice of Common Pleas and Lord Chancellor), in which they both
expressed astonishment at the abolition in revolutionary France "of the law as
a science of methodized and artificial equity". The leaders of the
revolutionary "sect" had
deliberately, at one stroke, demolished the whole body of that 
jurisprudence which France had pretty nearly in common with 
other civilized countries. In that jurisprudence were contained the 
elements and principles of the law of nations, the great ligament of 
mankind. With the law they have of course destroyed all
176 Regicide I p. 240 ("corporations established"); Representation pp. 94-95 ("politick or 
corporate"), and for the similarity of this claim to Burke's assertions in the 1790s see Appeal p. 
211; Reflections pp. 117.
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seminaries in which jurisprudence was taught, as well as all the 
corporations established for it's conservation.
Burke emphasized that he had not yet heard yet of any country even in Asia 
or northern Africa, which was wholly "without some such colleges and such 
corporations". The inevitable result of the policy was that in France no one "in 
a publick or private concern, can divine by what rule or principle her 
judgements are to be directed", nor can anyone, whether a university 
professor or Court practitioner "hazard" an opinion of what is or is not law in 
France. The revolutionaries had thus "not only annulled all their old treaties; 
but they have renounced the law of nations from whence treaties have their 
force. With a fixed design they have outlawed themselves, and to their power 
outlawed all other nations".177
At the heart of the vision of the state and the laws presented by Burke, stood 
the disagreement about whether individuals had a right to be political judges 
in their own cause. Locke, while claiming to concede th a t"Civil Government" 
was the remedy for the inconvenience of men in the state of nature having the 
power of being "Judges in their own Case", by retaining in them this power 
exactly as concerns political matters, effectively undercut his own claim. In his 
system men have a power of political judgment in their own case, a power 
that is supreme to any government. Burke, in the passage of the Reflections 
that treats the relations between natural rights and government, appears to 
have been pointing to this problem. He first repeated the Lockean claim that 
"one of the first motives to civil society, and which becomes one of its 
fundamental rules, is that no man be judge in his own cause"; but, following it 
through, he pointed out that the result of this premise can only be that man, 
by this divestiture, "abdicates all right to be his own governor".178
177 Regicide I p. 240.
178 ST sec. 13, 88; Reflections p. 150. Burke's argument here is consistent with his view of the 
matter almost 35 years earlier in Vindication p.172.
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In the Appeal the political result of this Lockean contradiction is presented by 
Burke as the foundation of the views held and propagated by the modem 
Whig "factions". Their object being "to divest men of all love for their 
country, and to remove from their minds all duty with regard to the state", 
they heralded the opinion "that the people, in forming their commonwealth, 
have by no means parted with their power over it". This idea was described 
by Burke as the "impregnable citadel" of the m odem  Whigs, for it implied 
that the people "are masters of the commonwealth; because in substance they 
are themselves the commonwealth".179
Thus Burke presented two opposing views of what constituted the foundation 
of government. One view, by starting from juridical rights of individuals, was 
based on individual consent, and thus always retained political power in the 
people. It regarded all political constructs such as constitution, government or 
contract, merely as functional instruments for the adequate management of 
the commonwealth. Power was practically delegated from the people, but 
only remained so by w hat Burke called their "pleasure" (perhaps implying 
too, that this conception of politics was rather close to that of absolute 
monarchy, where the constitution exists only at the pleasure of the sovereign 
-  and this he stated explicitly in the Reflections). Burke argued that such a 
conception of the polity meant not only that in a practical analysis, ultimate 
effective power always remained in the people, but also that in the regular 
course of things such power must be continuously retained and practiced by 
them. Burke never denied that in every state, ultimate power rested with the 
people and their opinions, but he stressed that constitutions existed in order 
to prevent exactly the practice, necessarily terrible, of such unstoppable 
power.180
179 Appeal pp. 187-199. See also Remarks p. 474.
180 Appeal pp. 202-203. In Fitzwilliam p. 84, warning that the French revolutionaries had their 
source in "English Writers and English Caballers" he characterized their ideas thus: "They are
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The other view, which was Burke's own, regarded legitimate political 
authority as irreversibly bound to the terms of the particular constitution -  in 
its widest sense -  of each polity. The commonwealth in this case was not the 
population physically living in a certain place and time, but an entity defined 
by its constitution. Political decisions draw their legitimacy from being 
reached constitutionally, even when the majority of the people can be showed 
to reject these decisions (although Burke held such divisions tended in the 
long run, to be fatal to the state).181
Burke identified the "citadel" of the m odem Whigs' outlook as the people's 
continuing "power over" political society. As has been shown above, he 
regarded this continuing power, as voiding political "contract" from meaning 
since the contract could be rescinded at will. But he had an additional and 
perhaps even more fundamental reason to reject the outlook as both wrong 
and dangerous: because it did not realize that men have an innate and potent 
craving for political power. Such a desire meant that "men love to hear of 
their power, but have an extreme disrelish to be told of their duty. This is of 
course; because every duty is a limitation of some power". Burke linked the 
idea that obligations or duties are a limitation of power, to the political 
significance of m en's desire for power: "It is not necessary to teach men to 
thirst after power. But it is very expedient that, by moral instruction, they 
should be taught, and by their civil constitutions they should be compelled, to
always considering the formal distributions of power in a constitution: the moral basis they 
consider nothing". His view  he described thus: "I consider the moral basis as every thing; the 
formal arrangements, further than as they promote the moral principles of Government, and 
the keeping desperately wicked persons as the subjects of laws and not makers of them, to be 
of little importance". See also Regicide II p. 288; Sheriffs pp. 314-319. See also Duration p. 598.
181 Appeal pp. 187-202. Compare to ST sec. 4, 6: "To understand Political Power right, and 
derive it from its original, w e must consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is a 
State of Perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as 
they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending 
upon the Will of any other Man"; and "But thought this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a 
state of licence" for "reason, which is that law [of nature] teaches all mankind, who will but 
consult it".
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put many restrictions upon the immoderate exercise of it, and the inordinate 
desire". Furthermore, Burke argued, this taste for "arbitrary power" in 
"vulgar" m en of every description means almost all dissentions in the 
commonwealth concern not the manner in which power is to be exercised but 
"the hands in which it is to be placed". He added that with power, "[w]hether 
they desire it to be vested in the many or the few, depends with most men 
upon the chance which they imagine they themselves may have of partaking 
in the exercise of that arbitrary sway, in the one mode or the other". In other 
words the prim ary political question should not be where ultimate theoretical 
power in the state rests, but rather how are ambition and thirst for power 
dealt with. By stressing that the correct political concern about power should 
be the m anner in which it is to be exercised and not where it should be 
"placed", he was apparently suggesting that a concern about the proper 
exercise of power inclined one towards seeking limits and controls upon it. 
Similarly, concern with the place of power fostered a propensity to stress its 
"arbitrary sway". Though by this view all political theories concentrating on 
the origin and locus of power (such as those of Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau), 
were shown to be basically misguided, and even harmful to civil society, 
Burke's wording brings to mind Locke's assertion, in the first of his Two 
treatises, that "[t]he great question which in all ages has disturbed mankind, 
and brought on them the greatest part of those mischiefs which have ruined 
cities, depopulated countries, and disordered the peace of the world, has 
been, not whether there be power in the world, nor whence it came, but who 
should have it". Locke and Burke it appears agreed that the discord over 
whom should have power greatly (and negatively) affected hum an affairs.
But while for the former this was indeed the important political question that
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had to be settled, for the latter it was a "vulgar", wrong and destructive 
enterprise.182
The disagreement was between an attitude to political power such as Locke's, 
which sought to define and assert it, and that of Burke, wishing to control it. 
This divergence may have originated for Burke in what he saw as a 
fundamental misunderstanding of human nature, in relation to men's desire 
for power, but, for him, this fundamental error was indicative of a wider 
problem with the political concepts of those he terms the "modem 
philosophers", being crude, simplistic and primitive -  suggesting to him 
similarly crude and primitive motives and ambitions. He described such 
thinkers at length as fighting over the names of rude power, without affecting 
the substance, and as espousing political concepts as those of the inchoate 
peasant uprisings of the middle ages, best conveyed by some rough popular 
rhymes.183
Burke's most sustained and comprehensive effort to describe and refute the 
"natural rights" political philosophy, while differentiating it from, and 
upholding the traditional political principles of the English constitution, those 
of the "Old Whigs", was in his Appeal, of 1791. Although already deep into the 
controversy about the revolution in France, Burke's attacks implicitly but 
repeatedly indicated Locke's political theory as the source of the problem. 
Three prominent examples will be now examined as illustrations.
The first example is the notion of majority mle being a "natural" political law. 
Burke expressed surprise that some political theorists "assume so readily" a 
power to act by majority among disbanded men after the "dissolution of an 
antient society". Such assumption for Burke was simply wrong, because 
accepting the decision of the majority was not a law of "original nature" but
182 Locke Two treatises, in "First treatise" sec. 106.
183 Appeal pp. 221-228; Reflections pp. 151-153 on fundamental defectiveness of simple 
government and on "primitive rights of men"; Fitzwilliam p. 80 on the "primitive staple" of 
revolutionary governments' "frame".
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existed only in the artificial product that is "civil society" - and even there,
men submitted to majority decision after "very long training", only by
a very particular and special convention, confirmed afterwards by 
long habits of obedience, by a sort of discipline in society, and by a 
strong hand, vested with stationary permanent power, to enforce 
this sort of constructive general will.
Indeed if any mode of collective decision deserved to be called natural, Burke 
observed, decisions by unanimity were a far more likely candidate. This 
argument directly confuted Locke's famous argument in the Second treatise for 
"the act of the majority" having "the power of the whole" by "the Law of 
Nature and Reason", because "if the consent of the majority shall not in reason, 
be received, as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but 
the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the 
whole". Locke then proceeded to reject unanimous consent as impractical, 
since "Such a Constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a 
shorter duration, than the feeblest Creatures; and not let it outlast the day it 
was bom in". These arguments, which Burke was contesting, were 
notoriously problematic ones in Locke's theory. The obvious problem with 
them was (and is) that Locke asserted the rule of majority was a law of nature, 
but did not prove it as such. Locke's attempt to salvage majority decision as 
the default option, by undermining the practicality of unanimity, did not 
prove the necessity of majority; Locke's effort to rescue his claim by alluding 
to the similar opinion of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, would only compound 
the problem for the great majority of the readers of Burke's time, who did not 
look very favorably on Hobbes, to say the least.184
184 Appeal pp. 211-212 (almost verbatim what is found a decade earlier in Representation pp. 94- 
95); ST sec. 96,98. See also in Lasletf s edition of the Two treatises note 333n. Some 
contemporary writers as prominent as James Mackintosh, upheld obviously Hobbesian ideas 
-  and even owned to Hobbes as their source. See Mackintosh Vindiciae pp. 306, 386.
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The second example is Burke's rejection of what might be termed a "natural" 
leap from the individual to a society. He believed such a leap to be specious, 
as a civil society, a people, is neither easily nor immediately created from 
individuals. This was for him true not only when the original creation of a 
society was discussed, but even when the problem was the fate of an existing 
society in which government has been dissolved. He remarked that "[w]hen 
men, therefore, break up the original compact or agreement which gives its 
corporate form and capacity to a state, they are no longer a people", they are 
only "a number of vague loose individuals, and nothing more". Furthermore 
in such a situation it was extremely difficult to "begin again" from the 
individuals "into a mass, which has a true politick personality". The 
assumption challenged was Locke's description of the formation of civil 
society from the state of nature, and the consequent claim that a dissolution 
and reconstitution of government was therefore feasible and in some cases 
even advisable. In essence, Burke was rejecting the assumptions behind 
Locke's theory that men had political rights and power that were distinct 
from and prior to government, and which continued in them even after 
government was established.185
The third example is the idea of a free covenant as the basis of society. Burke 
believed it to be very unlikely, if not downright impossible, that there could 
ever be a truly "free covenant" society, starting with some original voluntary 
association. He thought this to be unfeasible even if government had recently 
been dissolved, because at that juncture, any number of men would then have 
an original right to create a state apart from the rest, and could not be joined 
to a state by force, as such incorporation would be void by the principle 
"which supposes society to be in virtue of a free covenant". In such
185 Appeal p. 211; ST sec. 220-225. Pocock Virtue pp. 65-66, states that Locke insisted that a 
dissolution of government was not a dissolution of society. See also J.H. Franklin, John Locke 
and the theory of sovereignty (Cambridge, Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1978) pp. 92-94.
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circumstances, who was to say that a number of new polities might not be 
created out of the dissolved old one? In Burke's opinion this exactly would be 
the most probable outcome, as in such a situation, a totally voluntary 
agreement on such matters as land claims, would be improbable, to say the 
least. Anyone would be able to claim any land he wishes, and by their very 
principles and concepts, the "m odem  philosophers" must prefer such claims 
by a "natural person, and not a fiction of state" -  which has anyway ceased to 
exist. Thus Locke's claim about the free consent of individuals as the only true 
basis for a polity was rejected. Locke insisted that only a state created in a free 
covenant of consenting individuals is legitimate. Burke clearly indicated that 
no state was -  or could be -  formed in this way.186
It was, for Burke, especially ironic, that the very same political theories which 
he showed to be not merely wrong but actually "vulgar" and "rude", were 
believed, by those who held them to be no less than "perfect" (and see 
discussion of this term above). He claimed that the revolutionary teachers of 
such theories "profess to scom all mediocrity; to engage for perfection; to 
proceed by the simplest and shortest course". Therefore, "They build their 
politicks, not on convenience but on truth; and they profess to conduct men to 
certain happiness by the assertion of their undoubted rights". Since the 
"modem philosophers" believe they have perfectly understood man and 
polity, it is only natural for them to reject all other ideas as false and 
deceptive. It is equally natural, on these premises, to accept no compromises 
about establishing a government based on this perfect understanding, as "all 
other governments are usurpations, which justify and even demand 
resistance". Such principles, Burke believed, "always go to the extreme". They 
were extreme in their theoretical concepts -  advocating an unprecedented
186 Appeal pp. 213-215, and compare to ST sec. 95: "Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all 
free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subject to the Political 
Power of another, without his own Consent".
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union of power and will -  and they were extreme in their political 
consequences -  de-legitimizing any government that did not perfectly 
conform with such union.187
Ultimately, for Burke, a political system that worked, and especially one as 
successful as the British one, was the best proof of its own reasonableness. But 
even if and when some reform might be needed in the constitution, the worse 
possible way by which to attempt it, would be by subjecting a political system 
to the judicial reasoning of such as the Lockean natural rights school. Such 
attempts could not but bring ruin on a constitution which did not move on 
the same tracks with the judicial approach. Burke's hostility to this Lockean 
approach was remarkably constant over more than 40 years: from his ridicule 
of those writers on political ideas which inanely attempted to "compass the 
Designs they pretended to have in view, by the Instruments they employ" in 
the Vindication of 1756, to his condemnation of the "Canon of the Rights of 
Man" (after it had already wrought ruin in France, but was nevertheless still 
invoked by English supporters of reform), as the "symbol of all evil", in the 
Letter to the Earl Fitzwilliam on which he was working virtually to the moment 
of his death in 1797.188
187 Appeal pp. 256-258; and the warning from ominous consequences of ideas that "justify and 
even demand resistance", is probably directed to Locke's claim that any state not based on 
consent, is a false commonwealth, and as such those in it are not bound to it's decision. See 
also ST sec. 4, 89, 95-98.
188 Vindication p. 143; Fitzwilliam pp. 101-102.
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2. The "politick personality" -  Burke's political ideas
After having established Burke's rejection of Locke's political principles, it is 
now possible to attempt an understanding of its wider theoretical roots in 
Burke's political thought. This chapter will examine four themes, which in my 
view, form the framework of Burke's ideas about politics, and consequently 
his attitude to political ideas such as Locke's. The four central political themes 
of Burke's thought I will examine, are: (i) power and authority, (ii) opinion 
and reason, (iii) nature and artifice, and (iv) complexity and imperfection. In 
conclusion I will try to show how they came together, as (v) the elements of 
political society, envisioned by Burke's thought.
(i) The "dread majesty": pow er and authority - Edmund Burke regarded 
political power as essentially the control of physical force through the control 
of men's actions. This view is evident in his treatment of the affinity between 
political power and liberty, in the Reflections: "The effect of liberty to 
individuals is, that they may do as they please", but, he cautioned, "liberty, 
when men act in bodies is power". Clearly, the underlying assumption is that 
concerted action by groups - "when men act in bodies" -  is political power. 
But, by tracing the cause of the action (or, presumably, inaction), he identified 
political power with the authority that controls it. In this case, the authority 
was the will of individuals -  when they "do as they please", political power is 
an expression of liberty; conversely, when the action (or, inaction) of "bodies" 
of men is caused against their will, it is political power without liberty.189 
Accordingly, when treating liberty as a power in the polity, Burke 
emphasized that to assess its effects in a particular state there must an 
examination of how it had been combined "with government; with public
189 Reflections pp. 90-91.
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force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; with the collection of an 
effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with the 
solidity of property; with peace and order: with civil and social manners". 
Clearly this list represents the powers which determine men's actions in the 
polity, and liberty is to be evaluated among such authorities of the polity: 
government, and its control of agents of public force and of revenue; non­
governmental political forces such as the public's morality, religion, property 
and manners.190
All such powers, politically considered, exceed to a great degree their 
physical or descriptive attributes. The significance of terms like "property" or 
"government", being much more extensive than any descriptive list of their 
material assets, necessarily means that such terms represent concepts, within 
which such assets are only a partial component. Thus the significance of a 
term like "liberty" cannot be understood as merely denoting a technical 
political practice (the free acceptance or refusal of political activity by 
individuals, or by a collective), but should be regarded as consisting, in the 
main, of the concept of liberty. Burke wrote as much when he observed that 
"commonwealths are not physical but moral essences. They are artificial 
combinations; and in their proximate efficient cause, the arbitrary productions 
of the human mind". It is therefore in the realm of ideas, the products of 
men's minds, that a political action can be judged as being an expression of 
liberty or of the lack of it. Burke, indeed, repeatedly remarked on how the 
English constitution was celebrated by some as the palladium of liberty, at the 
same time that others treated it as a synonym for slavery. Plainly, the same 
political action, can be construed as an expression of liberty or of the lack of it, 
depending on the particular idea of liberty entertained. It follows that to 
understand political power, it is necessary to inquire into how do political
190 Reflections pp. 90-91.
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concepts such as government or liberty exert control over men's actions, in 
other words inquire into their authority.191
In the Sublime Burke indicated that although there are various social factors 
directing men's passions, ideas and actions, power is first bom  out of men's 
fear. Such fear (which he terms terror) can arise from the potential threat 
posed by animal or hum an physical "strength, which is natural power", but at 
the same time, "[t]he pow er which arises from institution in kings and 
commanders, has the same connection with terror". By this distinction 
between artificial "power which arises from institution" and "natural" power, 
that is force, Burke proposed that political power consists in the 
transformation of direct physical force, into a general and indirect concept, 
bearing authority. The control over force wielded by institutions like kingship 
and military command, their authority, has very little to do with any direct 
threat of actual physical strength, and very much with the concept they 
represent. This is bom e out by Burke's pointing out that the sovereign's 
authority described by the expression "dread majesty", was so strongly 
inherent in the English constitution, that only very few were able to overcome 
the feeling of awe that it had instilled towards the men in power. Political 
authority then, although it perhaps retains some elemental ingredient of 
primal fear, consists mainly in the transmission of the natural propensity for 
awe towards natural strength into a reverence towards artificial institutions.192
191 Regicide I p. 188. And see Burke's attack on the views of Englishmen like Richard Price and 
the members of the Revolution Society, which imply England is not "a free country", when 
compared to the new  freedom established in France, in Reflections pp. 143-145. And also the 
famous satirical etching published on 21 December 1792 by James Gillray "French liberty, 
British slavery", in R. Godfrey, James Gillray, the art of caricature (Tate Publishing, 2001) p. 97.
192 Burke connects power and fear to what he defines as sublime feelings, asserting that there 
is nothing sublime "which is not some modification of power", while at the same time noting 
that the common stock of every thing that is sublime is "terror". See Sublime pp. 236-239. The 
Sublime was first published in 1757, but in 1759 a revised edition appeared, with corrections 
and an additional new  section on power. See also N. Wood, "Burke on power" in The Burke 
Newsletter 5 (combined issue Spring-Summer 1964) pp..311-326.
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But, Burke pointed out, institutions do not produce authority by their mere 
functional existence. In other words political institutions, even long 
established ones like those of the British government, do not draw their 
authority from themselves, or in Burke's words, authority cannot "stand on 
authority alone", it needs "some other support than the poise of its own 
gravity".193
One way of supporting a government's authority is through installing fear by 
the direct threat of brute force. Burke repeatedly stressed how unusual it was, 
and not merely repulsive, for a polity to base its authority thus. Farthest 
removed from a rule of brute force were the traditional European states of his 
time, even relatively despotic ones. Because of the "mixed system of opinion 
and sentiment" which, extending a mitigating influence on political power, 
they differed greatly and favorably not only from contemporary Asian states 
but also from even the most brilliant of states in the antique world. However, 
according to Burke, even the purportedly arbitrary "Oriental Governments" 
(both of his own and of former times), such as the Ottoman empire and the 
states of the Indian sub-continent, were not ruled by arbitrary force, since 
there too religious and moral opinions exerted a check on the will of the 
ruler.194 There had been in history some cases of barbaric conquerors or 
ferocious despots, who disregarded all opinions and traditions, but they were 
the exceptions to the rule, and many times even in their own days, they 
limited the scope of their despotism and regulated the laws ruling their 
subject's lives. Thus there was never a polity regularly and systematically
193 Elliot pp. 36-40. This disagrees with Wood "Burke" p. 314, who claims that political power 
can generate its own authority. It seems to me that even in the Sublime, Burke's discussion of 
the institution of power clearly implied that the authority of political power is not really self­
generated.
194 Reflections p. 170; PH vol. XXV pp. 1273-1275. See also Impeachment: p. 361, "I challenge the 
world to shew [sic], in any m odem European book, more true morality and wisdom than is to 
be found in the writings of Asiatic men in high trusts"; p. 363, "every Mahomedan 
Government...is by its principle a Government of law"; and pp. 265-366, about the Hindus 
(termed "Gentoos").
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based on force, never "a government in the world in which there were not 
balances that distinguished it from an arbitrary government".195 
Never, that is, until the revolution in France when, for the first time, a 
complete despotism manifested itself, a regime where "[e]very thing is 
referred to the production of force; afterwards everything is trusted to the use 
of it". This was Burke's analysis of the essence of what was transpiring across 
the channel, from his forecast for the future in the Reflections, warning that 
only brute power "will survive the shock in which manners and opinions 
perish", to his assessment of the revolutionary regime in 1795, as one in which 
all traditional supports of government having been destroyed, and in which 
"popular choice even in shew " was lacking, so that "[e]very other ground of 
stability, but from military force and terrour, is clean out of the question". It 
could rely only on the support of troops and "Terrorists" (the term described 
those imprisoned for involvement in the Jacobin Terror, who had been 
released in 1795 by the convention government to help prop-up its tottering 
rule). Thus "[t]he whole of their Government, in its origination, in its
195 PH vol. XXV p. 1274. The recurring example of a self-limiting despot in Burke's writings 
was Oliver Cromwell, who "[k]new how to separate the institutions expedient to his 
usurpation from the administration of the public justice of his country", and who "attempted 
to legalize his power", so that his government was "somewhat rigid, but for a new power, no 
savage tyranny". This was, according to Burke, because in Cromwell "ambition had not 
wholly suppressed, but only suspended the sentiments of religion, and the love (as far it 
could consist with his designs) of fair and honourable reputation". And (clearly alluding also 
to the French revolutionaries) he added that these acts of Cromwell preserved England's 
traditions and laws, "which some senseless assertors of the rights of men were then on the 
point of entirely erasing, as relicks of feudality and barbarism". See Assembly pp. 302-303; 
Remarks pp. 497-498; Reflections pp. 165-166 (Henry VIII is given as an example); Regicide II pp. 
288-289, where Burke brings Genghis Khan and Muhammad as examples of conquering and 
ruthless despots, but elsewhere he remarks that the political systems they (and Tamerlane 
too) founded were guided by sound moral principles -  see the preceding footnote. In 1786, 
while still declaring that no completely arbitrary government had ever existed, Burke was 
implying that Hastings' rule of India was potentially heading in that direction. After the 
outbreak of revolution in France he would more than once indicate that he indeed believed 
Hastingsian "Indianism" as a political twin of the revolutionary evil. See PH vol. XXV pp. 
1273-1275, COR vol. VIE p. 432.
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continuance, in all its actions, and in all its resources, is force; and nothing but 
force".196
When Burke's distinction between the fear from physical "strength, which is 
natural power", and the artificial, political "power which arises from 
institution", is recalled, it transpires that a government which consists in 
nothing but force, by this reversion to direct physical threat becomes 
essentially anti-political, because what defines political power is for him an 
authority of concept, removed from directly physical threats.197 
Burke produced examples of this kind of support for authority, while 
discussing the authority of traditional governments, like Britain's. He asserted 
that "in the constitution of the human mind" prescription is an important 
foundation of political authority, accompanied "with another ground of 
authority", presumption. He viewed both of these as relevant grounds of 
authority in England's case, claiming that its constitution was a prescriptive 
one, and that if a nation has long existed and flourished under any "settled 
scheme of government", this is a "presumption" in its favor against "any 
untried project".198
(ii) The "empire of opinion": opinion and reason - The conceptual frame 
supporting political authority was termed by Burke as "general opinion" or
196 Regicide II pp. 288-289; Reflections p. 172, (and see also p. 252 about the revolutionary claim 
to liberty "ending with an abuse of power", and p. 369 about the revolutionary financial 
schemes being not even speculation but only "frauds mixed with force"); Fitzzuilliam pp. 89- 
90, where he details this regular use of force thus: "A forced constitution, a forced election, a 
forced subsistence, a forced requisition of soldiers, a forced loan of m oney'. Burke gave a 
concise version of his view in a speech of 1794, where he asserted that: "Mankind...in fact, 
never experienced a pure and merciless tyranny before the Jacobin authority of France". See 
PH vol. XXXI p. 424.
197 Burke connected power and fear to what he defines as sublime feelings, asserting that there 
is nothing sublime "which is not some modification of power", while at the same time noting 
that the common stock of every thing that is sublime is "terror". See Sublime pp. 236-239.
198 Representation p. 96. It should be noted that Burke himself had been among those who 
brought "the sacred rules of prescription" found in "the public law of Europe", into British 
statute law by bills such as the "Nullum Tempus Act" of 1769 Noble p. 172. See discussion of 
this issue in P. Lucas, "On Edmund Burke's doctrine of prescription; or, an appeal from the 
new to the old lawyers" in The Historical Journal 11 (1968) pp. 35-63.
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most often as just "opinion". This is the framework of "opinions" -  principles, 
ideas, concepts, views -  but also sentiments and customs, which determine 
men's worldview, and eventually coalesce to form "the general sense of the 
community". He described its importance:
[w]e know that empire of opinion is, I had almost said, human 
nature itself. It is however the strongest part of human nature; and 
more of the happiness and unhappiness of mankind resides in 
opinion than in all other external circumstances whatever.
Burke came to deal with the political role of opinion far more extensively after 
the outbreak of the French revolution, indeed increasingly so as it progressed; 
but his understanding of opinion's crucial political role can be shown to 
precede the revolution by many years, and to be remarkably consistent in 
content and style.199
In 1782 Burke was expressing his long standing view when he wrote, against 
a motion proposing reform in parliamentary representation, that, since "all 
government stands upon opinion" the motion's attempt to undermine the 
long-standing opinion of political representation in the state, by removing
199 Impeachment pp. 302-303. An early treatment of opinion is in Sheriffs p. 315, where Burke 
asserted that "[i]n effect, to follow, not to force the publick inclination; to give a direction, a 
form, a technical dress and a specifick sanction, to the general sense of the community, is the 
true end of legislature. When it goes beyond this, its authority will be precarious, let its rights 
be what they will"; and that not only taxation but "...no other given part of legislative rights 
can be safely exercised, without regard to the general opinion of those who are to be 
governed. That general opinion is the vehicle, and organ of legislative omnipotence. Without 
this, the extent of legislative power may be a theory to entertain the mind, but it is nothing in 
the direction of affairs".
Burke's thought on opinion has so far received relatively little scholarly attention. The best 
treatment of the subject to date has been R. Bourke's "Sovereignty, opinion and revolution in 
Edmund Burke" in History of European Ideas 25 (1999) pp. 99-120. Bourke writes that for Burke 
"government depended on the opinion of the governed". The origins of this view are traced 
by Bourke to William Temple in the 17th century, and to David Hume and Adam Smith in the 
18th. See Bourke "Sovereignty" p. 100.
In some places Burke used the word opinion or opinions differently (such as when treating 
"public opinion" in relation to a specific issue), but in all instances treated here the term 
clearly denoted general principles and strongly-held beliefs. And for uses of the term in 
Burke's time see OED vol. X pp. 858-859.
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"reverence" and "confidence" would lead to the eventual destruction of the
constitution as it existed. Fifteen years later, while composing the Third letter
on a regicide peace, Burke addressed the danger from French revolutionaries in
similar terms, when he accused them of professing "a resolution to destroy
every thing which can hold States together by the tie of opinion".200
"Opinion", for Burke, was composed not only of the sum of men's intellectual
opinions. According to his view, in "the constitution of the human mind",
opinions are the conscious, at least partially reasonable element influencing
men's attitudes and actions, which intertwines with other significant elements
of human behavior, such as habits, manners and sentiments. The close
relation between these elements may be found in many of Burke's writings.
He described the reciprocal influence between "affections" and opinions,
when (discussing the sympathy of the Foxite political opposition towards
revolutionary France) he wrote that "[o]pinions, as they sometimes follow, so
they frequently guide and direct the affections; and men may become more
attached to the country of their principles, than the country of their birth".
He was even more explicit when he asserted the duty of government to attend
to opinions because,
as opinions soon combine with passions, even when they do not 
produce them, they have much influence on actions. Factions are 
formed upon opinions; which factions become in effect bodies 
corporate in the state;- nay, factions generate opinions in order to 
become a center of union, and to furnish watch-words to parties; 
and this may make it expedient for government to forbid things in 
themselves innocent and neutral.
Thus, though passions, affections and manners were influential, Burke 
regarded opinions as the factor which ultimately conditioned all the other 
elements and as such was the most important -  indeed the ultimately decisive
200 Representation p. 93; Regicidelll pp. 339-341. In Discontents p. 252 Burke described the 
people's opinion as "the great support of the State".
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one -  among them. According to Burke, "[t]he social nature of man impels 
h im  to propagate his principles, as much as physical impulses urge him to 
propagate his kind. The passions give zeal and vehemence. The 
understanding bestows design and system. The whole man moves under the 
discipline of his opinions". Peculiarly, the source he gave for the 
preponderance of opinions was not, as might perhaps be expected, that they 
w ere more rational than sentiments or habits, but, quite the opposite -  that 
opinions, unlike feelings or manners, could overcome all reasonable 
restraints. Burke observed that it was difficult to calculate the force of "zeal 
for some opinion", and certainly its power was not "in exact proportion to its 
reasonableness", because "[t]here is a boundary to men's passions when they 
act from feeling; none when they are under the influence of imagination".201 
The great power of opinions meant for Burke that they should always be the 
concern of government. Indeed, long established opinions constituted to a 
great degree the essence of a state, and as such should be protected and 
fostered. Consequently, he argued, where necessary, established opinions 
w ere to be supported by formal means. A prominent example of such formal 
establishment was in the field of religious opinions -  one that Burke defended 
throughout his career. While advocating a great deal of religious toleration, he 
nevertheless held the formal overseeing of religious opinions as a central 
responsibility of government. Burke explicitly asserted (in the context of a Bill 
proposing relief for Catholics) that a state was empowered
201 Regicide III p. 310; Religious, p. 45; Regicide II pp. 278-279; Appeal pp. 239-240. See also in PH 
XXVIII p. 1370: "Opinions influenced the passions, and the passions governed the man". 
Burke touched on these relations in the Sublime. In the preface to first edition, he claimed that 
there does not seem to exist any thing like "an exact theory of our passions, or a knowledge of 
their genuine sources". Later he asserted that on "a superficial view, we may seem to differ 
very w idely from each other in our reasonings, and no less in our pleasures: but 
notwithstanding this difference, which I think to be rather apparent than real, it is probable 
that the standard both of reason and Taste is the same in all human creatures. For if there 
w ere not some principles of judgment as well as of sentiment common to all mankind, no 
hold  could possibly be taken either on their reason or their passions, sufficient to maintain the 
ordinary correspondence of life". See Sublime pp. 188,196.
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to inquire into the religious opinions of all who lived under its 
protection. It had an uncontrollable superintending power over 
those opinions, and it was highly necessary for the prosperity, the 
safety, the good morals, and the happiness of the community, that 
it should have such a power. Opinions influenced the passions, and 
the passions governed the man; it was a natural effect, proceeding 
from a natural cause.202
Religious opinions were not unique in their potentially destabilizing political 
effects. Burke explicitly stated that only those who have superficially studied 
"the Natural History of the hum an mind" believe that religious opinions are 
the only cause of enthusiasm, zeal and sectarian propagation, for, in fact, 
"there is no doctrine whatever, on which men can warm, that is not capable of 
the very same effect".203
Burke was also critical of setting political measures against the established
opinions of a population. This was a recurrent theme especially in his censure
of British policy in its overseas domains such as India, Ireland and most of all,
America. He did not deny the supreme rights of British rule, but he held that
working against established opinions was fundamentally counter-productive
in terms of political results; and even worse, it had destabilizing effects on
England's own constitution. Thus, commenting in 1775 on Britain's
destruction of the established "ancient government of Massachuset [sic]",
Burke asserted that he was
much against further experiments, which tend to put to the proof 
any more of these allowed opinions, which contribute so much to 
the public tranquillity. In effect, we suffer as much at home, by this 
loosening of all established opinions, as we do abroad.204
202 PH vol. XXVIII p. 1370.
203 Regicide II pp. 278-279. Burke held that the French revolution was predicated and carried 
out by violent atheists, w ho adopted religious zeal: "The rebels to God perfectly abhor the 
Author of their being. They hate him 'with all their heart, with all their mind, with all their 
souls, and with all their strength'."
204 Conciliation pp. 121-122. See also PH vol. XVIII pp. 498-499. About British policy and the 
opinions of India Burke see Impeachment pp. 302-303. For a more general statement see Appeal 
pp. 208-209.
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The unsettling of established political opinions, was held by Burke to be, in all 
cases, noxious. It led, to the problem of "prevalent temporary opinions", 
impermanent ideas and fashions, which, even when aimed at political 
convenience or improvement, were inherently disturbing to the public peace 
and unsettled the constitution. Even worse, it led to innovation as a principle, 
a "spirit of change", that was the expression of a "total contempt" for all 
ancient institutions, "when set in opposition to a present sense of 
convenience, or to the bent of a present inclinations". The political result 
would be what had happened in France: "a monarchy, mitigated by manners, 
respectful to laws and usages, and attentive...to public opinion", had been 
replaced by a ferocious tyranny "without laws, manners or morals, which far 
from respecting the general sense of mankind, insolently endeavours to alter 
all the principles and opinions, which have hitherto guided and contained the 
world, and to force them into a conformity to their views and actions".205 
The above passages underscore how established opinions, for all their 
predominance, still required "manners" and "usages" to sustain them. Burke 
stressed the mutual support between opinions and the other important 
springs of human action by consistently associating them, both rhetorically 
and substantially. Such was his depiction in the Reflections of the traditional 
manners, the "antient opinions and rules of life", destroyed in France by the 
revolution. Those long-established manners, originating in the age of chivalry, 
were typified exactly by their connection of feelings and ideas, what he 
described as a "mixed system of opinion and sentiment". Accordingly, he 
assigned to the revolution in "sentiments, manners and moral opinions", an 
importance greater than any strictly constitutional, political or administrative 
changes that the revolution had wrought.206
205 Appeal pp. 93-94,179-180; Reflections p. 110. See also Regicide I p. 208; Fitzwilliam pp. 115- 
116.
206 Reflections pp. 170-172,174.
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For Burke, "opinion", as a blend of sentiments, habits and ideas, constituted
the underpinning for political authority. It was "the very ground and pillar of
Government, and the main spring of hum an action", and therefore the great
concern of political philosophy. Thus, although it may sometimes appear as if
authority itself is not directly affected by opinion, the latter's long-term
influence on institutions and traditions can undermine and eventually destroy
these supports without which political authority will have to resort to brute
force or crumble. Again, this relation is present in Burke's analysis of British
policies towards the American colonists, which "set up in opposition to the
rooted and confirmed Sentiments and habits of thinking of an [sic] whole
People, has produced the Effects which m ust ever result from such a collision
of power and opinion". He elaborated on the cause for the fatal results of
setting power against opinion as follows:
[w]e have been too early instructed, and too long habituated to 
believe, that the only firm seat of all authority is in the minds, 
affections, and Interests of the People, to change our opinion, on 
the Theoretick reasonings of speculative men, or for the 
convenience of a mere temporary arrangement of State. It is not 
consistent with Equity or Wisdom to set at defiance the general 
feelings of great Communities, and of all the orders which compose 
them. Much power is tolerated and passes unquestioned where 
much is yielded to opinion. All is disputed where everything is 
enforced.207
Burke thus believed that the nature of political systems depended on the role 
of opinion in determining authority. A gradation of political systems can be 
drawn, according to Burke's view of the role opinion played in them. At one 
end he put the kind of government most dependent on opinion -  because
207 Regicide I pp. 294-296; Address pp. 262-263. The former is Burke's most comprehensive and 
concise treatment of opinion, in a passage that has been excluded from almost all editions of 
his works, but it appears to have been authored by him and should be considered with his 
other statements on the subject. The editors of the WS discuss its history and include it as a 
separate text from the Two letters on a regicide peace.
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least capable and disposed to rely solely on force -  constitutional monarchy; 
at the opposing end, lacking all influence of opinion, is complete despotism 
based only on force, a m odem  development first established in revolutionary 
France. Other types of government, like traditional republics or even 
traditionally despotic monarchies, western or oriental, lay somewhere in 
between according to the degree to which their authority rested on opinion 
against force.208
Thus, for Burke "[a]ll authority, in a great degree, exists in opinion: royal 
authority most of all". And he traced his vehement opposition to any 
compromise with revolutionary France directly to the crucial role of opinion 
in support of royal authority. Accommodation with revolution meant 
accepting that the ideas on which it was based were not outside the pale of 
civilized nations. Since those ideas were completely at odds with the 
established opinions underpinning all traditional European constitutions, the 
result had to be, eventually, the destruction of those traditional political 
systems. Burke believed the "Regicide Faction" ruling France was aware of 
this point, so that its policies were "perfectly systematick in every particular", 
designed to disseminate principles and adopting attitudes that undermined 
the accepted opinion of monarchy. With such an example before their eyes, 
"[m]en would reason not implausibly" that it would be better for the nation to 
get rid of the monarchy at once, than to suffer it to "become the instrument of 
its degradation and disgrace". But more than this, Burke asked, as the ideas 
and deeds of the revolutionaries affected the "general fashion of mind", and 
the normalization of relations with the revolutionary regime would show it to 
be both powerful and legitimate, indeed, "fashionable", will then "any one
208 See Elliot pp. 36-40; Regicide I pp. 263-264.
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dare to be loyal? Will any one presume, against both authority and opinion, to 
hold up this unfashionable, antiquated, exploded constitution?".209 
It appears that in regard to opinion Burke was charging the French 
revolutionaries with two different, apparently contrasting, accusations. On 
the one hand, he accused them of setting up  a political system in which 
authority was based solely on force (that is, opinion had no role); on the other 
hand, he charged them with holding and disseminating systematically 
regicide opinions (that is, opinions were at the root of events). The way to 
reconcile the two accusations, was by holding that revolutionaries embraced 
ideas which by their nature, whatever the avowed intentions might be, had 
the unavoidable effect of producing a rule of force. Burke put forward this 
explanation, in a passage pointing to an inherent conflict between what he 
saw as two main revolutionary principles -  of "Rights of Man", and of 
innovation. Treating the Directory's being "hardy enough" to try and raise 
confidence in its rule by acknowledging past falsehood and misdeeds and by 
having publicly "renounced the Creed of the Rights of Man, and declared 
Equality a Chimera", Burke remarked that their "recantation of the chief parts 
in the Canon of the Rights of Man" was possibly more despicable than their 
"originally promulgating, and forcing [it] down the throats of mankind...".
He connected such unprecedented conduct with the fact that "[ejvery thing, 
we hear from them is new, and to use a phrase of their own, revolutionary; 
every thing supposes a total revolution in all the principles of reason, 
prudence, and moral feeling".210
As a result of this combined action, Burke believed, a kind of systematic 
despotism was instituted in France, a government the like of which was never 
before "seen, or even imagined in Europe". It was also the reason it was so
209 Fitzwilliam pp. 79,115-116. See the similarity to his remark from 1782 that "all government 
stands upon opinion", in Representation p. 93.
210 Fitzwilliam pp. 101-102, and see also pp. 86-88.
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dangerous for Britain not only to make peace, but to have any kind of contact 
with the revolutionary regime, for "[i]t is a serious thing to have a connexion 
with a people, who live only under positive, arbitrary, and changeable 
institutions; and those not perfected nor supplied, nor explained, by any 
common acknowledged rule of moral science".211 
Opinion, then, may be said to have been regarded by Burke as the truly 
political power, the opposite of the un-politic power of force. Hence the 
importance of mooring within the framework of long-established ideas, 
sentiments and manners, this "strongest part of human nature". Such a 
framework ensured that, political views and actions developed while keeping 
to the main lines of the existing political structure and without resorting to 
excessive coercion. Burke presented himself as a product of such a 
framework, with his own outlook shaped by England's long-established 
political opinion that had become imbedded in it. Testifying about the 
constitutional views he presented in the Reflections, he claimed that: "I do not 
aim at singularity. I give you opinions which have been accepted amongst us, 
from very early times to this moment, with a continued and general 
approbation, and which indeed are so worked into my mind, that I am unable 
to distinguish what I have learned from others from the results of my own 
meditations". Burke considered the artificial and acquired outlook he 
extolled, as being antithetical to the to the purportedly innate and rationalist 
one advocated by the philosophical school of natural rights. He warned that a 
rule of force would be the only result from the destruction of opinion effected 
by adoption of the m odem  philosophers' absurd method of thinking about 
men and their affairs, which
[b]y what they call reasoning without prejudice, they leave not one
stone upon another in the fabrick of human society. They subvert
211 Regicide I p. 240.
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all the authority which they hold, as well as all that which they 
have destroyed.212
(iii) The "condition of our nature": nature and artifice -  This discussion of 
Burke's idea of the foundations of political society has touched repeatedly on 
his view of what is natural and artificial to men -  such as when he 
distinguished between natural and artificial authority, or when he warned of 
the consequences of reasoning without prejudice. It is now time to treat this 
theme directly. Burke often asserted that his political principles conformed to 
"nature and reason", an expression commonly used in 18th century political 
writing to describe what was held to be a self-evident truth. However, he 
made clear that his use of such terms carried a meaning completely different 
from that ascribed to them by writers on political ideas like those he satirized 
in his Vindication, and which he later described as the "modem" 
philosophers.213
Burke contested the m odem  philosophers' understanding of man's nature 
and reason as autonomous faculties -  to a great degree conflated into one 
faculty of natural reason -  in the individual, which not only preceded but 
always remained independent of society and history. He regarded these 
faculties instead as the result of society and history. Explaining why men 
needed civil society, he wrote: "man is by nature reasonable; and he is never 
perfectly in his natural state, but when he is placed where reason may be best 
cultivated, and most predominates". In other words, for man, society was 
"natural", while an unsocial state was unnatural. Only when man was in 
society the faculty of "reason" could be fully acquired and come to 
predominate. Denying a state of nature where the pre-social individual was 
perfectly endowed with reason, as opposed to an imperfect, artificial social
212 Reflections p. 197; Appeal p. 211. See also discussion in Bourke "Sovereignty" pp. 111-113.
213 Vindication p. 143. Appeal pp. 215-216. About principles "conformable to truth and nature" 
see Appeal pp. 256-258. See also about government being made for the "purpose of opposing 
that reason to will and to caprice" in Noble -  on p. 157..
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state, less natural and possibly less reasonable, for Burke the imperfect artifice 
of society was the only true natural state of man. Society was the only place 
where man could acquire some meaningful reason; or, in his famous phrase, 
"Art is man's nature". Artifice was for Burke a valuable hum an attribute; it 
was men's natural attribute, in the same manner as the nature of animals had 
nothing in it that was artificial. Within social artifice man was natural and 
reasonable; without the artifice of society, man forfeited his true nature and 
true reason, and descended into "a savage and incoherent mode of life" -  
becoming as natural and reasonable as a beast; in effect losing his humanity.214 
Burke did not set up a dichotomy between human "artifice" and animal 
"nature", instead he argued for the intricacy of humans and hence the 
complexity of what should be seen as "natural" to them. He neither 
subscribed to the idea of men possessing some nature or reason that existed 
wholly outside society, nor accepted that human nature and reason were only 
social artifacts. He saw human nature as a mix of an innate "first nature" and 
an acquired (therefore artificial) "second nature". Accordingly, he described 
his own (and the old Whigs') attitude to government, as addressing "human 
nature" by considering it at the general, "universal" level as well as at the 
artificial level, that had been modified by "local habits and social aptitudes". 
Burke regarded both of these parts as essential to men, so that attempts to 
separate between, or to detract from them were in effect unnatural. For him,
214 Appeal pp. 217-219. He explicitly wrote that, outside of civil society men are terrible "in 
such a manner as wild beasts are terrible"; and see also Reflections p. 174. The idea of artifice 
being natural to man was accepted by Burke, more than 20 years earlier. When Adam  
Ferguson articulated it in his Essay on the history of civil society (1767), this was praised by a 
review in the Annual Register, a publication that was at the time certainly edited and very 
probably also written by Burke. The review quoted a passage by Ferguson, where he stated: 
"We speak of art as distinguished from nature; but art itself is natural to man" - a striking 
similarity to Burke's "Art is man's nature" of 1791. It can be safely assumed that Ferguson's 
phrasing influenced Burke, but it is unclear if the latter already held the idea at the time, or 
adopted it from the former. Burke certainly did not agree with all of Ferguson's ideas, for 
instance disassociating himself from the Scotsman's praise of ancient Sparta. See also T.W. 
Copeland, Edmund Burke - six essays, (Jonathan Cape, 1950), especially pp. 118,139.
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the artificial part of men's nature was not a costume cloaking the sober attire 
of innate nature and reason, but rather the clothing necessary for covering 
"our naked shivering natures" - a vital need of man's existence.215 
Burke did not limit himself to stressing the import of the artificial component 
of men's lives, but argued for the need to understand rightly the role of the 
innate part too. The naturalist political theories, which disposed of the 
artificial part of men, in Burke's opinion also failed in their interpretation of 
the innate part -  regardless of their professed devotion to it. A good example 
of this view may be seen in Burke's treatment of natural familial ties between 
parents and children, as practically and morally superior to attempts at 
superseding them by an "enlightened" interpretation of what is natural. Such 
attempts, it should be remembered, were often made in the name of Locke's 
ideas on education, and on the supposed autonomy of children (Rousseau 
although also influential, was much less of an authority in England). In 1780, 
while speaking in the Commons against a proposal for taking poor Catholic 
children from their families (in order to educate them as Protestants), Burke 
defended the right of parents to determine their child's education, quoting as 
support Thomas Aquinas "against breaking the law of nature", and remarked 
that in this matter "the darkness of the twelfth century rose against the light 
of the eighteenth". He invoked the very same principle in 1791, when 
opposing the taking away of the French King's children from their parents 
(purportedly to receive a revolutionary reeducation) as a "violation of the first 
right of nature". In the same year, Burke more explicitly presented the
215 Reflections pp. 171-172; Appeal pp. 256-258. Burke proposed as the method by which the 
veracity of a theory regarding man is to be tested, the asking of -  "does it suit his nature in 
general; -  does it suit his nature as modified by his habits?". See Representation pp. 99-100. 
Burke indicated that the strongest and most beneficial features of society are those that 
conform to such mutually supportive interplay of innate and artificial. See for example Appeal 
pp. 264-265, 206-207; Reflections p. 299. Burke can be shown to have held this view  of human 
nature at least since 1757, when the first edition of Sublime appeared. See there his discussion 
of second nature in p. 265.
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relation between parents and children as the first among elements of "vulgar, 
natural morality" whose duties the "practical philosophers" reject "as 
contrary to liberty; as not founded in the social compact; and not binding 
according to the rights of men; because the relation is not, of course, the result 
oifree election". He was confronting two opposite ideas of w hat should be 
regarded as "natural". The first, "vulgar", but natural and moral; the second, 
avowing compact, rights of men, and free election (that is, consent), but for 
Burke, unnatural and immoral. Although in this case Burke was attacking the 
ideas of French revolutionaries, the description also indicted the view of the 
relations between children and parents, indeed between all individuals, 
presented by Locke -  as the use of the wording "social compact" (the term 
preferred by Locke) instead of the more Rousseauian "contract", might 
imply.216
Thus, for Burke, the approach of the "rights of men" resulted not merely in
the destruction of the acquired part of men's nature, but of the innate part as
well. The opinions of the "rights of men" school, actively instituted by the
revolutionaries in France, as they wrought destruction in the political sphere
also unavoidably corroded men's humanity. The revolutionaries'
[ejndeavouring to persuade the people that they are no better than 
beasts, the whole body of their institutions tends to make them 
beasts of prey, furious and savage. For this purpose the active part 
of them is disciplined into a ferocity which has no parallel. To this 
ferocity there is joined not one of the rude, unfashioned virtues, 
which accompany the vices, where the whole are left to grow up
216 p h  vol. XXI p. 720; Appeal pp. 265-267; Assembly pp. 315-316. About Locke's use of contract 
and compact see Laslett Two pp. 113-114. A  different but concurring dimension of family 
relations was touched upon by Burke in a conversation reported by his acquaintance Frances 
Ann Crewe, in which he remarked about the colony at Botany Bay in Australia consisting of 
male convicts only that: "planting a colony of Men without Women was violating the law of 
Nature which ought particularly to be attended to on the outset of new Governments", in H. 
Hart (ed.) "Extracts from Mr. Burke's table talk" in The Burke Newsletter 5 (1963-64) p. 278. For 
a view similar to Burke's see [Anonymous] Remarks upon p. 214.
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together in the rankness of uncultivated nature. But nothing is left 
to nature in their system.217
The success or failure of social and political systems depended on the degree 
to which they were attuned to men's true innate tendencies, and succeeded in 
channeling them to cultivate and support the whole. Britain was, for Burke, 
the eminent example of such a success, as through the "conformity to nature 
in our artificial institutions", the natural "instincts" aid "the fallible and feeble 
contrivances of our reason". Instead of drawing a dichotomy of separate 
nature and artifice, Burke approached hum an nature by viewing it to consist 
of a mixture of innate and acquired qualities, which we inextricably bound. 
Conversely, by its misunderstanding of what nature and artifice meant in 
human terms, the political structure offered by the naturalistic approach was 
one in which "nothing is left to nature", and in which "paltry artifices", 
bound to fail, were erected.218
Burke identified the source of the erroneous approach to hum an nature as the 
denial of the social dimension of that nature. The human tendency towards 
social relations, stemming from the most innate and basic impulses, without 
any artificial input, was so essential that attempts to treat men as a-social 
individuals were unnatural, and, in a literal sense, inhuman. Not only an a- 
social hum an nature was a delusion, but adopting it led to a complete 
misinterpretation of terms like nature, artifice and reason. Burke's caustic 
verdict on the attempts by modem philosophers at "reasoning without 
prejudice", separated from social context, has already been described above. 
He presented his refutation of such views even more comprehensively in a 
passage that would have stood out as a direct contradiction of Locke's
217 Regicide I pp. 246-247.
218 Reflections pp. I l l ,  121. See also Fitzwilliam p. 82. Elsewhere Burke similarly described the 
British outlook about government as "following nature which is wisdom without reflection, 
and above it". In this case he acknowledged that the same policy might also be attained by 
"profound reflection". See Reflections p. 119.
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approach to anyone even vaguely familiar with the latter's claim that men 
were by their nature "all free, equal and independent" (ST sec. 95). Burke 
affirmed that
[m]en are never in a state of total independence of each other. It is 
not the condition of our nature: nor is it conceivable how any man 
can pursue a considerable course of action without it's having 
some effects upon others; or, of course, without producing some 
degree of responsibility for his conduct. The situations in which 
men relatively stand produce the rules and principles of that 
responsibility, and afford directions to prudence in exacting it.219
In accordance with this denial of human nature as being autonomous in 
character, Burke also rejected ideas of sociability which presumed such an 
autonomy. In effect, he negated all versions of the social contract (Lockean as 
well as Hobbesian), as an agreement between independent individuals 
arrived at on the basis of direct interests or formal commitments. In an 
important passage, which it is worthwhile to quote at length, he pronounced 
that,
[t]he operation of dangerous and delusive first principles obliges 
us to have recourse to the true ones. In the intercourse between 
nations, we are apt to rely too much on the instrumental part. We 
lay too much weight upon the formality of treaties and compacts.
We do not act much more wisely when we trust to the interests of 
men as guarantees of their engagements. The interests frequently 
tear to pieces the engagements; and the passions trample upon 
both. Entirely to trust to either, is to disregard our own safety, or 
not to know mankind. Men are not tied to one another by papers 
and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by 
conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. 
Nothing is so strong as a tie of amity between nation and nation as 
correspondence in laws, customs, manners and habits of life. They 
have more than the force of treaties in themselves. They are 
obligations written in the heart. They approximate men to men, 
without their knowledge, and sometimes against their intentions.
219 Regicide I p. 249. On reasoning without prejudice see Appeal p. 211, Reflections p. 183. About 
man's duty becoming part of his nature by way of prejudice see D. Cameron, The social 
thought of Rousseau and Burke (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973) pp. 128-129.
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The secret, unseen but irrefragable bond of habitual intercourse, 
holds them together, even when their perverse and litigious nature 
sets them to equivocate, scuffle, and fight about the terms of their 
written obligations.
For our purposes the most important aspect of this interpretation of human
society is Burke's remark that the social connections between men, the
"irrefragable bond", are made and maintained "without their knowledge, and
sometimes against their intentions". In other words, that political societies are
created and preserved not out of men's conscious deliberations bu t by the
unknown, perhaps unknowable qualities of men's sociable nature.220
(iv) The "elaborate contrivance": complexity and imperfection -  For Burke,
the consequence of hum an nature, of the manner in which minds, feelings
and appetites effected actions, was an inevitable complexity of social and
political affairs. In the Reflections he proposed that,
[t]he nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are those of 
the greatest possible complexity; and therefore no simple 
disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man's 
nature, or to the quality of his affairs. When I hear the simplicity of 
contrivance aimed at and boasted of in any new political 
constitutions, I am at no loss to decide that the artificers are grossly 
ignorant of their trade, or totally negligent of their duty. The 
simple governments are fundamentally defective, to say no worst 
of them.221
With the dichotomy of complex versus simple government, Burke was 
obviously offering his view of government as a complex structure alternative 
to the natural rights theories which upheld the virtues of political simplicity. 
Several radical writers of the period, recognizing the import of his view, 
attacked Burke exactly on this point, censured the political complications he 
was defending as harmful, and expressed confidence at the coming victory of
220 Regicide I p. 247.
221 Reflections pp. 152-153. See also the similar argument in Duration p. 591.
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"the great simplicity of nature applied to the organization of society". Burke 
connected this the approach to the attempts to claim "primitive rights of men" 
in actual society. He stressed that its success could only result in a simple and 
primitive political system, devoid of all the benefits of the European states of 
his time, indeed of civilization. He could hardly believe anyone would really 
desire such an outcome.222
Burke saw political societies as the end result of a long, intricate and 
extremely arduous process; a process that was brought about by many 
different, unforeseeable and uncontrollable elements; one that unfolded 
differently in each case and place, modifying human nature according to 
particular circumstances, and overcame great problems, before individuals 
could be formed into "a mass, which has a true politick personality". The 
inherent complexity of hum an nature and society, required that the political 
management of his affairs be a complex endeavor as well.223 
Burke regarded the "complex state of our constitution" as a defining quality 
of Britain as a “free country". To allow the variegated, sometimes conflicting, 
purposes of men and their societies was to accept that these could not be 
handled in a simple manner. Some of these purposes were fulfilled by a 
balance between the powers of government. This alone was an endeavor 
difficult enough to sustain, for a "constitution made up of balanced powers, 
must ever be a critical thing". But balance of powers and roles in government 
was not nearly enough, for all kinds of "wide-spread interests m ust be 
considered; must be compared; m ust be reconciled if possible". Such functions, 
which Burke held to be completely out of the scope of a balance of powers, 
were carried out by the mixed nature of a government -  its combining of 
monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements. The point of mixed
222 Reflections pp. 152-153. For examples of radicals proposing simple government see Barlow 
Advice p. 267; Lofft Remarks p. 293.
223 Regicide I p. 247; Appeal p. 211.
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government was to deliver a balance of principles, in the same way a 
balanced constitution was supposed to deliver a balance of powers. The 
different elements mixed in government represented different principles, 
which were all necessary for good government, and "[t]he whole scheme of 
our mixed constitution is to prevent any one of its principles from being 
carried as far, as taken by itself, and theoretically, it would go". Hence, in 
order to avoid "the perfections of extreme[s?]", all the several parts of British 
government were constituted not only to fulfill the particular end of each, but 
also "each to limit and controul the others". Burke was aware of the 
accusations about the constitution being a cumbersome and unyielding 
mechanism, in which the main balance achieved was that of immobility. Not 
denying this tendency, and the possible consequence of it creating a standstill, 
he regarded gridlock as preferable to unconstrained rule. But he observed that 
in practice the danger of immobility was dispelled by the "perpetual treaty 
and compromise going on" within British government, sometimes openly 
sometimes less so.224
Another characteristic of Britain's complex constitution, perhaps the most 
important, was its intricacy. Burke asserted that "the machine of a free 
constitution is no simple thing; but as intricate and as delicate, as it is valuable". 
This intricacy meant that no power or part in the constitution was tidily and 
perfectly delineated. There was no separate legislative or judicial power there 
was no completely democratic or aristocratic estate of parliament. As a result 
of the many affinities and connections inside it, there was a high degree of 
cooperation and interdependence between the various components of the 
body politic so that "all these parts of our Constitution, whilst they are 
balanced as opposing interests, are also connected as friends; otherwise 
nothing but confusion could be the result of such a Complex Constitution".
224 Appeal pp. 258-260.
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Consequently, in a system as the British one, a total separation of the parts 
could be called for only by those who wished for "the common destruction of 
the whole, and of all its parts". Attempts to replace such a system with a 
simple structure effecting "the abstract and unlimited perfection of power in 
the popular party" would have resulted only in the political destruction they 
had wrought when implemented in revolutionary France.225 
Burke believed that the great complexity of a constitution such as Britain's 
made it very hard to understand. It was beyond the comprehension even 
of"[r]ational and experienced men" who could distinguish between "true and 
false liberty", even of most great minds. Only those few who were 
"profoundly studied" in matters of state (he mentioned Montesquieu as one), 
could verily comprehend "the elaborate contrivance of a fabrick fitted to unite 
private and public liberty with publick force, with order, with peace, with 
justice, and above all, with the institutions formed for bestowing permanence 
and stability through ages, upon this invaluable whole".226 
Such imperfect knowledge of "the elaborate contrivance" which was a 
successful constitution, meant, for Burke, that political theories too could not 
be perfect. The limits on political knowledge and the uncertainty it produced 
in matters of state were an important theme in Burke's thought on these 
issues. He remarked that
[w]e are not yet acquainted with the laws which necessarily
influence the stability of that kind of work made by that kind of
225 Appeal pp. 119-120, 258-260, 263-264; Observations pp. 440-442; Reflections 229-230. In an 
early fragment, composed around 1757, Burke noted that, in uncultivated countries, "society 
is not close nor intricate". See Abridgment p. 349. See also Burke's speech of 14 June 1784 
where he asserted that Britain's was not a government of balances PH vol. XXIV p. 948.). It 
should be noted that censure of the idea of a government of balances was a major theme in 
contemporary criticism of Locke's political theory. High Tories of the late 18th century were 
prominent critics of Locke's idea of a government of balances (employing arguments by 
Charles Leslie from the beginning of the century), but mainstream loyalists also voiced their 
opposition. See William White, A dissertation on government With the balance considered; or a free 
inquiry into the nature of the British constitution, and the probable effect of a parliamentary reform 
(1792) PW vol. VII pp. 185-214. See also discussion in Gunn Beyond pp. 187-188.
226 Appeal pp. 263-264.
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agent. There is not in the physical order (with which they do not 
appear to hold any assignable connexion) a distinct cause by which 
any of those fabricks must necessarily grow, flourish, or decay; nor, 
in my opinion, does the moral world produce any thing more 
determinate on that subject, than might serve as an amusement 
(liberal indeed, and ingenious, but still only an amusement) for 
speculative men. I doubt whether the history of mankind is yet 
compleat enough, if ever it can be so, to furnish grounds for a sure 
theory on the internal causes which necessarily affect the fortune of 
a State. I am far from denying the operation of such causes: But 
they are infinitely uncertain, and much more obscure, and much 
more difficult to trace, than the foreign causes that tend to raise, to 
depress, and sometimes to overwhelm a community.227
Since complete knowledge of either the material ("physical") or the abstract 
("moral") causes and effects which create and maintain a state was precluded, 
it followed that true political theory had to accept itself as intrinsically limited 
and imperfect. This argument, in different guises a recurring theme in Burke's 
writings, seems to have been directed to a great measure against the influence 
of Locke's ideas on political reform. Though addressing different 
circumstances (such as political reform in England or revolution in France), 
and though different political theories may also be (and probably were) 
censured by such attacks, the common concern of them all was to rebut 
erroneous renderings of Britain's constitution, among which Locke's was the 
principal one. Lacking explicit words by Burke one way or the other, 
circumstantial and textual references indicate the probable Lockean target. As 
already mentioned Burke had characterized the great majority of those who 
advocated constitutional reform in the 1780s -  many among whom overtly 
employed Locke's name -  as proponents of rights of men theories. Even more 
indicative of the Lockeans and Locke himself seem to be Burke's recurring 
negative allusions to radical assertions of perfect political rights. From the 
1756 Vindication's ridicule of calls for men to bring themselves into natural,
227 Regicide I pp. 188-189.
178
"perfect Liberty", to the 1791 Appeal's assertion that man is only "perfectly in 
his natural state" in artificial, civil society, Burke persistently employed the 
term "perfect" when opposing his view that men and their affairs could be 
understood only in the specific context of particular societies and their history 
to the Lockean a-sodal and a-historical view of man evident in Locke's 
fundamental assertion that men are naturally in a "State of Perfect Freedom".228 
But, Burke's marked aversion to discussions of the foundations of the polity 
was not limited only to w hat he saw as simplistic or perfectionist approaches. 
He certainly loathed such approaches, and regarded them as plainly counter­
productive. However, in truth, he considered all inquiries into the polity's 
foundations as inherently fraught with dangers, and recommended that, as 
much as possible, a protective veil should be drawn over such matters. His 
pronouncements in this regard were remarkably consistent down the years: 
from his assertion in the 1777 Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, about "one sure 
symptom of an ill conducted state" being the propensity of the people to 
resort to theories of government; through his claim in 1780, when addressing 
the proposal for shortening the duration of parliament, that "[i]t is always to 
be lamented, when men are driven to search into the foundations of the 
Commonwealth"; through his observation of 1782, opposing the proposed 
change in parliamentary representation, that it is "never prudent or safe to be 
meddling with the fundamental principles and ancient tried usages" of the 
constitution; through his remark of 1790 in the Reflections that in the political 
settlement of 1688, the two houses of parliament "threw a politic, well 
wrought veil" over every circumstance tending to weaken the rights they 
wished to perpetuate, or furnishing precedence for future departures; to the
228 For Burke's treatment of "perfect" rights see Vindication p. 183; Appeal pp. 217-219; and also 
Duration p. 589; Representation p. 93; Reflections p. 145. Compare to ST sec. 4. See also ST sec. 7, 
for the state of nature being one of "perfect equality". The other main political theory invoked 
by reformers, that of the "originalist" interpretation of the Ancient Constitution, was not 
characterized by a claim to simplicity, and neither did it claim perfect rights - though it 
asserted the constitution as a whole to be politically perfect, a view Burke shared.
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lament in his 1795 letter to William Elliot of the fateful consequences to be 
expected after "the veil was tom" from the "sanctuary of government" by 
revolutionary philosophy.229
Burke attributed the danger of delving into the political origins of a 
commonwealth to the fragility intrinsic to political authority's theoretical 
roots in a complex society. Since successful political societies developed out of 
many actual compromises and adjustments, they could not (and should not) 
be simply reduced to theory. All alterations of the political frame, even 
necessary ones, undermined its authority by revealing its theoretical 
problems - while exposing it to unforeseen practical dangers, because the 
actual effects of alterations could not be ascertained beforehand. He argued 
that "it is certainly necessary to resort to the theory of your Government, 
whenever you propose any alteration in the frame of it, whether that 
alteration means the revival of some former antiquated and forsaken 
Constitution of State, or the introduction of some new improvement in the 
Commonwealth". But such resorting to the theory of government meant 
tinkering with the extremely complicated machine that was inherently 
imperfect, for
[t]hat man thinks much too highly, and that therefore he thinks 
weakly and delusively, of any contrivance of human wisdom, who 
believes, that it can make any sort of approach to perfection. There 
is not[,] there never was[,] a principle of government under heaven, 
that does not in the very pursuit of the good it proposes, naturally 
and inevitably lead into some inconveniences, which makes it 
absolutely necessary to counterwork and weaken the application of 
that principle itself; and to abandon something of the extent of the 
advantage you had in View by it, in order to prevent also the
229 Sheriffs p. 319; Duration p. 589; Representation p. 93; Reflections pp. 102-103; Elliot pp. 39-40. 
Some radical authors addressed -  negatively -  the idea that of the truth of government was 
hidden. See Wollstonecraft Vindication p. 20. See also Paine Rights p. 181; Towers Thoughts pp. 
116-117.
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inconveniences, which have arisen from the Instrument of all the 
good you had in View.230
Moreover, delving into origins of government or of particular political 
institutions or titles might reveal those to be not merely theoretically 
imperfect, but actually and completely iniquitous. Such were, Burke 
indicated, the origins of many states (including England, if its government 
was instituted at the Norman conquest, as many argued), religious 
establishments (including the Anglican Church, founded on the objectionable 
decrees of the "monster" Henry VIII, and pillage of monastic property) and 
prominent aristocratic dynasties (such as the Dukes of Bedford). Indeed the 
whole of the Letter to a noble Lord (1796) was a warning against what he 
regarded as imprudent delving into this matter by some aristocratic 
radicals.231
This attitude was in plain contradiction to the whole premise of Locke's 
political thought. Indeed Burke's finding essential fault in such searching into 
the origins of the commonwealth implies a rejection of the whole purpose 
explicitly stated by the sub-title to Locke's Second treatise: an essay concerning 
the true original, extent, and end of civil government. In short, Burke's position 
about the theoretical untidiness of government's origins meant that the actual 
political practice of a constitution, such as Britain's, necessitated the 
employment of measures that could not conform to theoretically perfect 
principles. On one occasion Burke illustrated this tension by observing that 
"[t]o govern according to the Sense and agreeably to the interests of the 
People is a great and glorious Object of Government. This Object cannot be 
obtained but through the Medium of popular Election; and Popular Election 
is a mighty Evil". Thus, when men were "driven to search into the
230 Duration pp. 589-590.
231 Noble pp.165-170.
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foundations of the Commonwealth", they exposed practices that, though 
practically necessary, were theoretically at fault.232
In effect Burke held that the simplistic and perfectionist attitude to politics
destabilized all governments, and was particularly incompatible with the
complex and imperfect constitutions that delivered good government. He
warned against attempts to introduce the "foreign matter" of French style or
ideas into the British system, in which all parts fitted each other; the only
acceptable method by which to maintain such a system was for it to rely on its
own "matter", its own history and circumstances. Consequently, any kind of
peaceful attitude and relations between revolutionary France and "the
Jacobins of England" imperiled the British political system, for
[i]t is but too plain, that our constitution cannot exist with such a 
communication. Our humanity, our manners, our morals, our 
religion, cannot stand with such a communication: the constitution 
is made by those things, and for those things: without them it 
cannot exist; and without them it is no matter whether it exists or 
not.233
The manners, religion or property of a state were not merely the things which 
government was designed to protect (such as they were in Locke), but to a 
great degree its foundations. In what may be described as a mutually 
supporting relation, Burke's political order was in great measure made by the 
very things it was designed to protect.
These considerations lead back to the nature of political authority and 
opinion, discussed above. Burke, as already seen, held that in complex 
polities, authority rested on a mix of opinion, habits and sentiments. But if 
opinion was separated from its companions, and employed directly to 
scrutinize authority and its origins, what resulted was a spectacle of 
theoretical imperfection, which only served to undermine existing
232 Duration pp. 589-590.
233 Appeal pp. 258-260, Fitzwilliam p. 107.
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governments. In such a situation, accepting ideas which held authority to be 
based on perfect rights could only spell disaster. This was also why Burke, 
although claiming that the British constitution stood on some fundamental 
principles, balked at attempts to isolate and address these separately from the 
whole. He addressed the whole as "perfect", and regarded attempts to delve 
into its origins as a serious danger to the authority of that whole, insisting that 
the constitution's authority must rest on prescription and presumption. 
Government was "a practical thing, made for the happiness of mankind, and 
not to furnish out a spectacle of uniformity, to gratify the schemes of 
visionary politicians". He identified such a conflict as existing between the 
"practical" benefits of the British constitution and the calls from radical 
supporters of political reform to change the constitution by tearing the "veil", 
and attempting to impose on it a perfect "uniformity" based on natural 
rights.234
Burke accused the Lockean supporters of constitutional reform of being 
doubly wrong, first when they assumed their ability to identify and 
understand these principles completely, and second when they believed the 
whole constitution of consisting simply of the sum of these principles. With 
time the tone of his condemnations changed. His relatively mild reproach of 
1780 towards the Corps of Schemers "who in reality, and at bottom, mean 
little more than to indulge themselves with Speculations", hardened in the 
next decade, with the actual attempts to bring about changes in a 
representation which he deemed "as nearly perfect" as the human 
imperfections "will suffer it to be", in order to subject it to "captious criticism 
and rash experiment". But it became outright denunciation in the 1790s, as he 
found among the English "Speculators" those who regarded the events and 
ideas of revolutionary France as encouragement of their political approach. In
234 Representation p. 96, Sheriffs p. 317. See also Reflections pp. 147-148.
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1795 criticizing a pamphlet by Baron Auckland (William Eden), a relatively
moderate Whig, who had attempted to encourage negotiations with the
Directory by suggesting that the new French constitution was "a mixed
Oligarchy" and as such essentially similar to the British system, Burke wrote:
[b]y this easy manner of treating the most difficult of all subjects, 
the Constitution for a great Kingdom, and by letting loose an 
opinion, that they may be made by any adventurers in speculation 
in a small given time and for any Country, all the ties, which, 
whether of reason or prejudice, attach mankind to their old, 
habitual, domestic Governments, are not a little loosened: all 
communion, which the similarity of the basis has produced 
between all the Governments that compose what we call the 
Christian World and the Republic of Europe, would be dissolved.235
He added that, as such "hazarded speculations" can only result in distancing 
Britain from its traditional principles while becoming closer to France's, "in 
proportion as we recede from the ancient system of Europe, we approach to 
that connection which alone can remain to us, a close alliance with the new 
discovered moral and political world in France".236
It was in revolutionary France that Burke found actual confirmation for his 
view about the danger of destroying traditional authority by unsupported 
opinion. He pointed to the revolutionaries' predicament resulting from their 
own principles -  having tom  the veil of authority, they eventually realized the 
resulting instability of such power, and by the time of the Directory, 
frantically attempted to reinstate the trappings of authority. Since dissolving 
political authority was simple, while recreating it not at all, and since the 
revolutionaries' ideas ran completely counter to established authority, the 
result of such a change of approach was comical. Burke derided the "new
235 Fitzwilliam p. 83. For Locke's definition of oligarchy see ST sec. 132. Auckland's pamphlet, 
Some remarks on the apparent circumstances of the war in the fourth week of October 1795 (1795), 
directly caused Burke to the draft what would later become his Letter to Earl Fitzwilliam. See 
COR vol. VIII pp. 333-335.
236 Fitzwilliam p. 83.
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Habit of the Directory", its members attempting to cover their insolence by 
being "powdered and perfumed and ribbanded and sashed and plumed"; 
they were, he wrote, like the "Senate" that appeared on the stage of the 
theater, always causing laughter because the audience recognized it as 
composed of the "revolutionary scene-shifters", those who had performed the 
vilest roles in the play -  "the very scum and refuse of the Theatre".237 
Having thus examined the four themes which formed the framework for 
Burke's political outlook, I will now attempt to study how he envisioned the 
structure and function of the political society which would conform to this 
framework.
(v) The "materials of the fabrick": the elements of political society -  What 
Burke described as "old, habitual, domestic Governments" constituted a 
framework of established opinions and sentiments, in which the resort to 
brute force was minimized, and such force as necessary was made gentler. In 
short, "[wjithout force, or opposition, it subdued the fierceness of pride and 
power".238
The "modem" political theories were so destructive not because of some 
specific idea, but primarily because of the premises on which the theories 
were built. Since they assumed from the outset an "original" man without 
history or opinions, such a man was defined by the only things he had, 
mental will and physical power. Thus terms, like consent and rights or reason 
and nature, became merely euphemisms for will and power. Will and force 
would come to dominate politics. The traditional political approach, with all
237 Fitzwilliam pp. 72-73. See also Regicide I pp. 202-203, where the extravagant costumes of 
revolutionary ministers were likened to "a theatrical costume of the opera". Burke was 
pointing to the new and elaborate uniforms decreed by the directory regime for the several 
ranks of state officials. The description in Fitzwilliam of the "plumed" directory (also 
described in p. 74 as "feathered scoundrels") appears to me an oblique repartee to those, like 
Paine, who had written of Burke's concern for the fate of the French royal family that he 
"pities the plumage, but forgets the dying bird". It was the revolutionaries who had now  
"plumed" themselves. See Paine Rights p. 72.
238 Representation p. 108; Reflections p. 170.
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its complexity and imperfection, intertwined principles and powers so 
completely that they could not be separated. Even the most formidable and 
intractable power, popular will, became enmeshed in a system where it had to 
contend for influence with religion, property and habits, to determine the 
course taken by society and government. The institutionalization of 
established opinions, creating a religious establishment and various corporate 
expressions of prejudice, aristocracy, property and so on, lent additional 
support to ideas that in a more simple system would have been easily swept 
away.
Burke believed such a political order to have the potential to be both moral 
and prosperous. He claimed this had been evidently the case in European 
states "the day before the revolution in France" when, there was "so beautiful 
and so august a spectacle presented to the moral eye" as never before in 
history. Ironically, the very success of this system, the long term prosperity 
and stability it supplied, assisted the twin developments, which rose to 
destroy it. The first one was a change in the attitude to politics, which Burke 
described as sociologically driven. Among the aristocracy, the primary 
guardians of the traditional order, "laxity and debility" spread, resulting in 
facile attitudes to politics. Among the "men of letters", the spectacle of an 
increasing weakness of the old order fostered "bold spirits and dark designs" 
-  that is, ambition for political power. The consequences of such changing 
attitudes, were soon manifest. "Knowledge" which had been until then 
guarded and controlled, became "diffused, weakened and perverted"; 
"General wealth" loosened morals and vigilance while increasing 
presumption; "Men of talent" began to find their portions of public prosperity 
"not equal to their estimate (or perhaps to the public estimate) of their own 
worth". In other words, while the aristocracies displayed a mix of indolence 
and pride, the intellectuals reacted with frustration and ambition.
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But it was the second development, one of ideas, which was held by Burke to 
be the crucial element in the challenge to the traditional order. This was the 
emergence of a false philosophy, which by upholding the preeminence of 
original nature and simplicity undermined the legitimacy of the characteristic 
artifices and complications of the traditional order, while it justified the 
ambitions of intellectuals who criticized that order. The two developments 
mutually complemented each other so that when the "false philosophy 
passed from academies into courts", even the rulers of the old order became 
infected with theories that could only lead to their ruin. Though Burke held 
this process to have gone farthest in France, bringing on the revolution, he 
believed it to have been a general phenomenon, relevant everywhere in 
Europe, including Britain. According to Burke the "false philosophy" 
gradually undermined the established opinions on which the old order 
rested, eventually effecting a breach "in the whole order of things and in 
every country".
This description is important because it supplies us with a detailed picture of 
his view of what those opinions and their mutual relations were. First, he 
claimed, "Religion, that held the materials of the fabrick together" was 
systematically loosened; then all other accepted opinions "under the name of 
prejudices" inevitably fell along with it; eventually "Property" too, now 
"undefended by principles", instead of a pillar upholding the old order, 
became a burden on it. Instead of extending status and power property 
became a lure for all those who would gain it if the old order fell. The 
undermining of religion, prejudices and property, left authority as the only 
remaining element of order in the state. But, authority could not stand "on 
authority alone", it needed "some other support than the poise of its own 
gravity". Without the accepted opinions to sustain it, authority was nothing 
but an empty shell, standing precariously and attacked on all sides by "the 
infernal energies" of ambitious talent prompted by vice and disorder. Before
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long, it would also fall. Thus the structure of Burke's traditional political and 
social edifice was laid down: established religion was the central pillar on 
which rested the whole; prejudices and property were two additional pillars 
lending it support; authority, the imposing facade of civil society, encased all 
others, but could not stand for long without them.239
As has been observed in his account of the spread of the "false philosophy", 
Burke held aristocracy to have a crucial role in the function and preservation 
of political society. By dereliction of its duty as the guardian of traditional 
political society, aristocracy had made the spread of false philosophy possible; 
if it did not resume its role, the traditional political order was doomed. I 
believe that understanding why Burke believed aristocracy fulfilled such an 
important political role in upholding the authority of the traditional political 
system, will go a long way towards explaining the manner in which such a 
system functioned.
It appears that, as long as they were in place, the established opinions which 
upheld the authority of traditional government, performed two vital 
functions: they conferred on those holding public office an authority 
independent of their personal qualities (which, Burke implied, were many 
times lacking); and they bestowed on political authority an awe of sacredness. 
Thus government gained authority without resorting to the use of force.
When m odem  philosophy tore the "veil" from government, established 
opinions were weakened, and they ceased to function as supports to 
authority. Governments had to turn elsewhere to prop up their authority, or 
succumb to anarchy. Burke agreed that, "when once things are gone out of 
their ordinary course, it is by acts out of the ordinary course they can alone be 
re-established". But he absolutely rejected suggestions that the right remedy 
to the weakening of established opinions, was the one to which the
239 Reflections pp. 186-187; Elliot pp. 36-40. In Observations pp. 434-435 he terms them "the 
props of Society".
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revolutionaries had resorted in France -  turning to rude power as the only 
prop for order and authority. Such remedy had evidently been raised as a 
solution to the growing tide of revolution in England and throughout Europe. 
Burke asserted that he would be not counted among those who would "evoke 
the powers of hell to rectify the disorders of the earth". The desirable solution 
of government's predicament was to recruit "the impulses of individuals at 
once to the aid and to the control of authority", which for Burke, meant an 
appeal to political virtue. Such virtue offered "personal qualities" to support 
the weakened traditional authority of office holders, and showed something 
"not only venerable, but dreadful" in "the sanctuary of government" to 
support its weakened sacredness. Apparently envisaging the action of strong, 
prominent personalities, who while preserving the traditional framework of 
the constitution, could win widespread support, and receive emergency 
governmental powers, he described such action as the "true republican 
spirit", by which monarchies could be rescued "from the imbecility of courts 
and the madness of the crowd".240
Two points bear consideration here. The first is that political virtue was 
implicitly but clearly associated with aristocracy: while monarchical and 
popular politics were characterized respectively by "imbecility" and 
"madness", the commendation of "true republican spirit", would, to Burke's 
readers, have implied contemporary aristocratic republics, like the 
Netherlands or Venice, as well as the classic example of the aristocratically- 
led Roman republic. The second point, is that although he balked at resorting 
to brute force to restore order and authority, Burke indicated that the spirit 
and personal qualities of politically virtuous leaders should also preserve a 
menacing streak, evoking the feeling that government had something
240 Elliot pp. 39-42. Burke acknowledged such a remedy to be a dangerous concentration of 
power, but regarded it as a bearable evil, as long as this was understood as exceptional, and 
the constitutional framework was maintained. See also his discussion of such a prospect for a 
restored France in Remarks pp. 491-492.
189
"dreadful" too within it. This view was entirely in line with Burke's theory of 
political power, which, as will be remembered, held the authority of 
institutions to retain some element of primal fear from physical strength (in 
the Sublime he had used the expression "dread majesty"). Indeed in his analysis 
of the Europe-wide weakness of traditional regimes he was witnessing, Burke 
directly traced the weakness to their loss of all capacity to intimidate.241 
The same position informed Burke's attacks on the British government's 
failure to secure the conviction of radicals in successive trials of the early 
1790s. He derided the government's praise of judicial moderation and 
leniency, as merely masking its weakness and impotence. Burke observed that 
after about a century in which it had scarcely ever been defeated in court, 
government had suddenly come to suffer numerous reverses within a few 
years. He believed the problem was not one of laws (which had not changed), 
but of a loss of nerve and self-confidence, which was spreading around so 
that by "a connexion easily felt, and not impossible to be traced to it's cause, 
all the parts of the State have their correspondence and consent". For Burke, 
"[ljiving law, full of reason, and of equity and justice, (as it is, or it should not 
exist) ought to be awful too", or it would "excite nothing but contempt", so 
that only resolve and sense of purpose, indicating the government's 
willingness to be awful if necessary, could change the direction of things. In 
short, Burke held that political authority should avoid either "evoking the 
powers of hell", that is relying only on force, or drifting into "laxity and 
debility", that is abandoning all willingness to use force. Instead, it should be 
based mainly on established opinions, but keep the capability to arouse fear, 
if needed.242
241 Sublime pp. 236-239.
242 Regicide I p.198. Burke also remarked in this context that "the law is clear, but it is a dead 
letter. Dead and putrid, it is insufficient to save the State, but potent to infect, and to kill".
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Burke's appeal to political virtue in a time of crisis raises the question of why 
he did not place it as one of the regular components of political authority. He 
never offered an explicit answer to this question, but I believe the probable 
reason may be ascertained from his regarding virtue as requiring 
extraordinary effort. Something that could be summoned and exerted in times 
of emergency, and even then only by a few great men was by definition an 
exceptional characteristic. It was a trait too individual, uneven and 
unsustainable to be of regular use to civil society; it was unsuitable for a 
system seeking long-term stability and structure. There are also indications 
that Burke held the belief (shared with other thinkers among whom were 
Montesquieu and Rousseau) that the exertion of political virtue was limited 
by the size of a state. This seemed to be the import of his claim in the 
Reflections, that small states were better suited to be republics, while large 
ones were better governed as monarchies. Virtue was commonly identified at 
that time with republican regimes, as in Burke's own description of the 
political virtue needed to face the crisis as "republican spirit". However the 
most telling example of Burke's position towards political virtue is in his 
remark in the Letter to William Elliot (1795) about the heroes and patriots of 
old, which "knowing no mode of policy but religion and virtue", would not 
suffer "Monarchs or senates or popular Assemblies, under pretences of 
dignity, or authority, or freedom, to shake off those moral riders which reason 
has appointed to govern every sort of rude power". Virtue was assigned here 
a rank equivalent to that of religion in directing political power. But Burke 
was discussing the ancient polities and not those of his own days. Virtue was 
extolled as a quality, while at the same time being associated with the ancient 
republican spirit. To every educated reader of the time, this would have 
pointed to the copious political literature of the 18th century, especially of the 
British school, which had insisted that modem states were better than ancient 
ones because manners had replaced coarse virtue (as Burke himself put it,
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"made power gentle, and obedience liberal"). Thus virtue was depicted as 
better suited to sterner and coarser times, in which politics was more about 
"rude power". Perhaps virtue was to be episodically resurrected in 
circumstances -  like revolutionary times -  when there was a resurgence of 
"rude power". But in the main, political virtue was too extraordinary an 
element to become a permanent fixture of modem governments, particularly 
in large states such as Britain. This approach also accounted for Burke's 
placing of religion as the remaining central pillar that "held the materials of 
the fabrick together" in the political framework.243 
If virtue was to Burke a desirable element in politics, but one that was not 
necessary in the normal course of things, the role of property he saw as 
indispensable. Property, especially (but not solely) landed property, was 
essential to the political function of aristocracy in traditional governments, 
and consequently to the existence and survival of such governments. This 
view by Burke has an important implication for his idea of the relationship 
between property and government, and, accordingly, to the political theory of 
Locke. It has often been claimed by scholars, among them F.P. Lock, J.R. 
Dinwiddy and F. Canavan, that Burke agreed with Locke in believing 
government to exist in order to protect property. But this claim does not stand 
up to scrutiny. When the fundamental relationship between property and 
civil society in Burke's thought is studied, a very different picture emerges, 
one that positions him as completely opposed to Locke's assertion that 
"Government has no other end but the preservation of Property". In an 
immediate, practical sense, Burke certainly saw government as the protector 
of property, but such a stance is shared by every thinker who ever defended 
ordered government. To hold Locke's view, Burke would have had to regard 
property as a natural attribute (in effect a right) of men, preceding
243 Reflections pp. 170-172, 228-229; Elliot pp. 41-42. See also Pocock Reflections p. xxxii.
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government in both time and importance; and to regard government as 
existing solely (or at least principally) for the protection of natural property. 
Burke nowhere accepted the proposition that property was more of a natural 
human attribute than government, and that the existence of the latter was 
solely or even primarily for the protection of the former. Instead he 
consistently described a complex relationship in which property and 
government were mutually supportive elements of a sociopolitical whole. He 
repeatedly pointed out how prescription and possession legitimized the title 
to property which had been attained unlawfully -  a legitimization which 
could not be accepted by those who regarded property as a natural attribute. 
More than this, it can be shown that Burke actually turned Locke's theory on 
its head, when he indicated that, far from being the end of government, 
property was actually a tool (like religion and prejudice) necessary for the 
preservation of government.244
Among the many places where Burke treated the relation between property 
and government as one of mutual support, it is worthwhile to look at a 
passage often referred to in scholarly claims about Burke's alleged affinity to 
Locke's theory, where Burke claimed: "Prescription is the most solid of all 
titles, not only to property, but, which is to secure that property, to 
Government. They harmonize with each other, and give mutual aid to one 
another". This passage, while certainly describing government as a protector 
of property, did not confine their relationship to this Lockean end, pointing 
instead to a more complex interplay in which they (together with 
prescription) harmonize, and reciprocate "mutual aid". Moreover, Burke's
244 For Locke's position see ST sec. 94,124. For the claim that Burke agrees with Locke see 
Lock Burke's pp. 80-81; Dinwiddy "James Mill" p. 263; Canavan Economy pp. 70-71. For 
Burke's enumerating "solidity of property" as one among a whole list of various other 
political elements of the state, see Reflections pp. 90-91.
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claim in the passage, that prescription was the most solid title to property, 
was directly contrary to Locke's view.245
In other places Burke placed the stress far more on property being the tool
and defender of government, rather than its end. He gave an example of this
view in a passage treating the economic difficulties caused by England's
continuing war against revolutionary France. He pointed out that
[i]f wealth is the obedient and laborious slave of virtue and of 
publick honour, then wealth is in it's place, and has it's use: But if 
this order is changed, and hono[u]r is to be sacrificed to the 
conservation of riches, riches which have neither eyes nor hands, 
nor any thing truly vital in them, cannot long survive the being of 
their vivifying powers, their legitimate masters, and their potent 
protectors. If we command our wealth, we shall be rich and free: If 
our wealth commands us, we are poor indeed.
Although the term "wealth" was employed in this case, the import of the 
passage for the political role of property cannot be mistaken -  not the end but 
the tool (indeed, the slave) of "public honour", property is to be commanded 
by government, to pursue other purposes.246
The view of property as a political instrument was even more pronounced 
when Burke treated its role in permitting and sustaining the constitutional 
role of the aristocracy. He was aware that natural rights theories depicted, 
often implicitly and sometimes explicitly, aristocracy as an unnatural and
245 Representation p. 96. Another passage that may look as showing affinity with Locke's 
position is one where Burke, pouring scorn on the latest declaration by French revolutionaries 
"in favour of property" noted that no traditional European government "either in its origin or 
its continuance" ever thought it necessary to make a declaration in favour of property, since 
"[t]he more recent ones were formed for its protection against former violations: the old ones 
consider the inviolability of property and their own existence as one and the same thing; and 
that a proclamation for its safety would be sounding an alarm on its dangers". But here too 
Burke does not point to government being one-sidedly subsidiary to property, but rather to 
an affinity that makes them both mutually dependent. See Fitzwilliam pp. 101-102. See also 
PH vol. XXX p. 555.
246 Regicide I p. 194. See also Discontents p. 268, and Regicide III pp. 374-375 (but the last is 
problematic, being an "editorial extension" by which Burke's executors compiled together 
materials of various provenance).
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thus redundant human institution. His answer, styled in the language of 
natural rights theories, was that "[t]he state of civil society, which necessarily 
generates this aristocracy, is a state of nature". In other words, civil society 
and aristocracy were both truly "natural" to men, unlike the spurious state of 
nature of the natural tights theories. Moreover, Burke indicated that one could 
not be had without the other, since hierarchy was something inevitable in any 
society. Consequently, the true political question concerning hierarchy was 
not how to justify its existence, but rather how to bring it to perform as 
beneficially as possible. Burke believed that an established, hereditary and 
land-based aristocracy, which was channeled by manners and opinions 
corollary to its character towards serving the interests of the whole was the 
best method to achieve that beneficial performance. He stressed that in places 
like America, where circumstances did not engender a hereditary and 
established aristocracy, there should be a deliberate effort to compensate for 
this lack, mainly by putting a greater stress on republican virtue, with all 
ensuing political uncertainties and hazards.247
But establishment and heredity were not enough, for property too had an 
important role in defining the political outlook of the aristocracy. That 
particular inclinations and views were appended to the type of property men 
owned was universally accepted. The conventional division was between 
financial (or "moneyed") property, which was associated with activity and 
ambition on the one hand, and landed property, which was associated with 
sluggishness and inertia, on the other. In ascribing to this view Burke was not
247 Appeal pp. 210-211; Quebec, pp. 7-8, 33-34. About radical attitudes to aristocracy see for 
instance Wollstonecraft Vindication pp. 9-13, where hereditary property is deemed to have 
made it's recipients into an "artificial monster". Burke described such claims at length in the 
Appeal pp. 188-189, and also in Reflections p. 347, and Noble 166-167. In the latter work he 
noted the tendency of democratic and absolutist theories to converge on the alleged 
redundancy of aristocracy -  in fact, attempting to hide these theories' similar tyrannical 
aspirations, as was the case with Henry VIIIs enmity to "every thing that was great and noble", 
finally leaving no liberty in the country.
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exceptional, but he viewed the attributes pertaining to landed property as 
being politically beneficial. This view conflicted with Locke's theory, which 
regarded property as consisting almost wholly (99%, as he put it) of men's 
labors, thus implying a de-legitimization of those who enjoyed property 
without actively endeavoring to make it productive. To be sure, Locke, in 
accordance with his theory, expressed principled criticism, in the Second 
treatise, of property owners who did not contribute to labor, manufacture or 
trade, including idle and unproductive owners of landed property. For Burke, 
the slow but independent nature of the landed interest and population, and 
especially of country gentlemen "of liberal views and habits" was exactly 
their merit in that it extended a moderating influence on government, 
counterbalancing the active power of the moneyed and urban interest.248 
Burke opposed neither the economic activities nor the political influence of 
the urban and financial interest, but he regarded it as politically destabilizing 
if left unbalanced by a strong landed interest. Though he commended (and, 
on his own farm, practiced) active improvement of agricultural production by 
landowners, Burke recognized that owners of landed property -  especially of 
large estates -  though many times less productive than others in strict 
economic terms, nevertheless made a significant contribution in political 
terms. They were bred in circumstances that enabled them to nurture 
personal virtue, discipline and learning, to devote themselves to public 
service and duty, and to regard as their goal the managing and directing the 
state in the interest of the whole. The men who accepted this role became for 
Burke not only an important part of political society, but in many ways its 
very essence. He proposed that "true natural aristocracy is not a separate
248 ST sec. 25-51 (chapter on property) and elsewhere; Reflections pp. 312-313. See also Ashcraft 
Revolutionary pp. 265-270 on Locke; Dreyer Burke's p. 70 on Burke. For a discussion of the 
balance of power between Landed and moneyed interests see R. Bourke, "Edmund Burke and 
enlightenment sociability: justice, honour and the principles of government" in History of 
Political Thought 21 (2000), pp. 651-653.
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interest in the state, or separable from it. It is an essential part of any large 
body rightly constituted". More than this, true aristocracy was so much a vital 
element of the political nation that without it, in effect, "there is no nation". 
Burke did not delude himself to think that all aristocrats, or even most, 
adopted this model. His Letter to a noble Lord was a scathing criticism of those 
aristocrats who denied it. But he held that enough of them had embodied the 
model in the traditional European states. This had been, and still was, the case 
in England. In France, more than a hundred years of absolute monarchy had 
sapped the political vitality and role of the aristocracy, making revolution 
almost inevitable. But even there, the aristocracy always remained for him the 
best part of France, and its true hope for a better future. Consistent with this 
opinion, and with his assertion that without aristocracy there is "no nation", 
were Burke's repeated remarks to the effect that with so many "landed 
proprietors of France, ecclesiastical and civil" expelled by the revolution, the 
French body politic, did not reside any more in geographical France, but 
among the exiled.249
Because of the vital role of the landed aristocracy, the House of Lords was for 
Burke the institution at the core of Britain's constitution. It was not only part 
of a balanced and mixed constitution, but it best displayed the political 
intricacy which he deemed so essential -  being part of the legislature, but 
having also judicative (as the court for impeachments) and executive powers 
(a number of Lords were ex-officio members of the government). It 
represented all of the established opinions which Burke identified as essential 
to beneficial political authority - not only prejudice and property as 
represented by the aristocratic members (referred to as the Lords temporal), 
but religion too with membership in it of all Bishops of the established church
249 Appeal pp. 217-218; Remarks 465-468. Burke explicitly warned that it was because in France 
"the whole of the power obtained by this revolution will settle in the towns" that the landed 
interest and population by their sluggishness and inertia will not be able to counter the 
noxious political developments he foresaw. See Reflections p. 311.
197
(referred to as Lords spiritual). For Burke, this last feature, a political role for 
established religion, was if anything too restricted. It is instructive to observe 
that the one significant reform (or rather restoration) in the constitution which 
he ever hinted that he might entertain, would have made it not less artificial 
but more. Some years before the French revolution, while discussing the 
British constitution, Burke had remarked that the "Convocation of Clergy had 
formerly been called and sat with nearly as much regularity to business as 
Parliament itself", and while it now convened for ceremonial purposes only, 
he noted it was still part of the constitution, and may one day be "called out 
into act and energy". He doubted then if circumstances would make such a 
revival desirable. But at the time of the French revolution he seemingly 
regarded such revival as more attractive, when he suggested that the 
existence of separate chambers for the nobility and clergy in the ancient 
constitution of France, was potentially more beneficial than the situation in 
the British system.250
It can be said that Burke regarded aristocracy as the most important 
component of a beneficial political system, because by its character, it wielded 
the political power that was farthest removed from natural force. Lacking the 
physical force of popular numbers or monarchical armies, aristocracy drew 
almost all its political significance from property and from prejudices such as 
hereditary titles. As the most artificial part of an artificial system, it was the 
most committed guardian of this system. Burke gave a detailed account of the 
manner in which the aristocracy carried out its role as political guardian, 
when he expounded his opposition to a reform of parliamentary 
representation. He observed that the main political organ of the aristocracy, 
"the House of Lords is by itself the feeblest part of the Constitution", which 
would not last a year without the support of its connections with the Crown
250 Sheriffs p. 316; Assembly pp. 329-330.
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and the Commons. He meant that the Lords drew their political significance 
from the services they carried out for the crown (in the military the 
government and so on), and by their influence on many of the seats in the 
House of Commons (a considerable number of constituencies, where noble 
families held partial or decisive influence). It was for this reason that reform 
of parliamentary representation would "defeat the operation of property in 
Elections" and dissolve "the connexion and communication of interest" by 
which the two houses mutually supported each other. Events in France had 
illustrated the destructive effects of undermining the political role of 
aristocracy by arbitrary monarchy. Reform of parliamentary representation 
presented the same danger only from the popular side, because "artificial 
representation of the people being once discredited and overturned, all goes 
to pieces, and nothing but a plain French democracy or arbitrary monarchy 
can possibly exist".251
Although aristocracy was the most artificial element in the British 
constitution, the monarchical and popular elements were also constructed as 
artificial representation, and not as natural, "arbitrary" or "plain" political 
agents. Since the whole system was predicated on the "artificial 
representation of the people", the fundamental opposition between it and the 
natural rights theories was not merely a philosophical distinction but one of 
direct practical import. The ideas of artificial representation and of politics as 
the realization of natural rights were mutually exclusive, and could not co­
exist within one constitutional system. According to Burke, this was what had 
happened in France, and what might happen in England. The young men of 
England, exposed to the natural rights ideology reigning in France "will 
receive a taint in their religion, their morals and their politicks, which they 
will in a short time communicate to the whole kingdom", that will start to
251 Observations pp. 440-442.
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corrode the whole frame of the British political system. "The Jacobin faction in
England must grow in strength and audacity", while the ministry will not be
able to find support in parliament. The House of Commons elected under
such circumstances will lack the courage to arm the crown with extraordinary
powers. The Lords who "ought naturally to be the pillars of the Crown",
when their titles are made contemptible and their property invidious, will
become merely so many trembling individuals seeking only to postpone the
day of their ruin. Though Britain might still stumble along for some time, the
decisive moment would have passed, its constitution dead if not yet buried.
The decisive day, Burke indicated, would be the triumph of the natural rights
ideology over that of artificial representation:
That day was, I fear, the fatal term of local patriotism. On that day, I 
fear, there was an end to that narrow scheme of relations called our 
country, with all it's pride, it's prejudices, and it's partial affections.
All the little quiet rivulets that watered an humble, a contracted, 
but not an unfruitful field, are to be lost in the waste expanse, and 
boundless barren ocean of the homicide philanthropy of France.252
Many years before the revolution in France, Burke had described the
beneficial political system, one which restrained an "encroaching
prerogative", an "overweening peerage", and a "tumultuous and giddy
people", as intended to direct the consciousness of men towards a politically
"safe mediocrity". The goal was that men, whatever their talents or
circumstances will know and tell themselves:
I cannot elevate myself above a certain very limited point, so as to 
endanger my own fall, or the ruin of my Country. I know there is 
an order, that keeps things fast in their place; it is made to us, and 
we are made to it.
If this order was rejected, Burke believed that anything became possible, and 
men may put forward any proposition, "[w]hy not ask another wife, other
252 Fitzwilliam pp. 114-117; Regicide III pp. 303-304.
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children, another body, another mind ?". This placing of the foundation of 
political order in men's mind, was reiterated by Burke even more clearly 
some fifteen years later, deep into his anti-revolutionary struggle, when he 
claimed that
commonwealths are not physical but moral essences. They are 
artificial combinations; and in their proximate efficient cause, the 
arbitrary productions of the human mind".253
In both of the above quotes, the crucial point made was that political systems 
are essentially "arbitrary" products of men's mind. That is, they can be 
fashioned and directed whichever way men might wish. The fundamental 
political danger is then not from the arbitrary will of monarchs or masses, but 
from the arbitrary will of individuals. It is this will which m ust be addressed 
in order to erect and sustain a good government. To achieve that, it is not 
enough to make government "to" men, but men too must be "made to it". The 
anti-Lockean import of this approach is plain, as it denies the assumption on 
which the whole of Locke's political theory is predicated -  that political 
societies should be fitted to men, not men to them. But the more significant 
political question raised by Burke's approach is that if men are not the 
sovereign rulers of political society (as they are made by Locke), but are rather 
"made" to them, who is the sovereign?
253 Representation pp. 104-105; Regicide I p. 188.
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3. The "idea of continuity" -  Burke's idea of sovereignty
Edmund Burke's concept of sovereignty is relatively neglected by scholarship, 
with little space, if any, usually devoted to this subject in either general 
studies of 18th century political ideas or particular research on him. However, 
even a cursory glance at this scholarship, reveals that in addition to a lack of 
clarity in the treatment of the subject, there is no agreement on its substance. 
There are widely differing views about the content and importance of Burke's 
concept of sovereignty, and even claims that he did not have one. It also 
appears that current scholarship neither undertakes a comprehensive 
treatment nor recognizes the significant implications, of Burke's actual 
concept of sovereignty. The limited character of scholarly treatment of Burke's 
concept of sovereignty nonetheless presents widely differing views about the 
subject. F. O'Gorman, for instance, claims that Burke believed that in every 
particular polity "the location of sovereignty was unalterably settled" 
according to its peculiar arrangements. That is, in every state sovereignty 
might be situated in another place, and there is no general rule on this -  
except that this location of sovereignty might not be changed after having 
been established. "In the case of Britain, for example", O'Gorman points out, 
sovereignty "was vested in the King and in parliament, an arrangement 
which no earthly power could alter or amend".254
Another view is presented by H.T. Dickinson who, while addressing attitudes 
to the issue of sovereignty in relation to the American problem, writes that 
Burke and the Rockingham Whigs "were ready to endorse the theoretical 
sovereignty of Parliament" but urged, out of prudential considerations, that it 
should not be exercised in a manner that would unduly antagonize those
254 O'Gorman Burke p. 17. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile this description with  
O'Gorman's assertion, on p. 16, that Burke derived from Locke "his fundamental 
assumptions about the British constitution".
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subject to it. In other words, Burke is held to have espoused the position that 
parliament was the sovereign, but preferred this sovereignty to be practiced 
prudentially.255
A third view on this matter is that of J. Conniff, who, while claiming that 
Burke, like most thinkers of his time, "accepted the doctrine of sovereignty; 
that is he believed that final political authority had to be vested somewhere", 
disagrees with the assertions of both previous scholars as to the place this 
sovereignty was located. He states that Burke, "came close to holding that an 
administration was responsible to Parliament", but finally "insisted that 
sovereignty lay with the king". Conniff argues that Burke chose this path 
because he preferred the problems involved in the King's sovereignty over 
the dangers of a popular sovereignty.256
The discrepancy between the above descriptions of Burke's idea of 
sovereignty is evident -  O'Gorman claims it as in King and in parliament, 
Dickinson only in parliament, and Conniff only in the King. This divergence 
may be explained by assuming that all three descriptions are attempts to 
paraphrase the political reality behind the formula, common in Burke's day, 
of sovereignty being located in the institution of the "King-in-Parliament". 
The meaning of this formula is that in the British state sovereignty is vested in 
an institutional structure of government, which included the King, the House 
of Lords and the House of Commons. However, whichever one of the above 
descriptions is preferred, their main shortcoming is not that they lack 
precision, but rather that they all are essentially incorrect in their reading of 
Burke's concept of sovereignty. Although there are additional disagreements 
between the above scholars about Burke's treatment of sovereignty (for 
example, O'Gorman holds that Burke had a general concept of sovereignty, 
while Dickinson and Conniff do not mention any such general concept), they
255 Dickinson Liberty p. 215.
256 Conniff Useful pp. 272-273, see also p. 93.
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all share the view that assigns little importance to this concept. They contend 
that Burke's concept of sovereignty was one that was fairly common in the 
context of 18th century ideas, and was not a peculiar or significant element of 
his own political thought, the implication being that it should be regarded as 
an uninteresting subject.257
Of a wholly different nature is the treatment of Burke's concept of sovereignty 
by L. Strauss, F.A. Dreyer, P. Stanlis and J.G.A. Pocock. These scholars see the 
issue of sovereignty as significant in Burke's thought, and, accordingly, 
apportion to it more than a few cursory lines. But they too fall short of a full 
and comprehensive treatment of the subject.
Dreyer provides what is probably the most detailed and extensive treatment 
of Burke's ideas on sovereignty. His conclusion seems to be that Burke did not 
in fact have a theory of sovereignty. But this, Dreyer contends, was not 
because of a lack of interest in the subject, rather the opposite is suggested. 
Burke expressed a num ber of competing concepts of sovereignty and the 
state, and was unable or unwilling to decide between them. This amounts to a 
claim of basic incoherence in Burke's discussion of the state and its 
sovereignty. Dreyer indeed asserts that Burke used expediently three 
alternative and inconsistent identities to describe the state: "agency", "trust" 
and "corporation". Each of the three identities entails a completely different 
concept of sovereignty through its relationship with government. In the first 
government is the agent of the people (that is the people are actively 
sovereign), in the second the trustee for the people (that is the people are 
passively sovereign), in the third the corporation of the people (that is, the 
corporation is sovereign). The question of the consistency or lack of it in 
Burke's ideas on sovereignty and the state will be treated later. Here, it 
suffices to point out that Dreyer's analysis of Burke's idea on this subject is, I
257 See for example O'Gorman Burke p. 45, and Conniff Useful pp. 272-273.
204
believe, important in one aspect -  its emphasize on the central role of the 
concept of corporation or body politic in Burke's writings on state and 
government (especially in his later years).258
A different view of Burke's concept of sovereignty is presented by Strauss, 
who writes that although Burke did not reject the view that "all authority has 
its ultimate origin in the people or that the sovereign is ultimately the 
people", denied political relevance to this sovereignty, holding it to be 
"dormant", while in practice "the convention, the original compact, i.e., the 
established constitution, is the highest authority". These quotes present a 
number of interesting observations, which might serve as starting point for a 
discussion of the many issues raised by them. Unfortunately, Strauss does not 
proceed to discuss them. His insights are consistently obscured by a 
combination of equivocal terms with the lack of sufficient exposition. An 
example of this problem is evident in the above quote, where Strauss treats 
the terms "convention", "original compact" and "established constitution" as 
synonymous. They are not evidently so, and if they should be regarded as 
identical, Strauss does not provide an explanation of why this is so.259 
Stanlis claims straightforwardly that Burke's political philosophy is clearly 
consistent in its two principles "Political sovereignty based on Natural Law" 
and reverence for "the corporate character of the people". However, this 
clear-cut claim is not sufficiently explained, and what is even more 
problematic, it leaves unclear the relationship between the corporate people 
and natural law. Undoubtedly, Burke held that higher morality -  or natural 
law -  was at the origin of all legitimate government, but this might be also 
said of a number of vastly diverging thinkers (including Locke), and as such
258 Dreyer Burke's pp. 37-53 (especially pp. 51-53); another kind of claim about Burke having 
no comprehensive political philosophy is made by F.P. Lock, who writes that Burke had no 
political philosophy, instead he "knew what he stood for" and was willing to use whatever 
argument or vocabulary that would best convince his audience. See Lock Burke's p. 98.
259 Strauss Natural pp. 299-300.
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does nothing to explain the place and function of sovereignty in the actual 
state. Asserting, as Stanlis does, that Burke believed in "a civil order founded 
upon constitutional law and the Natural Law", creates the impression that 
these two systems of law are at some level identical, or at least 
complementary. But this impression is not followed trough, and Stanlis 
confuses matters even more when he describes natural law as the supreme 
moral law, while maintaining the Constitutional law was the "ultimate 
political law" of any nation, and as such ultimately sovereign. Later, in his 
description of constitutional law, it proceeds "from the will of many 
generations of men and institutions, as regulated by corporate right reason", 
and natural law does not appear. Thus the relations between the political and 
moral, and the way in which natural law is to be politically ascertained and 
effected, are all left unclear. It can also be argued that Stanlis' view matches 
that of Strauss in that both regard the traditional constitution as the actual 
political sovereign; while they diverge on the source for this authority, with 
Strauss putting it in the people and Stanlis placing it in natural law.260 
J.G.A. Pocock offers yet another view of Burke's concept of sovereignty. His 
treatment of the subject is extensive, but not always clear. He proposes that 
Burke's ideas on sovereignty should be understood in the context of two 
English political traditions that have been already discussed above: that of the 
"ancient constitution" (which I have termed "originalist", and counted among 
its followers the younger Pitt) holding the English state and laws to be based 
on an ancient, immemorial and perfect constitution, and that of the 
"prescriptive conservatism" (which I have termed "historical") holding that 
the ancient constitution should be accepted in its present form. According to 
Pocock, "prescriptive conservatism" was in effect an offshoot and alteration of 
the "ancient constitution" tradition, that had been outlined by the prominent
260 Stanlis Burke pp. 214, 245. See also p. 165. Stanlis does not propose (as did some thinkers, 
foremost among them John Selden) that constitutional law is an emanation of natural law.
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17th century Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale (perhaps following John Selden) 
and later perfected by Burke himself. Pocock's claim is that while for 
followers of both traditions the constitution was, essentially, the sovereign, 
they were divided between those who believed this sovereignty to be located 
in unchangeable and easily recognizable original principles, and those from 
whom sovereignty was vested in the constitution as a system of continuous 
transmission of institutions. The implication (for Pocock does not state this 
explicitly) that the working customary constitutional system should be seen 
as Burke's sovereign is certainly intriguing. However, Pocock does not 
sufficiently clarify the relations between the "ancient constitution" view and 
Burke's. At some points it appears that Burke's view completely denies that 
any original principles of the ancient constitution are traceable, in effect a 
functionalist (even relativist) view of the constitution; at other times it seems 
that Burke accepted some original principles for the constitution. Sentences 
produced by Pocock, like "the bedrock of ancient constitutionalism was being 
laid at the foundations of the prescriptive conservatism to which Burke would 
give classic expression a few years later", do not provide an explanation of the 
matter, and are not followed through by him.261
It is evident then that current scholarship does not provide a satisfactory 
treatment of Burke's concept of sovereignty. Unlike some of these scholars, I 
will argue that Burke did hold a theory of sovereignty, that it was an essential 
element of his political thought, and that he held the sovereign in Britain to be 
neither the "King-in-Parliament", nor some of its component parts. Unlike 
other scholars, I will attempt to offer a comprehensive and coherent treatment 
of Burke's thought on the subject. I will also consider the relationship between 
Burke's concept of sovereignty and Locke's ideas, as I believe that the latter
261 Pocock Virtue pp. 94, 278. In the latter passage Pocock's views are inferred, as he does not 
explicitly use the term sovereignty. See also the additional discussion of these ideas in Pocock 
Ancient pp. 170-175.
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had a major role in prompting the articulation of the former, which was in 
many respects intended to confute Locke. I will present my argument in three 
stages, considering in turn: (i) Burke's view of Locke's idea of sovereignty, (ii) 
Burke's own idea of sovereignty and (iii) Burke's application of his view to 
particular polities and constitutions.
(i) The "edge of crimes": Burke and the Lockean concept of sovereignty -
Theories of sovereignty hold that every state must have a source of 
independent and supreme authority, and are concerned with the locus and 
function of the legitimate supreme dominion or authority in a state. As will be 
remembered, Burke always expressed a marked distaste for delving into 
questions pertaining to the origin and location of sovereignty, the 
"foundations of the Commonwealth", and for much of his political career 
preferred to treat questions relating to the actual function of sovereignty.262 
Nevertheless, from about 1780, and especially after the outbreak of the 
revolution in France, Burke was confronted with calls for constitutional 
alteration based on claims pertaining to the origin and location of sovereignty, 
and increasingly came to treat such questions. His attempts to repel the 
attacks on the British state and the old order of Europe brought him to 
address those ideas and terms, and to articulate his own views on the subject. 
Accordingly, the best starting point for an analysis of Burke's theory of 
sovereignty, is his portrayal of the theory against which he formulated his 
own. The theory he was opposing (though he touched upon it in one form or 
other in virtually all he wrote after 1790) was most comprehensively treated 
in two works that were composed with the explicit purpose of winning the 
hearts and minds of those Whigs who were hesitant about which way to turn
262 Duration p. 589. O'Gorman states that "Burke was uninterested for the most part in such 
theoretical questions as the location and distribution of sovereignty in the state", but it seems 
that Burke's basic attitude was more of aversion than disinterest. See O'Gorman Burke p. 45. 
Another aspect of sovereignty pertains to relations between states, but will not be explored 
here.
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in the impending split between the Foxite and Burkean wings of the party: the 
Appeal from the new to the old Whigs (1791) and the Observations on the conduct of 
the minority (1793).
In both works Burke subjected the ideas he ascribed to the Foxite Whigs to 
comprehensive and scathing criticism, as representative of theoretical 
principles completely divergent from the old Whig tradition. Since the Appeal 
and its anti-Lockean import has already been discussed above, it is now 
necessary to examine the Observations. This was a text addressed -  initially as 
a private letter -  to the two most important aristocratic Whig leaders, the 
Duke of Portland and the Earl Fitzwilliam, whose opinions were held as 
significant by many (among them Burke) who regarded them as representing 
the mainstream of the Whig tradition. Consisting of 55 observations on 
various (sometimes minor) aspects of party policy, the part of the Observations 
most pertinent to the present discussion was the one devoted to treating Fox's 
Commons speech of 7 May 1793 on yet another motion for parliamentary 
reform.
In the speech Fox attempted to show that his support for reform was not the 
result of any Rousseauian or other French ideas, but was rather in line with 
English and Whig political traditions. He stressed the distance between his 
views and those of Rousseau by stating to have personally found the 
beginning of the Social Contract "so extravagant, that he could not read it 
through". Fox then claimed his support for parliamentary reform was within 
the tradition of the "Magna Charta", and the parliamentarian principles of 
1640 and of 1688. He also associated the same tradition with support for the 
American side in that conflict, and with former supporters of reforms that 
now opposed them, naming among those William Windham (who 
acknowledged his position had changed because of the French revolution) 
and, disingenuously, Burke (who did not, in fact, ever support significant 
parliamentary reforms). Finally, Fox offered the philosophical basis for his
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position, by asserting that: "He was ready to say with Locke, that government 
originated not only for, but from the people, and that the people were the 
legitimate sovereign in every community".263
In his treatment of this speech Burke accused Fox, of asserting what was in 
fact the Jacobins' "fundamental and fatal principle", that "in every Country 
the People is the legitimate Sovereign". He pointed out that such principle 
"confounds, in a manner equally mischievous and stupid, the origin of a 
Government from the people with its continuance in their hands". Burke 
stressed this was a doctrine unprecedented in any government, with the 
French revolutionaries having adopted it apparently "from the writings of 
Rousseau", but he added that whether Fox's position "is necessarily 
connected in theory with Jacobinism is not worth a dispute: the two are 
connected in fact. The partizans of the one are the partizans of the other".264 
Burke's arguments here deserve particular attention, both because they were 
not raised on the floor of the house in the heat of debate but selected 
deliberately, and because of their intended readership: the text was composed 
in 1793 as a private memorandum sent to the two foremost Whig grandees, 
the Duke of Portland and the Earl Fitzwilliam, concerning Fox's words and 
positions, at the time they were considering a break with his wing of the 
party. In these circumstances Burke could assume them to be intimately 
familiar with Fox's every contention and wording (indeed Fox's stance in 
favor of parliamentary reform greatly contributed to the final split of the 
Whigs). Firstly Burke rejected the "fatal" principle, offered by Fox as Locke's 
own, of the people as "legitimate Sovereign"; secondly he characterized that 
principle as maliciously and stupidly confusing the origin and continuance of 
government; thirdly he claimed this principle was unprecedented in any
263 "Speech of 7 May 1793" in Fox Speeches vol. V, pp. 102-117, and especially p. 115. Fox's 
mention of 1640 came close endorsing the republican side in the civil war as the precursor of 
1688 and the Whig ascendancy.
264 Observations pp. 438, 443.
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government; fourthly he marginalized the importance of the French and 
English manifestations of this principle having a common source, stressing 
instead their convergence in practical questions of policy.
These considerations cannot be understood other than as a complete 
condemnation of Locke's principle of the sovereignty of the people. Burke did 
not dispute Fox's identification of his principle with Locke, and thus implied 
that the denunciation of that principle was one of Locke too. His claim that 
the principle had no precedent in actual government denied that it (and by 
implication Locke) was part of the Whig or even the English political 
tradition. Even Burke's conceding that this bad, wrong and confused 
principle did necessarily originate in French theory only strengthened the 
case against Locke, since it left him by default as its undisputed originator. 
The effect of this accretion of indictments was that without explicitly 
mentioning him Burke not only disassociated Locke and his theory from the 
Whig mainstream, but implicitly savaged him as the predicator of a fatal 
doctrine, held in common with the tainted company of Rousseau and the 
Jacobins. There can hardly be a more decisive rejection of Locke's theory of 
sovereignty.
In those parts of the Appeal where he treated sovereignty, Burke presented a 
more comprehensive and detailed version of his argumentation against the 
same principle of the people as legitimate sovereign. He described the 
doctrine of the (Foxite) "new whigs" as professing that sovereignty not only 
did "originate from the people", but that "in the people the same sovereignty 
constantly and unalienably resides". The political consequences that he 
described as following from this principle, were: that the "people" may 
"lawfully depose kings" and at their pleasure set up any "new fashion of 
government"; that "the people are essentially their own rule, and their will 
the measure of their conduct"; that the "tenure of magistracy" is not a proper 
"subject of contract" because magistrates have duties but not rights; and that
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if a contract "is de facto made with them [the people] in one age" even when it 
binds all of that age, "it does not pass to posterity". In his treatment of the 
issue in the Appeal, Burke did not attempt to confute one particular version of 
popular sovereignty, but addressed what he believed were the features 
common to them all, thus encompassing all the theories upon which such a 
sovereignty was being proposed in England, which would have included, of 
course, that of Locke. Burke proceeded to expose what he took to be the 
fundamental fallacies in both the premise and consequences following from 
this principle, by concentrating on the use in it of equivocal terms and on the 
logical inconsistencies following from this equivocation. The most blatant 
confusion he discerned, one that he reiterated in the Observations (and had 
pointed to in the Reflections too), was that between the origin and continuance 
of government. In his view, this confusion stemmed primarily from the 
misuse of two terms, "people" and "contract" -  that he regarded as crucial to 
the conceptual framework of this theory of sovereignty. For him, the faulty 
constructs of "modem" theories of sovereignty sprang in great part from their 
erroneous grasp of these terms; while only from a correct understanding of 
the terms a beneficial concept of sovereignty could emerge.265 
Burke proposed that when the question of "the supreme authority of the 
people" was addressed, there should first be a clear definition of what was 
meant by the term, "people". Such a definition, he contended, was not clearly 
made in the "modem" theories embracing popular sovereignty. These 
theories, he argued, never decided if the term, "people", described an 
assemblage of many, independent, individual political persons or rather one 
whole, collective political person. This indecision, Burke believed, left a fatal
265 Appeal pp. 147-148. The same subject was treated in the Reflections more concisely: Burke 
(referring to Price) declared the doctrine of popular sovereignty as either "nonsense" or 
affirming "a most unfounded, dangerous, illegal and unconstitutional position", describing 
its principle as "that a popular choice is necessary to the legal existence of the sovereign 
magistracy". Reflections p. 97.
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gap in the basic arguments of popular sovereignty theories, a fundamental 
incongruity that was perennially threatening to unravel the fabric from 
within. He added his conviction that at least some of those holding such 
theories intentionally avoided definition, in order to identify the elusive 
popular will with that of "their own faction".266
Obviously, the unclear definition of "people" was a recipe for constant
conflict and confusion. The only apparent course by which to overcome
theoretical incoherence, was to assume that the wills of the individuals and
the collective coincide at some level -  to be in some sense identical -  thus,
circumventing the conflict, instead of deciding between two options. Burke
objected to such a solution both as logically flawed and as politically harmful.
The logical flaw he presented concisely in the Observations, as a circular
succession of contradictory arguments:
Before society, in a multitude of men, it is obvious, that 
sovereignty and subjection are ideas which cannot exist. It is the 
compact on which society is formed that makes both. But to 
suppose the people, contrary to their compacts, both to give 
away and retain the same thing, is altogether absurd. It is worse, 
for it supposes in any strong combination of men a power and 
right of always dissolving the social union; which power, 
however, if it exists, renders them again as little sovereigns as 
subjects, but a mere unconnected multitude.
In other words, the sovereignty of popular will was a contradiction in terms, 
since sovereignty was an idea which pertained to the rules of governing a 
people, while the power to dissolve society was by definition above all such 
rules.267
As to the actual political harm of such idea, Burke held that even conceding 
collective and individual wills coming to coincide, as theoretically coherent, 
the practical political outcome of such a theory could not but be a disaster.
2“  Appeal pp. 147-148, 206, 210-211.
267 Observations pp. 438-439.
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The inevitability of disaster followed for Burke from observing that even 
those claiming that a harmony of individual and collective wills could be 
found accepted that this would not be an instantaneous process, but rather 
one preceded by opinion-forming and deliberation. He pointed out that since 
the will of the people was created by the decisions of the majority, and such 
decisions in turn had to originate in the will of individuals, then: "Every 
individual must have a right to originate what afterwards is to become the act 
of the majority". He concluded from this that any attempt to put such a theory 
into practice must result not in (what its proponents assumed) a situation 
where sovereignty, first vested in individuals, was harmoniously transformed 
into the collective will by way of majority and consent, but rather in a state 
where two sovereignties would be constantly wrestling with each other - with 
nothing at all certain or constant. In other words, nothing is or ever can be 
settled in such a polity, because all individuals have the right - the complete 
freedom - to attempt and originate the future will of the collective in whatever 
fashion they might desire. Instead of the individual and people being 
basically of one political mind, what actually would result is a perpetual 
instability of mind -  one might say, of minds -  a kind of ever changing, 
unpredictable political will. Such a political system, was destined to witness 
ever more violent swings between the authority of individuals and that of the 
collective, a vicious circle of perpetual instability, that could only result in a 
collapse of the state, or in the abandonment of such philosophical 
foundations.268
In addition to his objections to the way the term "people" was used by 
supporters of popular sovereignty, Burke also criticized the use of the term 
"contract" as so flawed that it lost all meaning. He asserted that the doctrines 
holding that sovereignty did "originate from the people", and that "in the
268 Appeal pp. 228-231.
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people the same sovereignty constantly and unalienably resides", meant in 
practice that the "people" however defined, could depose kings, set up any 
"new fashion of government" or continue without government. In other 
words, that "the people are essentially their own rule, and their will the 
measure of their conduct". Such rule of will plainly contradicted any 
plausible meaning of the term "contract" as a binding agreement, and made 
the "tenure of magistracy" (government) not a proper "subject of contract", 
but simply a subject of that arbitrary sovereign will. It should be remembered 
that only a few radicals (like Paine) explicitly proposed that government was 
subject to arbitrary popular will, while Lockeans and Locke himself attempted 
to define the relationship in terms of some sort of obligation that was 
nevertheless not a binding contract (Locke proposed "trust"). By his insistence 
that the relation between rulers and ruled was a binding contractual one, 
Burke was plainly targeting the validity of all Lockean attempts -  including 
Locke's own -  to offer an alternative to such a contract. Thus, by his treatment 
of "contract" he also rejected the use of the term "trust" by supporters of 
popular sovereignty. Burke's additional criticism of the sovereignty of 
popular will, as entailing that a contract "does not pass to posterity", and thus 
that a constitution could not bind successive generations, was so similar in 
wording to Locke's explicit assertion in the Second treatise, that no one could 
"by any compact whatsoever, bind his children or posterity", that it seems 
hardly possible to have been merely coincidental. For Burke, the sovereignty 
of popular will, since it led to a completely functionalist view of what a 
constitution is -  as merely the expression of the current will of the people -  
was a recipe for perpetual unrest, the "annual Constitutions" which he 
sardonically described as France's lot since the revolution (and which some 
radicals indeed aspired to).269
269 Appeal pp. 147-148; ST sec. 116 (and see also sec. 141); Fitzwilliam p. 82. Some radicals, like
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It is sometimes claimed by scholars (J.C.D. Clark and F.A. Dreyer are 
examples) that Burke's use of the term "contract" or "compact" is proof of a 
debt to the political tradition of the social contract and of Locke. Other 
scholars (H.T. Dickinson is an example), although conceding that Burke did 
not subscribe to the Lockean view, propose that Burke wrote little on the 
subject, and what he did was ambiguous. However, it seems to me that both 
positions are wrong. Burke not only rejected Locke's idea of contract as a 
voluntary agreement between self-sufficient individuals, but consistently 
used the term "compact" or "contract" to describe a political construct with 
qualities which actually negated those of Locke's contract. For Locke the 
"contract" established society -  or as he termed it the "Community", while 
government was erected by society as a "trust". Locke (and Lockeans such as 
Priestley and Paine) upheld this division exactly for the purpose of arguing, 
as he did explicitly, that the dissolution of government was not a dissolution 
of society, and in case of government dissolving, political power reverted to 
society until it formed a new government. But Burke denied exactly this 
division between society and government, instead proposing the state as "a 
social, civil relation", that is, as an essential synonymity of social and political 
attributes, inextricably mixed. In short Burke did not believe that a political 
and a social sphere could be neatly (or even messily) divided, because 
government and society could not exist without each other. If government 
was dissolved so was society, and "in that state of things each man has a 
right, if he pleases, to remain an individual". He returned to this same 
principle in many guises, such as when he described the constitution as the 
"engagement and pact of society" and denied the right of dissolving "the 
whole civil and political mass, for the purpose of originating a new civil order 
out of the first elements of society". Moreover, though he undoubtedly
Paine (more indirectly) and Christie, seriously considered the merits of reviewing the 
constitution at fixed periods, as proposed in France. See Christie Letters p. 162.
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asserted this view more forcefully after the outbreak of the French revolution, 
Burke can be shown to have championed it many years before, at least from 
the time of the American conflict.270
In effect Burke proposed that theories upholding the sovereignty of popular 
will made their own use of terms denoting political obligation (like "contract" 
or "trust") meaningless, as the only real source of legitimate government they 
acknowledged was consent. Thus he identified the principle "which supposes 
society to be in virtue of a free covenant", in other words, individual consent, 
as the true linchpin of all theories of popular sovereignty. He held that the 
failures of these theories to establish coherent definitions for such ideas as 
"people" and "contract" left them with the claim that it was feasible to 
achieve a state in which the will of individuals would freely accept the setting 
and deliberations of the collective, as the only avenue by which a semblance 
of logical and terminological coherence could be maintained. Following this 
identification of individual consent as the true foundation for theories of 
popular sovereignty, Burke attempted to confute such foundations.271 
At the time Burke was addressing these issues, there were two main versions 
of what constituted individual political consent. The first one, identified with 
what Locke defined as "tacit" consent, held that although every legitimate 
commonwealth had to be based on the consent of its members, this consent 
could be given in an implicit and passive manner. In Locke's words "every 
man, that hath any possession, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of 
any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent". The second version of 
consent, advocated among others by Richard Price and Joseph Priestley, held
270 Clark Reflections pp. 33, 40 and 219 in note; Dreyer Burke's pp. 68-70; Dickinson Liberty p. 
291. ST sec. 211, 243; Appeal pp. 207, 211-214; Reflections pp. 90-91,105-106,150. For Burke's 
statements of this idea before the French revolution see Sheriffs p. 318; Representation pp. 96- 
97. For a discussion of Locke's view, see Ashcraft Revolutionary pp. 576-577. And for Pocock's 
view that the passage in the Reflections dealing with "first elements of society", could be read 
as a repudiation of Locke's Second treatise, see Pocock Reflections p. 220 note xiv.
271 Appeal pp. 211-215.
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that at least in principle, the consent necessary for the existence of a 
commonwealth had to be one expressed by every individual either by direct 
involvement (in small states) or by the choice of representatives. In Price's 
words: "In every free state every man is his own legislator".272 
Burke did not enter into a discussion of the differences between versions of 
individual consent, targeting instead the very use of the idea in discussions 
about political society. As has been already discussed above, Burke did this 
by questioning the notoriously problematic assumption, widely identified 
with Locke, that the "natural" and legitimate expression of this consent was 
by majority decisions. Instead of Locke's assertion that "the act of the majority 
passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having by the 
Law of Nature and Reason, the power of the whole", Burke stressed that 
deciding by a majority was not a "law of original nature", but rather one of 
the "most violent fictions of positive law" ever made on the "principles of 
artificial incorporation". Locke had conceded that "if the consent of the majority 
shall not in reason, be received, as the act of the whole, and conclude every 
individual; nothing but the consent of every individual can make any thing to 
be the act of the whole". Burke insisted that as at the origin of society there 
could be no majorities, only unanimity, "a people can have no right to a 
corporate capacity without universal consent". In other words, he was 
undermining the idea of individual consent by requiring its proponents to 
own up to their claim to the assent of every individual.273
272 ST sec. 119, and also sec. 120-121; Price from "Two tracts on civil liberty, the war with 
America, and the debts and finances of the kingdom", in D.O. Thomas (ed.), Richard Price, 
political writings (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. 23-25. See also Priestley 
Essay pp. 13-14.
273 ST sec. 96, 98 (and see also sec. 95, 99); Appeal pp. 211-215 (Burke was restating almost 
verbatim what he had predicated in Representation pp. 94-95). The solution to the problem of a 
lack of consent is for Locke a right of secession from the state, but this is not only impractical 
-  certainly when groups and not individuals are concerned -  but as Burke had claimed above, 
also indefensible on logical grounds, when the issue is the dissolution of the social contract.
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Burke drove home the consequences of the original agreement of society 
being created or changed by unanimity only, when he added that any other 
method would have contradicted the meaning of the term "contract". He 
pointed out that as the very "nature of a contract" was to be obligatory to all 
parties to it, then, when a political compact was settled upon, whether "tacit 
or expressed", the terms of agreement could be legitimately altered only with 
"the consent of all the parties". By this last argument Burke drove home his 
contention that any notion of individual consent "tacit or expressed" was 
irreconcilable with the idea of contract. For even if a social contract started as 
a "free covenant", from the moment it was established no party was "free" 
anymore but bound to its contractual obligations. By the very act of political 
incorporation, the contract ejected individual consent from the political arena. 
Moreover, since even the proponents of consent agreed that unanimity was 
unachievable, the presence or lack of individual consent became completely 
irrelevant to the existence of the state.274
It is important to add here that, although Burke was willing to discuss the 
theoretical proposition that political societies originate with a "free covenant" 
-  in order to show its logical inconsistency -  he did not believe such could be 
the case in any actual instance. As already discussed, in his opinion, the actual 
beginnings of political societies always and unavoidably involved 
problematic -  sometimes criminal -  circumstances. It was because unanimous 
agreement was a chimerical idea, and majority decisions impossible before 
political society existed that the state at its beginning necessarily acted 
without individual consent, and often relied on the threat or the actual 
exertion of brute force. Hence, Burke warned, great concern with the 
circumstances in which the "original power" of the people might revert to 
them, was "nice, and therefore dangerous" -  for "resuscitation of such a
274 Appeal pp. 200-202.
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power in the people" whether lawful or not m ust be in any case "devious", 
because "ever on the edge of crimes". He noted this was the case not only at 
the beginning of political societies, but also when the authority of existing 
governments was threatened, as had been the situation in 1688, which he 
described as "wholly out of the law". In Burke's opinion, then, the principle of 
a free covenant or consent, far from being the solution to the origin of political 
society, was the problem.275
But the erroneous quality of the idea of consent, did not, for Burke, exhaust its 
noxious and damaging effects. He held that political consciousness was 
dangerously warped by this idea, which, under the cover of perceived rights, 
made men's individual, arbitrary will, the source of sovereignty. The 
introduction of individual consent into political discourse fostered a 
presumptive political right of individual self-determination from which the 
only certain thing to emerge was the natural human lust for power. This was 
because the idea of consent, could not be confined to the beginnings of 
commonwealths only, and once accepted as legitimate in political discourse, it 
soon would undermine every aspect political society. Consent given at will, 
could be taken back by the same will, and thus the individual was never 
really giving up his sovereignty. He was never wholly in society and in fact 
there never was a society -  only a collection of autonomous individuals vying 
for what they will. At the individual's pleasure was the possibility of trying to 
alter (or destroy) the frame of government, as he only had to try and convince 
others of his opinions. Burke was convinced that the last corruption of ruling 
power, "arbitrary will", would gradually poison the heart of every citizen, 
and all love of country or of laws and customs would be replaced by 
conspiracies and sedition "grown into a principle, and animated by
275 Appeal pp. 209-210; Reflections p. 116. Elsewhere he commended the wisdom of 
parliamentary leaders of 1688 that disinclined them from using "the powers derived from 
force and opportunity" to begin political society anew. See Reflections p. 104.
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discontent, ambition, or enthusiasm". The notion of consent would convince 
men that any change in the polity, including that of the frame of government, 
depended only on their will. Such conviction meant that states based on 
individual consent could never know rest from attempts to change them, for 
even when such enterprises succeeded, in no way was "the new state, 
fabricated by such arts, safer than the old". All the prerequisites for another 
change would be still in place, as long as the principle of consent persisted. 
Moreover, since consent to political change could be achieved after the 
alteration of the state, this principle legitimated any successful revolt. For 
Burke, therefore, the principle of consent tended to legitimize politics as 
merely a brute struggle for power, with success becoming the only criterion 
for judging a revolt, and politics reduced to a state of might makes right. The 
only important thing would be to acquire, by any means, "the possession of 
power".276
Such doctrines, fostering in men a presumption of a sovereignty of individual 
will, tended to subvert not only "all government, in all modes" and "all stable 
securities to rational freedom", but even "all the rules and principles of 
morality itself".277
(ii) The "communi sponsione reipublicae": Burke's sovereign idea - Burke's 
rejection of the "modem" doctrines of popular sovereignty brings up the 
question of his alternative to them. I will now attempt to show what he 
believed to be a theory of sovereignty that was not only morally desirable, but 
also coherent and feasible. The fundamental principle of Burke's idea of 
sovereignty was that it started with the community. Contrary to political
276 Appeal pp. 228-231. Burke then appears to be saying that the only result of a polity effecting 
Locke's principle of consent, w ill be Hobbes' state of nature.
277 Appeal pp.147-148. Burke was particularly exasperated by such theoretical speculations, in 
times of political instability, wandering why, even if "speculatively" true (adding "God 
forbid they should!"), would someone bring them up at a time when such "perilous theories" 
were everywhere undermining "the foundations of all antient and prescriptive 
Governments". See Observations pp. 438-439.
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theories that started with the individual and proceeded to create and define 
the collective, Burke's discussion of political society started from the 
community, which for him to a great degree defined the individual. This 
community was not an abstract collective, but always a particular one, with a 
history and a character of its own. In this sense, there was no difference for 
him between the origins and practice of sovereignty -  an actual political 
society was the origin and the practice of sovereignty. The claim that 
sovereignty originated from the people was "a position not denied, nor worth 
denying or assenting to", because it was not relevant to current political 
society.278
As shown by his view of the political role of opinion, Burke always accepted 
that a government neither could nor should persist for long without popular 
support. But he believed that popular opinion could be legitimately expressed 
only through the traditional constitutional framework, because without the 
constitution there was no "people" and thus no popular opinion. Only within 
the framework of an existing political society could a meaningful discussion 
of sovereignty and related ideas, like consent, contract or rights, become 
possible. Thus, Burke refused to accept the "modem" theories' view of the 
people as a head count of individuals or as an indefinite mass, regarding it 
instead as a population headed by its traditional leaders and acting by the 
established mles and institutions of that political society. When "great 
multitudes act together, under that discipline of nature, I recognise the 
PEOPLE".279
Indeed, Burke's definition of the people as political society, goes a long way 
towards explaining his idea of sovereignty:
278 Reflections, pp. 152-153.
279 Appeal pp. 217-219; Remarks p. 458; Discontents pp. 252, 278-279. For this reason Burke also 
opposed appeals for public contributions, "voluntary, according to the irregular, unsteady, 
capricious will of individuals", demanding instead action through traditional institutions 
"according to the will and wisdom of the whole popular mass, in the only way in which will 
and wisdom can go together". See Regicide III pp. 351-352.
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The idea of a people is the idea of a corporation. It is wholly 
artificial; and made like all other legal fictions by common 
agreement. What the particular nature of that agreement was, is 
collected from the form into which the particular society has been 
cast. Any other is not their covenant.
This is a passage with many significant insights into Burke's ideas. But the 
most important one concerns his use of the term "corporation". The most 
important feature of his definition was the description of the corporation as 
an idea. His depiction of this idea as "artificial" and "fiction" makes plain he 
did not regard it as some kind of organism. Moreover, by portraying it as a 
"common agreement", he indicated that for him the essence a corporation 
was not in its technical legal definition. Rather than as a formal structure, he 
saw it as signifying shared opinions and attitudes. It may be added that 
Burke's definition was not an occasional turn of phrase, as it reiterated his 
remark from 1782 (discussed above), to the effect that terms like "politick or 
corporate personality" describe "ideas" and as such "mere fictions of law, 
they are creatures of voluntary institutions".280
Burke's corporation of the people was -  unlike the French revolutionary 
monolithic self-image that Burke derided as "the Republick one and 
indivisible" -  a compound of smaller and different corporations. Some of 
these had no formal political function, but were nevertheless potent elements 
of political societies. At times they were only shared "resemblances" 
"conformities" "sympathies", the "secret, unseen but irrefragable bond of 
habitual intercourse", which created collective attitudes and ideas. At other 
times they were more formal associations, like societies and clubs. Other
280 Appeal pp. 210-212, 215; Representation pp. 94-95 (see also pp. 104-105). On the origins of the 
idea that the English state as a corporation was not an organic entity akin to a human body, 
but rather an undying corporation -  deriving from the theological term "corpus mysticum" -  
see in S. Lockwood's "Introduction" in S, Lockwood (ed.), John Fortescue, On the laws and 
governance of England, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. xxvi. See also 
discussion of Burke's view of corporation in Hampsher-Monk History pp. 282-285.
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corporations were more legally established as constituent parts of the political 
systems (though this did not exhaust their function) like the aristocracy, the 
established church, chartered boroughs and of course the Houses of 
Parliament. Burke had famously championed early on in his career the 
creation of a political role for parties as a kind of corporation. He claimed to 
have arrived at this position after the rise of a new court party or "Court 
corporation", which had to be opposed by the creation of another grouping, a 
party as "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the 
national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all 
agreed". Accordingly, he commented many years later that political "factions 
become in effect bodies corporate in the state". Together the smaller 
corporations formed the greater compound corporation that was the political 
system, and hence "in civil society, its own specific conventions in each 
corporation, determine w hat it is that constitutes the people, so as to make 
their act the signification of the general will".281
For Burke most men partook, as a matter of course, in many associations, both 
formal and informal. These naturally overlapped (and sometimes conflicted), 
but he saw it it as possible -  indeed commendable -  that a man did not have 
to hold one sole allegiance that would reject all other affections and 
affiliations. Not only did a strong allegiance to one's community not preclude 
sympathy for others but men typically were members of several collectives -  
local, occupational, devotional, familial, some inherited, some elective and 
many entailing particular rights or duties. Men could be committed to more 
than one collective (especially if the two were themselves to some degree 
affiliated), such as was his own case when he stated his commitment to
281 "Republick" in Remarks p. 458; "irrefragable" Regicide I p. 247; "Court corporation" 
Discontents pp. 274, 316-318; Religious, p. 45. "factions" Appeal pp. 210-211, 215. Burke also 
indicated that there could be super-national corporations (such as confederations) and that 
individual states were "municipal corporations of that universal kingdom" of "eternal 
societies". See Reflections pp. 120,195.
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further the cause of liberty in both his native Ireland and his adoptive 
England, such was the case of his friend Lord Keppel, which he described as 
having had two countries "one of descent, and one of birth" (the Netherlands 
and England), adding that to him "[t]heir interests and their glory are the 
same".282
The most important of the corporations composing a political society was, for
Burke, the family. Though not directly part of the political system, the family
was the first (in both sequence and importance) community, through which
men came into the larger community "with the social status of their parents,
endowed with the benefits, loaded with all the duties of their situation".
Furthermore, Burke explicitly stated that the British gave
to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood; binding up 
the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties; 
adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family 
affections; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of 
all their combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our 
hearths, our sepulchres, and our altars.
But perhaps the most important aspect of this similarity and affinity between 
the qualities of political society and of the family -  what he described as 
"philosophic analogy" -  was what it told about the character of political 
obligation.283
Marriage may be voluntary, but the duties of marriage are defined by the 
nature of that institution. Being bom  is certainly not voluntary. The familial 
relations of the individual, whether of choice or not, entail obligations to 
which every one is bound, irrespective of his choice. The duties arising from 
such relations, "as we are able perfectly to comprehend, we are bound
282 Noble p. 167,182-183. Burke returned to this theme on various occasions. See Appeal p. 207 
and Regicide III p. 325.
283 Appeal pp. 264-265, 206-207; Reflections pp. 151,120-121. More generally About Burke's 
language of family in the political realm see in S. Blakemore, Burke and the fall of language 
(University Press of New England, 1988) pp. 32,35-37.
225
indispensably to perform". The analogy between such familial obligations
and political ones, was made explicit by Burke. For him the social ties spun
out of these physical relations were "the elements of the commonwealth", and
in the same way as they continue
independently of our will, so without any stipulation on our own 
part, are we bound by that relation called our country, which 
comprehends (as it has been well said) 'all the charities of all'. Nor 
are we left without powerful instincts to make this duty as dear 
and grateful to us, as it is awful and coercive.
In other words, the obligations of a man towards his political society were of
the same nature as his duties towards his family. From this followed, wrote
Burke, that men did not have a right
to free themselves from that primary engagement into which every 
man bom  into a community as much contracts by his being bom  
into it, as he contracts an obligation to certain parents by his having 
been derived from their bodies.284
Moreover, Burke maintained that even the rare exception to this rule, when 
"necessity, which is out of and above all mle, rather imposes than bestows" 
made a civil war or dethronement of a King inevitable, it was always "an 
extraordinary question of state, and wholly out of the law", one of 
dispositions and means and probable consequences "rather than positive 
rights". In effect Burke denied that terms like laws and rights could be ever 
employed as a way to deal with the breakup of the civil order -  which was the 
whole point of Locke's Second treatise P5
284 Appeal pp. 206-208. See also C. Parkin, The moral basis of Burke's political thought (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1956) p. 31. A good example of the connection that, Burke 
claimed, was recognized even by revolutionaries, between the hierarchical order of family 
and society, is his mention of the Foxites' opposing primogeniture (of landed inheritance). 
They held it to be "a law against every law of nature", creating injustice in the family -  but 
the result they expected from annulling it was a political one, saying: "Establish family 
justice, and aristocracy falls" [this is from Paine]. Appeal p. 189.
285 Appeal pp. 206-208, Reflections p. 116.
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It is instructive to see how, parallel to this idea of the syntony of political and 
familial obligations, Locke (and Hobbes) proposed a fundamental agreement 
between the nature of political and familial relations, but one that was 
completely opposed to Burke's. Locke's Two treatises was an attempt to refute 
absolutist claims (the most famous of which, in Filmer's Patriarcha, prompted 
Locke to pen the work) that political authority originated in familial (that is 
paternal) authority, which was to be identified with the monarchy. Locke 
(and Hobbes) denied such origins of political authority, and claimed that even 
familial relations were based on a rational consent. For Locke, the power of 
parents over children sprang only from the incapability of the under-aged to 
take care of themselves. This power, being necessary only because of the 
dependence of infants on parental care, was a trust that ended when the child 
reached adulthood. It was a relationship that had nothing to do with physical 
or affective bonds. It meant that no man could bind his children or posterity 
in any way, for once the child once became an adult he had the freedom to 
decide on his own about every matter, and adults had no duties towards their 
parents. It was the same in the political as in the familial sphere, as, for Locke, 
consent was the basis for all authority.286
The fundamental principle of Burke's theory of sovereignty, was that the 
obligation of the individual to his political society existed "independently of 
our will". This obligation followed from Burke's contention that society 
preceded men, so that every individual was bound to the collective which had 
created him. This was also extendable to immigrants, who could be said to be 
adopted by political society, by their immediate enjoyment of its laws, 
culture, economy and so on. It was a transaction in which men living in a 
political society had already received the goods, the benefits of social life they
286 G.J. Schochet, Patriarchalism in political thought (Oxford, Blackwell, 1975) pp. 226-239,245- 
263. Hobbes too accepted familial, or rather paternal, authority (even in the state of nature), 
but held that this derived from the consent (or assumed consent) of the child.
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were enjoying, and so were bound to pay the costs, their obligations towards
that society. Burke argued that in practice, men submitted to "antient and
prescriptive" governments, "not because they have chosen them, but because
they are bom  to them". He emphasized that obligations to society were also
justified by their affinity with the basic moral duties that men keep, regardless
of their wishes, since "the strongest moral obligations are such as were never
the results of our option". The involuntary character of Burke's political
sovereignty was made unmistakable by his contention that even if there were
cases where the coming into political society could be shown to have initially
been a voluntary act, "its continuance is under a permanent standing
covenant, co-existing with the society; and it attaches upon every individual
of that society, without any formal act of his own". Burke's obligatory
"permanent standing covenant", immediately brings to mind the "free
covenant" based on consent, which he had condemned so forcefully as
spurious. Especially in the Appeal Re cast the two as opposites, proposing that
[njeither the few nor the many have a right to act merely by their 
will, in any matter connected with duty, trust, engagement, or 
obligation. The constitution of a country being once settled upon 
some compact, tad t or expressed, there is no power existing of 
force to alter it, without the breach of the covenant, or the consent 
of all the parties. Such is the nature of a contract.287
The contrast between his obligatory and unchangeable "covenant", and the 
derivative and instrumental meaning of the term he ascribed to the "modem" 
theories of popular sovereignty could not be starker. He denied that a right to 
frame the commonwealth at will existed, in the "few" or the "many" and 
denied any legitimacy for such a will effecting changes in the constitution 
except by unanimity. Burke stressed that his claim that contracts were un- 
rescindable was not only a matter of logical or terminological consistency, but
287 Appeal pp. 200-202, 204-206; Observations pp. 438-439,
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also one of utilitarian and moral significance to society. The keeping of
contracts, whether one liked them or not, was the one fundamental rule
without which any other rules cannot exist.
The people are not to be taught to think lightly of their 
engagements to their governors; else they teach governors to think 
lightly of their engagements towards them. In that kind of game in 
the end the people are sure to be losers. To flatter them into a 
contempt of faith, truth, and justice, is to ruin them; for in these 
virtues consists their whole safety. To flatter any man or any party 
of mankind, in any description, by asserting, that in engagements 
he or they are free whilst any other hum an creature is bound, is 
ultimately to vest the rule of morality in the pleasure of those who 
ought to be rigidly submitted to it; to subject the sovereign reason 
of the world to the caprices of weak and giddy men.
For Burke, the term "contract" implied a non-rescindable obligation of all 
those comprised in it. Any attempt to breach the social contract created not 
only an intellectual problem but a political and moral one too, because all 
engagements were then cast as similarly open to challenge. His emphasis on 
the falsehood of the claim that governors were bound while the people were 
not, strongly suggested that the culprit was Locke's idea of trust.288 
Burke's obligatory covenant was his version of the contractual basis at the 
source of authority in the state. He described this idea in the Reflections, (while 
discussing the source of authority for the settlement of monarchical 
succession) as "emanating from the common agreement and original compact 
of the state, communi sponsione reipublicae" -  the common engagement of the 
state -  and its laws are binding on King and people as long as "they continue 
the same body politic". He returned to it in the Appeal when he remarked that
288 Appeal pp. 212, 200-202. Compare to ST sec. 95. Burke suggested that the fundamental 
political safety for the people lay in keeping obligations, even ones they did not like. If this 
was not done then the strong few were the only ones who stood to gain, because without a 
general keeping of engagements binding them, they could (and would) do as they wished  
with the weak. According to his view, the rules of society were made in order to give the 
weak some protection from those stronger than them.
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the "covenant" and form in which a particular political society was cast, were 
made "by common agreement". The principle was that men living within the 
framework of such an "original compact" and "covenant" bore "a virtual 
obligation as binding as any that is actual". This idea, with its stress on 
"virtual obligation" stemming from the management of affairs by a 
benevolent agency, appears to be connected to the political argument deriving 
from the concept of "quasi-contract" (originally "ex quasi contractu", linked 
to the wider concept of "negotiorum gestio"). This derived from civil (Roman) 
law, but established in British political discourse as an important idea by 
Josiah Tucker's anti-Locke Treatise of 1781. Unfortunately, the extent to which 
Burke was indebted to civil law or to Tucker (if at all) in developing his idea 
of political obligation has not yet been addressed by scholarship.289 
It can be said that the character of obligation in Burke's political society, the 
source of authority, was hereditary. It was hereditary because men inherited 
their duties and rights, as well as the whole of their political system, rather 
than choosing it. Burke viewed this principle of inheritance not merely as a 
factual aspect of present politics, but also as a feature that should be 
understood and cultivated. The need for such an attitude arose from the very 
nature of political society as an idea. Since "commonwealths" were "the 
arbitrary productions of the human mind", changes "in the constitution of the 
human mind" could have great effects on the state, indeed could destroy it. 
His antidote to transient intellectual fashions and hazardous opinions was the 
acceptance of the political role of inherited ideas. He stressed that
a nation is not an idea only of local extent, and individual
momentary aggregation, but it is an idea of continuity, which
289 Reflections pp. 105-106; Appeal pp. 210-211, 204-206. See also Sheriffs p. 315, for Burke's 1777 
description of the relationship between "the general sense of the community" and the 
legislature. The phrase, “communi sponsione reipublicae", has not been traced to ancient sources 
-  it might have been created by Burke. Pocock translates it as "the common volition of the 
commonwealth" -  see Pocock Reflections p. 220. About "quasi-contract" see OED vol. XII pp. 
1002-1003. See also Tucker Treatise pp. 141-146.
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extends in time as well as in numbers, and in space; And this is a 
choice not only of one day, or one set of people, not a tumultuary 
or giddy choice; it is a deliberate election of ages and of 
generations.
This was his justification for "prescription of government". He rejected claims 
according to which such a political system was "formed upon blind 
unmeaning prejudices". He argued instead that inheritance as prescription 
was the only method of injecting deliberation and wisdom into the inevitably 
complex endeavor that is politics. Inherited prescriptions embodied real 
reasons, even if men were unable to discern them at a certain times. He 
maintained that
man is a most unwise, and a most wise, being. The individual is 
foolish. The multitude, for the moment, is foolish, when they act 
without deliberation; but the species is wise, and when time is 
given to it, as a species it almost always acts right.290
In such a hereditary political society rights too effectively became obligations, 
since the individual who inherited them was bound to preserve and transmit 
them "in the same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and 
our lives". Accordingly, Burke praised the men of 1688 for understanding that 
English liberties could be perpetuated and preserved "sacred" only as 
"hereditary right", since from Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right,
English liberties were all asserted as entailed inheritance, as an estate, without 
any reference to general or prior rights. The English thus had had "an 
inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage; and an house of commons and a 
people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties, from a long line of 
ancestors". The implication was clearly that in a hereditary political society,
290 Regicide I p. 188; Representation pp. 96-97. In the latter text he further expanded on this idea 
remarking that "a Constitution made by what is ten thousand times better than choice, it is 
made by the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil, and 
social habitudes of the people, which disclose themselves only in a long space of time".
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duties and rights were a kind of possession, almost a property. The "idea of 
inheritance" furnished for Burke the principle by which such property was 
retained through the generations, without excluding additions to it, which 
"proceeding on these maxims, are locked fast in a sort of family settlement". 
But even more pertinent than the analogy of the family in this context, was for 
him that of the corporation. He described political improvements in such a 
political system as "grasped as in a kind of mortmain for ever". Mortmain 
(literally -  dead hand), was a legal term describing land holdings which were 
made inalienable because owned by a corporation. To him political society 
was such a corporation, formed as "a permanent body composed of transitory 
parts".291
Having established the character of Burke's "body corporate of the kingdom",
it is now left to see what "organ it is that shall declare the corporate mind",
and by what process. What were, the principles upon which the practice of
sovereignty was to be executed in his view of political society? The decisive
and most particular element of Burke's sovereignty was the role ascribed in it
to custom. I have already pointed out that he held each political society to be
established and defined by its own particular "covenant". Burke nevertheless
held that there was one constant to which all political societies had to give
heed, and that was the central role of custom. It was in great measure by that
society's political traditions, its customs, that the principles of such a covenant
were to be discerned. This was articulated most clearly by Burke when he
wrote that he has made
what the antients call mos majorum, not indeed his sole, but 
certainly his principal rule of policy, to guide his judgement in 
whatever regards our laws. Uniformity and analogy can be 
preserved in them by this process only.
291 Reflections pp. 110,119-120. For a discussion of these ideas, see Pocock Reflections pp. 211- 
212. For "mortmain" see OED vol. IX p. 1106.
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Meaning ancestral custom, "mos majorum", which also originated in Roman 
law, was regarded by Roman writers as the source for many of their laws, 
while also implying that there was a moral element inherent in established 
customs. Accordingly, Burke added that when this point was fixed, 
speculations could swing in all directions "without publick detriment, 
because they will ride with sure anchorage".292
Burke's support of, and reliance on, custom and experience in politics is a 
commonplace, and has certainly been attested to on innumerable occasions. 
However, there is a significant aspect of this issue that has not as yet been 
adequately understood. Studies of Burke's ideas stress one aspect of the 
importance he ascribed to the political effect of established custom, that of 
accumulated experience. This might be called the empirical function of 
custom, and it certainly formed part of Burke's justification for its role in 
politics. But for him this was not the essence of custom's role in politics. 
Furthermore, this essence was also not embodied in the assumption of 
wisdom on part of past generations of lawgivers.293
The important aspect of Burke's idea of political custom, that has not yet been 
sufficiently acknowledged and understood by scholars, is that custom or 
convention was for him an actual component of the political sovereign. 
Moreover, it was not an insignificant component, but the actual holder of the 
greater part of sovereignty. In other words, custom for Burke was far more 
than a prudential practice of accumulated experience, and was, in fact, the 
holder of the main share of actual sovereignty in the state. This consequence 
followed from the fact that the source of all authority in Burke's political
292 Appeal pp. 163-165, 213.
293 For Burke stressing the importance of both accumulated experience and the wisdom of 
past generations as important benefits of the British constitution see Appeal pp. 264-266. M. 
Freeman is a modem scholar who puts the emphasis on these aspects, writing that Burke 
viewed tradition as representing the historical accumulation of wisdom, so that on the whole 
"the later, the better". See M. Freeman, Edmund Burke and the critique of political radicalism 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1980) pp. 98-104.
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society, the "sure anchorage" for all deliberations was its "original 
contract".294
The original contract might be said to be the real sovereign, as long as the 
state existed, since its fundamental principles could not be overcome, and all 
were subject to them. More so, since the individuals in the state were made by 
it and to it. As seen above, Burke opposed abstract speculations about the 
nature of the state, but he also rejected the originalist approach to the "ancient 
constitution". Thus, the only means by which the principles and rules of the 
contract were to be discerned was the agency of custom. By this agency, 
custom produced a real and decisive authority in political society. Burke 
asserted that exactly such a role was fulfilled by custom in 1688, when the 
Declaration of Right observed "the traditionary language, along with the 
traditionary policy of the nation". In this sense, as a reiteration of the 
customary political principles of the state, the Declaration was for him an 
"immortal law".295
The political result of such an approach was, for Burke, that
[wjhere the great interests of mankind are concerned through a 
long succession of generations, that succession ought to be 
admitted into some share in the councils which are so deeply to 
affect them. If justice requires this, the work itself requires the aid 
of more minds than one age can furnish.
294 Burke's use of the term "original contract" in his discussion of sovereignty seems 
calculated to oppose the particular and unrescindable contract of each society to the 
"modem" notion of an abstract social contract. The term "original contract" used by the 
Commons to describe the basis for the English polity: "That king James the Second, having 
endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of the Kingdom, by breaking the Original Contract 
between king and people, and, by the advice of Jesuits, and other wicked persons, having 
violated the fundamental Laws, and having withdrawn himself out of this Kingdom, has 
abdicated the Government, and that the Throne is thereby become vacant". But the Lords did 
not agree to the wording, and it was absent from the final declaration of parliament. See PH 
vol. V p. 50.
295 Reflections pp. 103-104.
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In other words, custom, the "succession of generations", ought to have a 
share in the political "councils".296
Burke explicitly stated that the political "PEOPLE", acting within its 
traditional framework, had a real title to sovereignty, "that perhaps equals, 
and ought always to guide the sovereignty of convention". What Burke was 
saying then was that even within the confines of the traditional political 
structure, the political nation did not hold supreme sovereignty. Instead his 
sovereignty was a compound of the political nation and of convention. 
Moreover, the division of sovereignty between these two was such that even 
when the "people" deliberated to act together in harmonious agreement, its 
quantum of that sovereignty only "perhaps equals" that of convention. This 
meant that not only when there were disagreements within the political 
system, no prominent component of it (like the King or the Commons) had 
sufficient sovereignty to legitimately deliberate; but that even when all 
components agreed on a political course, there remained an essential power 
of veto of custom, which prevented certain types of decisions that could affect 
the principles of that civil society. When it is considered that in Burke's view 
the political "people" were in many of their aspects defined and directed by 
custom, it appears that in fact custom always held more than half of 
sovereignty. The only significant power of the political nation in this respect 
was the title it had (and only when in general agreement) to "guide" the 
sovereignty of convention.297
296 Reflections p. 282. Burke described the establishment of this principle in government "a 
power like that which some of the philosophers have called a plastic nature" left to operate in 
the constitution.
297 Appeal pp. 217-219. In Reflections p. 192, Burke expressed the same idea when he declared 
the current generation in a state to be "the temporary possessors and life-renters in it", that 
should not dare to "act as if they were the entire masters" and "teaching these successors as 
little to respect their contrivances as they had themselves respected the institutions of their 
forefathers". See also see also Pocock Ancient pp. 182,188, 229-232. This position by Burke is 
in agreement with the view of sovereignty presented in a manuscript from 1788-1789,
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Burke was not unaware that such a role for custom presented several 
problems. Among the various objections that might be raised against such a 
view of sovereignty, probably foremost was that of a possible inability of 
custom to cope with changing circumstances. I believe that Burke attempted 
to answer this problem by a combination of appeals to public virtue in 
extraordinary circumstances, but primarily by an emphasis on the 
conservation of old and even apparently obsolete parts of the customary 
constitution, which could be revived and shaped into a new role. Such was 
the case with the constitutional instrument of Impeachment which Burke had 
a principal role in reviving after a long hiatus by the proceeding against 
Warren Hastings; and such was the case with the Convocation of Clergy, 
which Burke hinted, might be revived one day, if the need arose.298 
The peculiarity of Burke's idea of sovereignty, what he termed as "the 
beautiful order", may be reduced if it is examined in the context of being a 
corporation. The foundation of sovereignty in this corporation, the source for 
all legitimate acts of political power, was the original contract of every 
political society. This contract, creating and defining civil society, was the 
charter of the corporation, defining the basic principles to which all the 
legitimate political acts within the corporation -  executive, legislative, judicial 
-  had to conform. Custom was the regulation of the charter by way of which 
the basic principles were relayed and transmitted through the generations 
while conforming to changing historical circumstances. The generation of 
those living in the state at a certain time was the current membership; its 
government, the current executive body of the corporation. Bound by the 
basic principles and trustee for past and future generations, such a
attributed by some to Burke, and entitled "The voice of reason". See discussion in Canavan 
Reason pp. 212-214.
298 Elliot pp. 39-42; Sheriffs p. 316. Impeachment had been last employed in 1746, but Burke 
long considered it an important constitutional instrument, and had contemplated its revival 
at least since 1780. See P.J. Marshall's"Introduction" in WS vol. VI pp. 2-3.
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government had only the permission to guide it through contemporary 
circumstances, in order to preserve the corporation according to its principles. 
Since, for Burke, civil society was a corporation comprising all past and 
present (and future) generations, he held them all to have a share in its 
sovereignty. His sovereign was thus the historical, corporate people. Or, in 
Burke's own words: "Corporate bodies are immortal..." and "Nations 
themselves are such corporations".299
A reconsideration of current scholarship on Burke's idea of sovereignty is 
now possible. The views expressed by scholars such as O'Gorman, Dickinson, 
and Conniff, according to which Burke's sovereign in Britain was the "King- 
in-Parliament" are incorrect. He held this body to guide the sovereign 
decisions of the state, but only as an agent of the corporate people, being 
bound to the political principles of the original compact as expressed by 
political conventions. Thus, according to Burke, the King-in-Parliament could 
not, for example, legitimately decree an abolition of the House of Lords -  
even if the Lords had assented to this.300
Dreyer's claim of basic incoherence in Burke's discussion of the state and its 
sovereignty, is a serious one, for it addresses his alternative use of three -  
apparently inconsistent -  identities in this discussion, "agency", "trust" and 
"corporation": in the first government is the agent of the people, in the second 
the trustee for the people, in the third the corporation of the people. But these
299 Appeal pp. 218-219; Reflections p. 247. It is interesting to note in this context, that in his long 
involvement with the affairs of the East India Company, Burke was indeed dealing with a 
corporation that had become, in the sub-continent, something very much akin to a state. The 
arguments and concerns he developed while treating this concrete situation may have aided 
the theoretical framework he presented here.
300 Burke asserted that the various components of the political structure could not renounce 
their share of authority, since all were bound to keep "public faith". If this principle was not 
kept, he warned, their "competence and power would soon be confounded" and the only law 
left would be "the will of a prevailing force". See Reflections p. 105. This was also the 
justification Burke gave for rejecting the legitimacy of the French National Assembly, as it 
had unconstitutionally changed the principles on which it was originally constituted and 
assembled as the States General. See Appeal pp. 230-234..
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inconsistencies are only apparent, if the characteristics of Burke's corporation 
of political society are taken into account. If sovereignty is placed in the 
historical people, then government as the directive body of that corporation is 
both the agent for the current members of the corporation (which can express 
their wishes and interests), and the trustee for those of the members (past and 
future generations) that cannot actively represent their interests.
Strauss' indication that "convention", "original compact" and "established 
constitution" are identical, is to a great degree correct, though he does not 
elucidate the point adequately, but the main problem with his view is that he 
tends to obscure the significant share of sovereignty held by current political 
institutions, and their leading role in directing the practice of that sovereignty. 
In the case of Stanlis' treatment of the subject, his rather description of a 
concept of political sovereignty "based on Natural Law" and on reverence for 
"the corporate character of the people" does not describe or explain the actual 
place and function of sovereignty in Burke's thought.
Pocock's description of Burke's view as "prescriptive" (as opposed to 
"ancient") constitutionalism appears to me incorrect. Pocock correctly stresses 
the adaptive aspects of Burke's idea of constitution, without however 
granting enough importance to the implications of the sovereignty of the 
original principles. His interpretation makes Burke's constitutional view 
much more functionalist and even relativist, than is warranted by the 
considerable constraints established by Burke's adherence to the original 
principles, on the possible direction such a constitution might take in its 
development through the years. Pocock claims that Burke held that "an 
immemorial constitution is not based upon any original principles", being 
only prescriptive. But Burke, it will be remembered, stressed the danger of 
"meddling with the fundamental principles and ancient tried usages" of the 
constitution. Clearly he held that although the "sole authority" of the 
constitution was prescriptive, some "principles" existed in it. That is, for
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Burke the constitution did not draw authority from its principles, but from its 
own existence and function over time. Burke's view was closer to the ancient 
constitution tradition than Pocock's "prescriptive" title concedes. Burke 
believed there was an ancient constitution, but held that only its general 
principles were immutable; he believed in the constitution as a developing 
whole, but put limits to this development since it could not outgrow the 
original principles. His concept of constitution might be described as 
immutable in its principles, and adaptive (to a degree) in its forms.301 
Strauss, Dreyer, Stanlis and Pocock, while closer in their interpretations of 
Burke's theory of sovereignty than other scholars, and correctly identifying 
some of its aspects, do not present an adequate picture of the components and 
the whole of this theory. Hence, no there is not yet to be found a definition 
that satisfactorily describes the complete characteristics and implications of 
Burke's concept of sovereignty, with the peculiar role assigned in it to the 
sovereignty of custom.
(iii) The "recovery of that antient constitution": Burke's sovereignty applied
- It is now possible to proceed to a discussion of how Burke related his theory 
of sovereignty to actual cases of particular polities and constitutions. Apart 
from a few general moral principles, which, he believed, were upheld by 
religious establishments, in virtually all traditional states, Burke held political 
societies to be accountable primarily to their own rules. The premise of the 
polity as being to a great measure defined by its original constitution, and 
irrevocably bound to it, resulted in a concept that might be termed hereditary 
constitutionalism. Burke clearly set such a concept of a constitution against 
that held by "modem" political theories. He stressed the fundamental 
difference between a concept of constitution as a binding and irrevocable 
statement of principles, and one where a constitution was in effect a set of
301 Representation pp. 93-94; Pocock Politics pp. 228-229.
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procedural rules, changeable at will by decision of the current population of 
the state. His constitution was in effect the extension and articulation of the 
original social contract and its customary practice, while the other concept's 
subjection of what it terms "constitution" to the sovereignty of popular will 
necessarily established it, in Burke's opinion, as inherently anti- 
constitutional.302
Quite naturally, Burke's most extensive and recurrent treatment of this issue 
regarded the British constitution. He claimed that the general concept of 
political sovereignty he advocated was the same one expressed by the 
particular British constitution and by the "old" Whig tradition of government. 
In virtually all of Burke's works touching on the British constitution he 
treated what he saw as potentially fatal attempts to impose on it the "new", 
"speculative" or "French" constitutional principles. For Burke the real 
problem with Foxites, declaring as Fox himself did in 1791 that "the new 
constitution of France" was "the most stupendous and glorious edifice of 
liberty, which had been erected on the foundation of human integrity in any 
time or country", was that they claimed that such constitution was erected on 
the principles inherent in the British constitution. Burke vehemently denied 
this, claiming that "the French constitution was the exact opposite of the 
English in every thing, and nothing could be so dangerous as to set it up to 
the view of the English, to mislead and debauch their minds". To him that 
was precisely the object of the "modem" Whigs, subversion "of the whole 
constitution of this kingdom", in order to replace it with their new notions 
and "m odem  usages".303
302 See Burke's characterization of the theory of the will of the people as an "unconstitutional 
doctrine" in Reflections pp. 110-111. See also p. 184. Though he was referring to the British 
constitution here, it is obvious he thought such a doctrine was unconstitutional in every state 
that was not revolutionary France.
303 Quebec pp. 2-3, 20-21; Appeal pp. 82-83.
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Undoubtedly, the most extensive treatment of the matter was in the Appeal,
where, relying mainly on quotes from the 1710 impeachment trial of Dr.
Henry Sacheverell, Burke strove to show his concept of political sovereignty
was the same one as upheld the managers of the impeachment, commonly
accepted in Burke's time as representatives of the mainstream Whig tradition
of government. He presented the constitutional doctrine of the "antient
whigs" as postulating that there was an "original contract, implied and
expressed in the constitution of this country, as a scheme of government
fundamentally and inviolably fixed in king, Lords, and Commons"; that the
"nature of such an original contract of government proves, that there is not
only a power in the people, who have inherited this freedom, to assert their own
title to it; but they are bound in duty to transmit the same constitution to their
posterity also"; and that 1688 should not be confused with
any loose general doctrines of a right in the individual, or even in 
the people, to undertake for themselves, on any prevalent 
temporary opinions of convenience or improvement, any 
fundamental change in the constitution, or to fabricate a new 
government for themselves, and thereby to disturb the publick 
peace, and to unsettle the antient constitution of the kingdom.
In short, he claimed that the "antient whigs" believed, as he professed to, in 
an obligatory and hereditary constitution, bound by the principles of the 
original contract, in which there was no individual or popular right of a 
present generation to change it fundamentally. To the Lockean claims that 
1688 indicated there were circumstances (such as James ITs abuse of royal 
authority) which sanctioned a right to effect fundamental changes in the 
constitution, or to fabricate a new one, Burke answered that the "antient 
whigs" explicitly rejected any notion of "licentious resistance; as if subjects 
were left to their good-will and pleasure, when they are to obey, and when to 
resist". Indeed, the only circumstance in which resistance was sanctioned, was 
when defensive revolution was "the only means left for the recovery of that
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antient constitution, formed by the original contract of the British state", and for 
its future preservation. In other words, even when called "revolution", the 
only justification for resistance was in order for it to effect a restoration.304 
It is hard to see how these passages presented by Burke, could be understood 
other than as a complete (and rather explicit) rejection of "modem" and 
especially Lockean claims of a sovereign right in the individual or in the 
people to fashion government according to will -  particularly in 
revolutionary circumstances -  and of the interpretation of 1688 as an example 
of this right. Instead he articulated his general concept of sovereignty as that 
of the Whig tradition of government, averring that the old Whigs opposed the 
concept of a "moral or civil competence" in the people to alter fundamentally, 
or set up any "new form" of, government -  insisting that they held instead 
that the competence for any changes in government (like regulating the 
succession to the crown) lay with the whole of the "body corporate of the 
kingdom", as directed by the King-in-Parliament.305
It is instructive to see that Burke believed the same principles to be relevant 
not only to the British case, but also to the apparently different American 
constitution. The American constitution had, since its institution been used by 
radicals as an eminent example of their political theories. Burke did not 
subscribe to such views and held the American constitution to be the best 
possible adaptation of the principles underpinning the British constitution to 
the new continent. He saw it as an attempt by the Americans to fulfill the 
wish that had been once confided to him by Benjamin Franklin: to preserve 
even in independence "a security to its antient condition". Burke believed that 
the Americans had inherited many features of the British system so that, 
together with the adjustments and adaptations necessary to local 
circumstances, a different version of the same original covenant had been
304 Appeal pp. 148,151-152,179-181.
3°5 Appeal pp. 163-164.
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incubated and eventually enabled to stand on its feet. The American character 
had inherited some "old English good nature", and had a political 
"republican education" when their internal republican government grew 
under the protective shadow of the British monarchy. At the time of their 
struggle for independence, Burke stressed the importance of their tradition of 
religious dissent in their upholding of freedom. But during this struggle they 
had also learned "order, submission to command, and a regard for great 
men", all elements of republican political virtue that the Americans were 
bound to need in the future, since by their circumstances they lacked 
aristocratic or monarchic "material". Finally, for Burke, the American success 
was founded on their having resisted the democratic temptation, and instead 
of setting up "the absurdity, that the nation should govern the nation", 
formed their government "as nearly as they could, according to the model of 
the British constitution".306
A further example of Burke putting into practice his constitutional principles 
was the position he took in the House of Commons debates about the 
preferred constitution for Canada, recently created out of the amalgamation 
of the province of Quebec, acquired from France in the Seven Years War, with 
those North American territories remaining under British rule after the 
independence of the thirteen colonies. There was a strong argument for 
creating a completely new constitution for the province, and a number of 
speakers in the debate proposed to do so. Burke opposed such proposals, 
regarding them as a "new French" style (that is to say, based on the principle 
of popular sovereignty) constitution for Canada. He attempted to find some 
compound of different constitutional and legal arrangements, including 
elements from the British constitution (for the British Canadians), from the
306 Appeal pp. 121-122; Quebec pp. 7-8. Burke described the American rebellion as their version 
of 1688, when "purely on the defensive" against a government that wished to break up the 
original contract, they restored their traditional laws and liberties. See Appeal pp. 122-123.
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old, pre-revolutionary French constitution (for the Quebecois), and from "the 
law of nations" (for the authority of British government). This was because he 
thought the elements from traditional constitutional and legal systems, albeit 
dissimilar, shared common principles and traits, so that they could gradually 
assimilate with each other. This could not happen with the principles of the 
revolutionary French constitution, which "founded on principles 
diametrically opposed" to the British constitution, could not assimilate to it in 
anything.307
The same approach also characterized Burke's attitude to the constitutional 
setting of revolutionary France. He held that the problem with the new 
French constitution were not only that its principles were the opposite of 
Britain's constitution, but that it also contrasted with the principles of all 
constitutions. The revolutionary government was merely the ruler over the 
current population of the country. Those who in terms of both ideas and 
personal identification remained the true bearers of France's ancient and 
sovereign constitution were the exiled members of the traditional political 
establishment. Therefore, he declared the French exiles to be the true "body 
politick" of France. With them in exile resided true France, while within the 
physical borders of the country there was only an usurpation.308
307 Quebec pp. 6-8.
308 Remarks pp. 457, 465-468; Appeal pp. 217-218.
Conclusion
Part I of this research has established that the treatment of John Locke's ideas 
was a prominent aspect of the constitutional debate of the 1790s. The 
employment of Locke's name and ideas was a central theme of the debate, 
especially so among radicals. Clearly, the importance of the Lockean 
inheritance stemmed from its significance to interpretations of 1688 and to the 
English political tradition. Almost all of the important radical texts explicitly 
touched on Locke and his ideas, doing so in order to dispute Burke's 
arguments about the nature of the English political tradition and of 
Whiggism. Regardless of the considerably different political outcomes they 
were proposing, moderate and extremist radical writers alike attempted to 
base their claims on Locke's authority. On the loyalist side, the picture was 
more diverse, but still Locke and his ideas were an important element of the 
discussion, with virtually all those who touched on them pointing to a 
dichotomy between Locke's political ideas and those of Burke.309 
Burke's prominence within the debate of the 1790s made the argument over 
his views central to participants' understanding of the Lockean inheritance. 
The essential unanimity among radicals and loyalists about the fundamental 
opposition between Locke's and Burke's political ideas meant for the writers 
of the 1790s that only one of the two interpretations offered by these two, for 
1688 and the English political tradition, could be true. The salient features of 
these contrasting interpretations can be illustrated by way of the four terms 
that have been identified as central to the 1790s discussion of the Lockean 
inheritance. According to the view ascribed to Locke, "contract" denoted only 
the social agreement between individuals creating the community; "trust"
309 For various radical attitudes to Locke, and the eventual retreat of many moderate 
reformers from Lockean arguments because of the radical political implications of these, see 
in Hampsher-Monk "Thelwall" pp. 10-11, and Claeys "French" p. 78.
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described the relations between a people and its rulers (which thus was not a 
contract); "consent" was regarded as stemming from individuals and decided 
in the majority; natural rights were described as indefeasible. According to 
the view ascribed to Burke, "contract" was an inextricable socio-political 
agreement, in which no part could be dissolved without destroying the 
whole; "trust" was the government's obligation towards the constitution, not 
towards popular will; "consent" was expressed through established 
institutions, and was not an inherent political faculty of the individual or even 
of the majority; natural rights were transformed by the social setting.
In addition to a general conflict between the ideas of Burke and Locke being 
perceived by the writers of the 1790s, two additional features point to the 
intensity that was ascribed to the conflict. The first is that the most 
intellectually substantial and systematic rejections of Locke's ideas were 
offered by loyalist authors like Tatham, Francklyn, Samuel Cooper and 
Bowles, who explicitly identified themselves with Burke's ideas; and, in 
Bowles' case at least, one that had received Burke's endorsement for some of 
his political writings. The second is that a small number of texts, both radical 
and loyalist, identified the essence of Burke's outlook in one particularly anti- 
Lockean idea, which can be rendered as an inter-generational political 
commitment. Christie, upholding every generation's "right to judge for 
themselves", rejected Burke's attempt to bind posterity by "unalterable laws" 
as unjust and impracticable. Cusack Smith defended Burke's attempt by 
observing that "[t]he very names by which we designate nations, as Greeks, 
Romans, & c. imply a unity of existence carried through successive and 
connected generations". Thus such writers seized on this issue as crucial 
political point, recognizing that, if accepted, it denied the Lockean 
interpretation of terms like trust, contract, rights and most important of all, 
consent. In other words, they identified as the crux of the matter, the existence 
of an established collective identity. If every generation was regarded as
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completely sovereign, there was hardly an English people or history; if a 
collective political identity was accepted, this limited by definition the 
sovereignty of the individual and of his rights.310
Part II of the research has established that Burke's attitude to Locke and his 
ideas was unfavorable. While Burke explicitly expressed public regard for 
Locke's reputation (mainly as the author of the Essay), he criticized many of 
the latter's ideas on human understanding and on education, as well as his 
writing style. Burke was also repeatedly and sometimes harshly censorious of 
Locke's political ideas. Burke never made a wholly favorable comment about 
Locke's political theory, and always added caveats to any positive expression 
about any of the latter's political ideas. Several of Burke's most important 
works, particularly the Reflections and the Appeal, contained sustained attacks 
on the fundamental assumptions of Locke's political theory. In two other 
works, the Representation and the Observations (to a lesser degree) Burke 
directly rejected the political principles which the parliamentary speakers to 
whom he was responding had ascribed to Locke's authority. Burke explicitly 
opposed his own (and, he maintained, Britain's traditional) constitutional 
view of the polity as a "politick or corporate personality", to the approach 
characterized by him as a "juridical" or "natural rights" ideology, that was 
not only distinctly Lockean, but in the context of the parliamentary debates 
addressed, clearly Locke's.
Regarding Burke's political ideas, this research has illustrated their anti- 
Lockean import. This im port stemmed to a great degree from his view of 
opinion as "the very ground and pillar of Government, and the main spring 
of hum an action". Burke's view of the political role of opinion shaped his 
whole approach to political thought. It emphasized that the foundation of 
political authority was "in the constitution of the human mind"; it justified
310 Christie Letters p. 163; [Cusak Smith] Rights p. 246.
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the establishment of opinions by "artificial institutions"; it demonstrated that 
by the unstable and uncertain nature of opinion, true political theory had to 
accept itself as intrinsically limited and imperfect; it explained the essential 
fault of the searching into the origins of the commonwealth explicitly stated 
by the sub-title to Locke's Second treatise: an essay concerning the true original, 
extent, and end of civil government. The structure of political society was 
described by Burke as consisting of opinions propping up political authority. 
If authority was not to resort to brute force, these opinions had to be 
instituted and protected. Establishing opinions, in the form of an established 
religion, an established aristocracy and so on, made the props supporting 
authority more solid. Virtue could carry out this function for some time, but 
in a large and complex state, the best long-term guardian of the political 
system was an aristocracy based on property.
Finally, this research gave Burke's idea of sovereignty particular 
consideration. It established that Burke's arguments on the nature of 
sovereignty refuted the Lockean definitions of "people" "trust" and 
"contract", and (after having identified it as the only true foundation for 
theories of popular sovereignty) went on to show that Lockean "consent" too 
was politically unfeasible, since majority rule was not a "law of original 
nature", but rather one of the "most violent fictions of positive law" ever 
made on the "principles of artificial incorporation". This latter term, "artificial 
incorporation", was shown to be, for Burke, the true framework of political 
society. In the artificial idea of people -  corporation as opinion -  Burke found 
both the origin and the function of political sovereignty. Men were obliged to 
abide by the rules of their traditional constitution by their having being bom 
into, and "made" by, it. Any other approach would advance the demise of 
that political society. Political custom or convention, the accumulated mles of 
political society, were for Burke an actual component of the political 
sovereign. Political custom was the expression of civil society as a corporation
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comprising all past and present (and future) generations, so that his 
sovereign, might have been said to be the historical corporate people -  as he 
stated in his actual discussion of various constitutions.
An attempt can be now made to answer the question posed in the 
introduction to this dissertation. What was the relationship between the 
political ideas of Edmund Burke and the political ideas of the Lockean 
inheritance?
I believe that the view prevalent among Burke's contemporaries, which saw 
his political ideas as an alternative to those of Locke, was correct. Moreover, 
those among them who regarded Burke's principle of inter-generational 
commitment as the decisive element of his anti-Lockeanism, identified the 
significance of the issue of sovereignty in his political thought. Both the 
review of Burke's treatment of Locke and his political ideas, and that of 
Burke's own political outlook have corroborated the perception of his 
contemporaries. Burke's political thought should therefore be viewed as a 
refutation of the Lockean inheritance and of John Locke's political ideas. 
Throughout his career, and, particularly, in his later years, he was consciously 
upholding the traditional constitution of a political society as an indissoluble 
compact, in the face of an avowedly Lockean radicalism. For Burke the ideas 
of Locke endangered the "politick personality" without which political 
society could not survive and would eventually turn into the rule of force.
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